Equity Research interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

72

Firms

45

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMorningstar12Man Group6Balyasny Asset Management5BLBlackRock5FTFranklin Templeton5MSCI5Jefferies4CSCredit Suisse3Fidelity Investments3Moody's3Perella Weinberg Partners3Point723S&P Global3The Vanguard Group3WMWellington Management3Advent International2Apollo Global Management2Bank of America2Carlyle Group2DED.E. Shaw2Houlihan Lokey2HSBC2Piper Sandler2Sequoia Capital2SSState Street2Viking Global Investors2WBWilliam Blair2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1BMBNY Mellon1Centerview Partners1Coatue Management1Goldman Sachs1GSGuggenheim Securities1HWHarris Williams1Insight Partners1Invesco1Mizuho1Moelis & Company1MSMorgan Stanley1PIMCO1SCSchroders1Scotiabank1T. Rowe Price1TSTruist Securities1

Topic

All topicsResearch process9Stock pitch6Company analysis8Investment philosophy5Valuation14Modelling2Portfolio and risk8Macro8Sector knowledge2Accounting8Career and fit12Industry knowledge6Quantitative research1Sector: technology3Sector: consumer1Sector: healthcare1Sector: energy1Sector: financials2Sector: industrials1Case and estimation2

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitBrainteaserMarket view

1. 016Walk me through a DCF, and tell me when it is the wrong tool for a research analyst.ValuationIntermediatetechnicalJefferiesEquity Research · New York · 2026MorningstarEquity Research · Chicago · 2023

   Say this

   Forecast unlevered free cash flow, discount at WACC, add a terminal value, then bridge to equity value per share. It is the wrong tool when the terminal value dominates so completely that the answer is just your assumption restated.

   Then walk it

   1. The mechanics are the same as on the banking side: EBIT taxed, plus D&A, less CapEx, less working capital change, discounted at WACC, plus terminal value, less net debt, divided by diluted shares.
   2. Where research differs is the use. A sell-side target price is usually set on a multiple, with the DCF as a cross-check and a way to demonstrate what the market is implying.
   3. The most valuable version is the reverse DCF: hold the current price constant and solve for the growth and margin the market must be assuming. That turns valuation into a testable statement about expectations.
   4. It is the wrong tool for banks and insurers, where you use a dividend discount or residual income model because interest is revenue and free cash flow is not meaningful.
   5. It is also weak for early-stage or deeply cyclical companies, where near-term cash flows are negative or unrepresentative and 90 percent of the value sits in the terminal assumption.
   6. So the honest framing: a DCF is most useful not for the number it produces but for making explicit what you have to believe.

   Where candidates lose it

   Delivering the banking answer verbatim. On the research side the expected addition is the reverse DCF and the awareness that DCFs are rarely the primary target-setting method. Say both.

   Expect next

   • How would you value a bank then?
   • What does the reverse DCF tell you about this stock?
   • What discount rate do you use and why?

   Reported by candidates at Jefferies (Equity Research, New York, 2026); Morningstar (Equity Research, Chicago, 2023). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 045How would you value a company with no earnings?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalPiper SandlerInvestment Banking · New York · 2026Sequoia CapitalVenture Capital · San Francisco · 2021

   Say this

   Move up the income statement until you reach a line that is meaningful, then value that. Revenue multiples, gross profit multiples, or a forward-year earnings estimate discounted back to today.

   Then walk it

   1. First ask why there are no earnings. A company spending heavily on growth is completely different from one with a broken cost structure, and only the first deserves a growth valuation.
   2. For growth-stage losses: EV to revenue, or better, EV to gross profit, since gross profit strips out the differences in cost of revenue between a software company and a delivery company.
   3. Then normalise: model forward to the year the business reaches a steady-state margin, apply a mature multiple to that year's earnings, and discount back. This forces you to state when profitability arrives and what it looks like.
   4. For asset-heavy or distressed cases, value the assets instead: net asset value, replacement cost, or liquidation value.
   5. For very early stage, the market approach dominates: what did comparable companies raise at, and what did similar businesses exit for.
   6. The discipline that matters: any revenue multiple is an implicit bet on a future margin. Saying 'six times revenue' without saying what terminal margin justifies it is not a valuation.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reaching for a revenue multiple with no view on terminal margin. Also failing to distinguish a company choosing to lose money from one unable to make money. That distinction determines whether the question is valuation or restructuring.

   Expect next

   • What terminal margin justifies that multiple?
   • When do they reach profitability?
   • Why is it difficult to value a first-year firm?

   Reported by candidates at Piper Sandler (Investment Banking, New York, 2026); Sequoia Capital (Venture Capital, San Francisco, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 046Why is it difficult to value a company in its first year?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalSequoia CapitalVenture Capital · San Francisco · 2021

   Say this

   There is no history to extrapolate, no stable unit economics, and the range of outcomes is enormous. Almost all of the value sits in a terminal state you are guessing at, so any point estimate is false precision.

   Then walk it

   1. No track record means no base rate for your own forecast. You cannot test whether management hits plan because there is no plan history.
   2. Unit economics are unstable. Customer acquisition cost and retention in the first cohorts are unrepresentative, usually because early customers are enthusiasts and the cost of reaching them was low.
   3. The outcome distribution is not normal, it is power-law. Most early companies are worth close to zero and a few are worth enormous amounts, so an expected value calculation is dominated by a tail you cannot estimate.
   4. A DCF is therefore meaningless: 100 percent of the value is terminal, and small changes in assumption swing the answer by orders of magnitude.
   5. What you use instead: the market approach, meaning what comparable rounds priced at; scenario analysis with explicit probabilities; and milestone-based valuation where each funding round buys information rather than value.
   6. And the honest venture framing: you are not valuing the company, you are pricing an option on a team and a market. The diligence weight sits on the founders and the market size, not on the model.

   Where candidates lose it

   Trying to make a DCF work. The expected answer names the power-law distribution and the shift from valuation to option pricing. Saying 'you value the team and the market' is the venture-native response.

   Expect next

   • So what do you actually diligence?
   • How do you size a market for an early-stage company?
   • How does a power law change how you build a portfolio?

   Reported by candidates at Sequoia Capital (Venture Capital, San Francisco, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 056What is free cash flow yield and why do some investors prefer it?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalAsset management

   Say this

   Free cash flow divided by market capitalisation, or unlevered free cash flow over enterprise value. Investors prefer it because cash is harder to manipulate than earnings and because it is directly comparable to a bond yield.

   Then walk it

   1. It bypasses most accounting judgement. Depreciation policy, capitalisation choices and provisioning all affect earnings and none of them affect cash.
   2. It is comparable across sectors and against other assets. A 7 percent free cash flow yield against a 4 percent bond yield is a meaningful comparison in a way that a P/E is not.
   3. It captures capital intensity, which EV/EBITDA cannot. Two companies with identical EBITDA and different CapEx have very different free cash flow yields, and the difference is real.
   4. The definitional traps: does free cash flow include or exclude stock-based compensation, acquisitions, and working capital swings? Companies present the flattering version, so build it yourself from the cash flow statement.
   5. The main weakness: it penalises companies investing heavily for growth. A business spending on a new facility looks expensive on free cash flow yield and may be the better investment. So it suits mature businesses and misleads on growth ones.
   6. Use normalised CapEx rather than one year's, because a single heavy investment year distorts it badly.

   Where candidates lose it

   Not separating maintenance from growth capital expenditure. A growth company's low free cash flow yield is not evidence it is expensive, and treating it that way is how people miss compounders.

   Expect next

   • How do you split maintenance from growth CapEx?
   • Should stock-based compensation be subtracted?
   • When does this metric mislead?
5. 057How would you set a target price?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalSell-side research

   Say this

   Apply a justified multiple to a forward earnings or cash flow estimate, usually twelve months out, and cross-check against a DCF. Then be explicit about what the multiple assumes.

   Then walk it

   1. Pick the metric that the sector actually trades on: EV/EBITDA for industrials, P/E for consumer, price to tangible book for banks, EV/revenue for early-stage software.
   2. Choose the forward year deliberately, usually the next twelve months or the following fiscal year, and say which. Comparing your target on next year's numbers to a peer multiple on trailing numbers is a common and invisible error.
   3. Justify the multiple rather than borrowing it. A premium to the peer group needs a reason: higher growth, higher returns on capital, lower cyclicality. A regression of sector multiples against growth or ROIC is the defensible way to do it.
   4. Cross-check with a DCF and with where the stock has traded historically relative to its own range and to the market.
   5. Then state the implied upside and the rating logic, and give a bull and bear case so the target has a range around it.
   6. The honesty test: if your target requires a multiple the stock has never achieved and a forecast above consensus, say so plainly. Stacking two aggressive assumptions is how targets become fiction.

   Where candidates lose it

   Applying the peer average multiple with no justification, and stacking an above-consensus forecast on top of an above-peer multiple without acknowledging that you have made two bullish calls at once.

   Expect next

   • Why that multiple rather than the peer average?
   • What is your bear case target?
   • How often would you revise it?
6. 064How would you compare two companies in the same sector trading at very different multiples?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalCSCredit SuisseGeneralist · Sydney · 2020

   Say this

   Assume the market is right until proven otherwise, then find the justification. Multiple gaps almost always reflect differences in growth, returns on capital, or risk. The investment question is whether the gap is larger than those differences warrant.

   Then walk it

   1. First decompose the gap. Is it growth, margin, returns on capital, capital intensity, cyclicality, balance sheet, or governance? Usually two or three of these explain most of it.
   2. Check the denominators are comparable. Different accounting policies, different fiscal years, different definitions of adjusted earnings, and different treatment of leases or capitalised costs all create fake gaps.
   3. Then quantify. If one grows 5 points faster with 10 points higher return on capital, how much premium does that justify? A regression of sector multiples against growth and ROIC gives a defensible expected multiple for each.
   4. The residual, the difference between the actual multiple and the regression-implied one, is the potential mispricing. That is where the idea lives.
   5. Then look for the non-fundamental explanations: index membership, liquidity, free float, ownership structure, or a governance discount for a controlled company. These are real and persistent.
   6. The conclusion should be specific: the cheaper one is cheap for reasons X and Y, which I think are permanent, or which I think the market is over-extrapolating. Either is a view.

   Where candidates lose it

   Assuming the cheaper one is the better investment. The default position should be that the market has a reason, and your job is to find it and then decide whether it is overstated.

   Expect next

   • What non-fundamental reasons could explain it?
   • Would you pair-trade them?
   • What would close the gap?

   Reported by candidates at Credit Suisse (Generalist, Sydney, 2020). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 084What is minority interest and why does it appear in enterprise value?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalBulge bracket IB

   Say this

   It is the portion of a consolidated subsidiary the parent does not own. You add it to enterprise value because the consolidated EBITDA includes 100 percent of that subsidiary, so the numerator must reflect 100 percent too.

   Then walk it

   1. Accounting: if a parent owns more than 50 percent it consolidates the whole subsidiary, taking all of its revenue and EBITDA, then deducts the minority's share of profit below the line.
   2. So consolidated EBITDA overstates what belongs to the parent's shareholders.
   3. To keep the multiple consistent, you add minority interest to enterprise value. Both numerator and denominator then represent the whole enterprise, including the part owned by others.
   4. Use the market value of the minority if the subsidiary is listed. Book value is the fallback and is usually a poor estimate.
   5. The alternative approach is to deconsolidate: strip the subsidiary's EBITDA out and value the parent's stake separately. Cleaner conceptually, more work, and it is what you do when the subsidiary is very different from the core business.
   6. The error to avoid is forgetting it entirely. If you ignore minority interest, a company that consolidates a large partly-owned subsidiary will look artificially cheap on EV/EBITDA, and that appears constantly in emerging market comp sets.

   Where candidates lose it

   Knowing the rule but not the reason. The reason is consistency between numerator and denominator, and being able to state that is what shows you understand enterprise value rather than having memorised the bridge.

   Expect next

   • Should you use book or market value for it?
   • When would you deconsolidate instead?
   • How does this distort a comp set?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.