Debt Capital Markets interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

45

Firms

26

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsTSTruist Securities5PIMCO4TD Securities4Apollo Global Management3Nomura3Scotiabank3Bain Capital2Houlihan Lokey2Mizuho2Neuberger Berman2Oaktree Capital Management2RCRBC Capital Markets2Carlyle Group1Deutsche Bank1Golub Capital1HPS Investment Partners1Invesco1KKR1Lazard1Moelis & Company1Moody's1Northern Trust1NUNuveen1Rothschild & Co1S&P Global1Wells Fargo Securities1

Topic

All topicsBond mechanics11Duration and convexity6Yield curve and rates5Credit spreads5Credit analysis and ratings13Credit modelling9Primary issuance9Syndication and loans10Structured credit7Covenants and documentation5Liability management5Indian debt markets7Fit8

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalBrainteaserMarket viewCaseFit

1. 022If CUSMA negotiations fall through this summer, what is the impact to the Bank of Canada?Yield curve and ratesHardtechnicalTD SecuritiesDebt Capital Markets · Toronto · 2026

   Say this

   It pulls the Bank in two directions at once, which is the whole point of the question. A trade breakdown is a large negative demand shock to Canadian growth, which argues for cuts, but tariffs and a weaker Canadian dollar push import prices up, which argues against. The Bank would likely cut and lean on the growth side, while flagging the inflation risk.

   Then walk it

   1. The growth channel is direct and large. Roughly three quarters of Canadian goods exports go to the United States, so tariffs or loss of preferential access hits manufacturing, autos and energy hard, and business investment freezes on the uncertainty alone.
   2. The inflation channel runs the other way. Tariffs raise input costs, and the loonie weakens on a worse terms-of-trade outlook, which raises the price of imported goods in Canadian dollars. That is a supply shock.
   3. A central bank facing a supply shock has to judge whether the price rise is a one-off level effect or feeds into expectations. If expectations stay anchored, you look through it and support demand. That is the Bank's stated approach.
   4. So the likely read: cuts, possibly faster than the market currently prices, with the communication emphasising that the inflation impulse is transitory and the output gap is opening.
   5. The complication is the exchange rate and the policy gap with the Fed. Cutting well below US rates weakens the loonie further, which imports more inflation. That constrains how far the Bank can go unilaterally.
   6. For a Toronto DCM desk the practical consequence: the Canadian curve steepens as the front end rallies on cuts, provincial and corporate spreads widen on the growth shock, and the new issue window for anything trade-exposed shuts.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering with one direction only. The interviewer picked this because it is a growth-versus-inflation conflict, and the mark is for identifying the trade-off and then taking a view with a reason. Also, do not guess at treaty detail you do not know — reason from trade share and the two channels.

   Expect next

   • Which channel dominates, and why?
   • What does that do to the Canadian curve?
   • How does the policy gap with the Fed constrain them?

   Reported by candidates at TD Securities (Debt Capital Markets, Toronto, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 026Which is cheaper right now, US bonds or US equities?Credit spreadsHardtechnicalPIMCODebt Capital Markets · San Diego · 2026

   Say this

   Compare them on a like-for-like yield basis: the equity risk premium against the credit risk premium. Take the S&P earnings yield minus the 10-year Treasury yield, and set that against investment grade and high yield spreads. When the equity risk premium compresses toward the credit spread, bonds are the better paid risk.

   Then walk it

   1. The bond side is observable: the 10-year Treasury yield plus the investment grade spread gives you an all-in corporate yield, and it is contractual, senior and dated.
   2. The equity side needs a proxy. Forward earnings yield, which is one over the forward P/E, minus the Treasury yield gives you a rough equity risk premium. At a 20 times forward multiple that earnings yield is 5 percent.
   3. The comparison that has mattered since 2022: when investment grade yields sit near 5 to 6 percent and the equity risk premium is compressed toward 100 basis points or below, you are being paid almost the same to sit at the top of the capital structure as at the bottom. That is historically unusual and it is the honest case for bonds.
   4. Then the qualifications, which is where the marks are. Equity earnings grow and coupons do not, so in an inflationary world equities have the better long-run real claim. And the earnings yield is a forward estimate, so it is only as good as consensus.
   5. So the answer should be a framework plus a current read plus a horizon. Something like: on today's numbers bonds look better paid on a risk-adjusted basis over three years, equities over twenty.
   6. And say what would change your mind: an inflation re-acceleration hurts the bond case directly, because you lose the real value of a fixed coupon.

   Where candidates lose it

   Picking a side with no metric. The question is testing whether you can make two asset classes comparable, so the framework matters more than the conclusion. Check the current earnings yield and IG spread level the morning of the interview, and state your figures with the date.

   Expect next

   • What is the equity risk premium right now?
   • Does that comparison hold at a 20-year horizon?
   • What would change your view?

   Reported by candidates at PIMCO (Debt Capital Markets, San Diego, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 073How do you view the long-term headwinds to broadly syndicated loan CLOs?Structured creditHardsuperdayNomuraStructured Products · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Three structural headwinds rather than cyclical ones: private credit is taking the loans that used to become CLO collateral, documentation has weakened so recoveries are likely to be worse than history suggests, and the AAA buyer base is narrow and concentrated. The arbitrage itself is also thinner than it was.

   Then walk it

   1. Collateral supply is the biggest one. Direct lending has absorbed a large share of new sponsor financings, particularly in the middle market, so net new BSL supply has been weak and CLO managers compete for the same loans. That compresses the asset spread and drives repricings.
   2. Documentation erosion: covenant-lite is now universal, EBITDA add-backs are aggressive, and unrestricted subsidiary and asset-transfer capacity is wide. The consequence is later detection of stress and worse recoveries — first lien recoveries in recent workouts have come in well below the historic 70 percent average, some in the 40s and 50s.
   3. Liability side concentration: the AAA tranche is bought by a small set of large buyers, historically Japanese banks, US insurers and money managers. A regulatory or appetite change at a handful of institutions moves AAA spreads and therefore CLO formation directly. That is a fragile funding base for a trillion-dollar market.
   4. Arbitrage compression: when the loan pool yields SOFR plus 350 and AAAs cost SOFR plus 130 to 150, equity returns work. Squeeze the asset side and widen the liability side simultaneously and new issue equity stops clearing, so formation stalls even with no credit losses.
   5. What is genuinely resilient, and worth saying so you are not one-sided: CLO structural protections have worked through two crises with no AAA principal losses, the liabilities are term-matched and non-mark-to-market, so there are no forced sellers, and the diversion triggers do their job.
   6. So my view: the structure is sound and the collateral quality and the arbitrage are the pressure points. I would watch the reported versus covenant EBITDA gap and first lien recovery rates as the leading indicators, not default rates.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering with cyclical commentary about default rates. The question says long-term headwinds, so the marks are for structural points — private credit competition, documentation erosion feeding into recoveries, and AAA buyer concentration. Also, give the other side, because a one-sided bear case on a desk that sells these is not persuasive.

   Expect next

   • What has happened to first lien recovery rates and why?
   • Who buys the AAA, and why does that concentration matter?
   • Are private credit CLOs a threat or an extension?

   Reported by candidates at Nomura (Structured Products, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 086Why is India's corporate bond market so shallow relative to its equity market?Indian debt marketsHardsuperdayIndian debt capital marketsCredit research

   Say this

   Because almost all the demand sits with a few institutions that only buy the top of the rating scale, and almost all the supply is private placements by AAA and AA financial issuers. The outstanding stock is roughly 50 to 55 lakh crore rupees, a bit under 20 percent of GDP, against well over 100 percent in the US — and the gap is a demand problem more than a supply one.

   Then walk it

   1. The demand side is the binding constraint. Insurance companies, provident and pension funds dominate, and their investment regulations push them heavily into sovereign and AA-plus or better paper. Below AA there is almost no natural buyer, so the market has a cliff rather than a curve.
   2. Banks fill that gap with loans instead. A mid-rated corporate in India borrows from a bank, not from the bond market, because the bank will take the credit risk that no bond investor will. So bank credit crowds out the lower-rated bond market.
   3. Supply is concentrated too. The large majority of issuance is private placement rather than public issues, and financial sector issuers — NBFCs, housing finance companies, banks — account for a very large share. Genuine non-financial corporate issuance is a minority of the market.
   4. Secondary liquidity is the self-reinforcing part. Buy-and-hold institutions do not trade, so turnover is thin, so new investors price in illiquidity, so fewer participate. Trading is concentrated in a handful of recent AAA lines and everything else is effectively untraded.
   5. What has actually helped: the SEBI electronic bidding platform bringing price discovery to private placements, mandatory bond financing for large borrowers, the corporate bond repo and the Bharat Bond ETFs, RBI's backstop facility for debt funds after the 2020 Franklin Templeton episode, and rising foreign participation through the index inclusion of G-secs, which frees domestic capacity.
   6. The honest diagnosis: you cannot fix this with issuer-side reform alone. Until there is a large investor base willing and permitted to take A and BBB credit risk — insurance limits, pension rules, a credit fund industry — the market stays a AAA financing venue. That is the single point worth making.

   Where candidates lose it

   Blaming it on lack of issuer awareness or on regulation generally. The specific answer is the absence of a buyer base below AA, because institutional mandates prohibit it, and the resulting crowding out by bank lending. Have one size figure for the market and a rough percentage of GDP.

   Expect next

   • What would actually fix it?
   • Why do NBFCs dominate issuance?
   • What did the Franklin Templeton episode change?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.