Hedge Funds interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

39

Firms

16

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMan Group10Balyasny Asset Management7Bridgewater Associates3DED.E. Shaw3Apollo Global Management2KKR2Oaktree Capital Management2Point722SCSquarepoint Capital2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1Coatue Management1HPS Investment Partners1Northern Trust1Viking Global Investors1Wolverine Trading1

Topic

All topicsStrategy taxonomy8Stock pitch10Short selling6Portfolio construction8Risk and drawdown8Performance and alpha7Event-driven and merger arb8Distressed and credit5Fund structure and economics7Financing, NAV and operations6Compliance and research process5Quant and systematic6India and Category III AIFs5Career and fit11

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalMarket viewBrainteaserCaseFit

1. 040Your best long and your best short are in the same sector and both going against you. What do you do?Risk and drawdownHardsuperdayLong-short equityMulti-manager platforms

   Say this

   If both legs are losing at once, the pair is not hedged on the dimension that is moving, so first I would find out what that dimension is. It is usually a style factor rather than the sector, and the answer depends entirely on whether I have a factor problem or two independent thesis problems.

   Then walk it

   1. Diagnose before acting. Run the attribution: if the long is a value name and the short is a growth name, a growth rally hurts both and the sector hedge was never doing the work I thought it was.
   2. If it is a factor, the fix is to neutralise the factor, not to abandon the theses. Overlay a style hedge or adjust the pair weights so the loadings offset, and keep the idiosyncratic view.
   3. If both theses are genuinely deteriorating on their own facts, that is a different message: my process has a common flaw, probably a shared assumption about the end market. Then I cut both and go back to the work rather than pick one to defend.
   4. Check the correlation assumption I entered with. If I sized the pair as a hedged position and it is behaving as two directional positions, my risk is roughly double what I thought and the size has to come down immediately, regardless of the diagnosis.
   5. Then the liquidity ordering. Reduce where reducing is cheap, which often means cutting the more liquid leg first, and accept that this temporarily unbalances the pair.
   6. And I would say the part people skip: an adverse move in both legs of a pair is one of the most useful signals a book gives you, because it means your model of what the trade was exposed to was wrong. That is worth more than the P&L.

   Where candidates lose it

   Picking one leg to cut on instinct, usually the loser you like less. Without attribution you do not know whether you have one problem or two. Say what you would measure first. And if the pair was sized as a hedge but behaves directionally, the size is wrong now, so address that before discussing the theses.

   Expect next

   • How would you separate factor loss from idiosyncratic loss?
   • If it is a factor, do you hedge it or reduce?
   • What would you have done differently when you put the pair on?
2. 044A fund shows a 2.5 Sharpe over three years. What questions do you ask?Performance and alphaHardsuperdayFund of fundsMulti-manager platforms

   Say this

   I would assume it is either a short sample, a hidden tail risk, or stale marks until proven otherwise. Three years of monthly data is 36 points, which is far too few to distinguish a 2.5 Sharpe from luck, so the questions are all about where the risk went rather than where the return came from.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with the statistics. The standard error on a Sharpe estimate is roughly the square root of one over the number of years, so three years gives an error bar wide enough that a true Sharpe of 1 produces a measured 2.5 reasonably often.
   2. Then look at the shape. Negative skew and high kurtosis are the signature of selling insurance. What are the worst three months, and were they in the sample? If the sample has no stress event in it, the number describes a regime, not a strategy.
   3. Then autocorrelation of monthly returns. If it is materially positive, marks are stale or the book is illiquid and the volatility is understated, which mechanically inflates the ratio.
   4. Then attribution. How much of the return is a factor exposure that happened to pay, how much is carry, and how much is idiosyncratic? A fund that was long momentum and credit spreads in a good period for both has beta, not skill.
   5. Then capacity and concentration. What was the AUM during the period, what is it now, and did the return come from a handful of positions? A 2.5 Sharpe on 200 million does not survive a move to 2 billion.
   6. And the operational questions, which allocators lose money on far more often than they do on strategy: who marks the book, who is the administrator and auditor, how independent is the valuation of the illiquid sleeve, and what are the terms if I want out.

   Where candidates lose it

   Being impressed. The whole question is whether you are sceptical in a structured way. Also, do not just say 'I would ask about risk'. Name the specific diagnostics: sample-size error bars, skew, return autocorrelation, factor attribution and who marks the book. That list is the answer.

   Expect next

   • How many years would you need to be confident?
   • What does positive autocorrelation in monthly returns imply?
   • What operational questions would you ask?
3. 045How do you attribute a fund's P&L?Performance and alphaIntermediatetechnicalMulti-manager platformsRisk management

   Say this

   Split it into the pieces that correspond to decisions someone made. Market, sector, style factor, then idiosyncratic stock selection, then financing and trading costs. The residual after the systematic pieces is the only part that is evidence of skill.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with market: beta-adjusted net exposure times the index return. That is the part you would have earned with no stock selection at all.
   2. Then sector or industry: the net weight in each industry times that industry's return relative to the index. This catches the PM who is really making a sector call and calling it stock picking.
   3. Then style factors from the risk model: growth, value, momentum, size, quality, volatility. Each has a net loading and a factor return, so each has a P&L line.
   4. Then the residual, which is stock selection. Split it long and short, because a book that makes all its money on the long side in a rising market has not demonstrated a short-selling capability and that matters for how much gross it should run.
   5. Then the costs that are frequently ignored: borrow fees, dividends paid on shorts, financing spread on the leverage, and realised trading cost. On a 300 percent gross book these can be well over a hundred basis points a year.
   6. The caveat to state: attribution is model dependent and the pieces do not add up cleanly. There is always an interaction and residual term, factor returns are estimated, and a PM can dispute the classification of a name. So I would use it to ask questions rather than to settle them.

   Where candidates lose it

   Attributing to positions rather than to risks. Listing the top five winners and losers is a P&L report, not an attribution. The point is to isolate whether the money came from decisions the PM is paid for. Remember to include financing and borrow costs; candidates almost always leave them out and they are large on a levered book.

   Expect next

   • What if all the alpha is on the long side?
   • How would you attribute a macro book instead?
   • What are the biggest cost lines on a levered long-short book?
4. 047How would you evaluate a track record you were thinking of allocating to?Performance and alphaHardsuperdayFund of fundsMulti-manager platforms

   Say this

   Work out what generated the return, whether it is repeatable at the size they want to run, and whether the business around it can survive a bad year. Return level is the least interesting thing on the page; the interesting things are attribution, capacity and operations.

   Then walk it

   1. First, decompose. Factor regression on the monthly series plus position-level attribution if they will share it. A track record that is 70 percent explained by long momentum and short volatility is an expensive way to buy two factors.
   2. Second, ask what the sample contains. Which regimes did it live through? A book started in 2019 has seen a crash and a violent recovery; a book started in 2023 has seen one direction. No stress event in the sample means the tail is unmeasured.
   3. Third, concentration of the result. If the top three positions made the whole number over five years, the process claim is much weaker than the return suggests.
   4. Fourth, capacity. What was AUM through the period, how liquid were the positions relative to size, and what does the expected return look like at three times the assets? Almost every disappointing allocation is an asset growth story.
   5. Fifth, the people and the business. Is the performance attributable to one person, what is the team turnover, what is the fee and expense load, and how much of the manager's own money is in the fund?
   6. Sixth, operations, which is where allocators actually lose capital. Independent administrator, audited by someone real, who marks illiquid positions, what are the gates and lock-ups, and what is the history of using them. Then the terms question: if I want out in a bad market, can I get out?

   Where candidates lose it

   Focusing on returns and Sharpe. Those are the inputs to the question, not the answer. The differentiated parts are capacity at future AUM and the operational due diligence, and a candidate who mentions the administrator, the auditor and who marks the book sounds like they have sat in an allocator's seat.

   Expect next

   • What single question would you ask the manager?
   • How would you test capacity?
   • What would make you decline a fund with excellent numbers?
5. 053A deal you own gets a second request from the antitrust authority. Walk me through what you do.Event-driven and merger arbHardsuperdayMerger arbitrageEvent-driven

   Say this

   First reprice the trade rather than react to the print. A second request lengthens the timeline and raises break probability, so the spread should widen; the question is whether it has widened by more or less than the new facts justify. Then decide whether the position is still correctly sized.

   Then walk it

   1. Step one: re-derive the implied probability from the new spread. If the spread went from 3 percent to 9 percent and the undisturbed downside is 20 percent, the market is now implying a much higher break risk. Compare that with your own estimate.
   2. Step two: re-underwrite the substance. What is the theory of harm, is the overlap horizontal or vertical, how large is the combined share in the market definition the agency will use, and are divestiture remedies plausible? Base rates matter: most second requests still end in completion, historically the large majority.
   3. Step three: reset the timeline. A second request typically adds six to twelve months, so the annualised return on the remaining spread can actually fall even as the gross spread widens. Recompute it, because that is where people fool themselves.
   4. Step four: check the agreement. Is the outside date far enough out to survive the review, who bears the obligation to litigate, and is there a reverse break fee if the buyer walks on regulatory grounds.
   5. Step five: size. Higher variance and a longer hold means less capital, not more, unless my own probability estimate is genuinely above the market's. And I would check what else in the book has the same regulatory exposure, because arb books accumulate correlated antitrust risk without noticing.
   6. Then the honest self-check: am I adding because I have new information, or because the position is down and the spread looks attractive? The second is how merger arb books turn a break into a disaster.

   Where candidates lose it

   Automatically adding because the spread widened. Widening on genuine new information is not an opportunity, it is a repricing. Also, forgetting that a longer timeline can reduce the annualised return even when the gross spread doubles. Do that arithmetic out loud and check correlated regulatory exposure across the rest of the book.

   Expect next

   • What proportion of second requests end in a block?
   • Who pays the reverse break fee and when?
   • How would you hedge regulatory risk across the whole book?
6. 067I would like you to evaluate my LP stake in a fund. How much would you be willing to pay for it?Fund structure and economicsHardsuperdayBGBaupost GroupEquity Hedge · Boston · 2018

   Say this

   I would start from reported NAV, then adjust it for three things: whether the marks are believable, what the liquidity terms let me do with it, and what fees I inherit. For a hedge fund LP interest that usually means paying a discount to NAV, and the size of the discount is the whole answer.

   Then walk it

   1. First ask what I am actually buying. A limited partnership interest in the fund, with its capital account, its high water mark, its lock-up status and its place in any side pocket. Not a portfolio of securities.
   2. Then interrogate the NAV. What percentage of the book is level one, exchange-priced and verifiable, versus level two and level three marked by the manager? I would take reported NAV on the liquid sleeve and haircut the hard-to-value sleeve materially, 20 to 40 percent depending on who marks it and whether the auditor tested it.
   3. Then the liquidity terms, which determine the discount as much as the assets. Am I locked for two more years, is there a gate, is a side pocket attached? Discount for the time I cannot get out, at my own required return. Two years locked at a 12 percent required return is roughly 20 percent of value before anything else.
   4. Then the fees I inherit. The seller's high water mark is a real asset to me: if the fund is below it, I get performance-fee-free return until it recovers, which is worth paying for. If the fund is at a peak, I inherit a full fee load.
   5. Then the qualitative discount: is the manager's team intact, is the strategy still in capacity, and why is the seller selling? Motivated sellers are the reason this market exists, and an LP selling because they know something is a genuine risk.
   6. Then say a number and defend it, because refusing to is the real failure. Something like: 'For a fund with 70 percent liquid marks, a one-year remaining lock and no side pocket, I would start around 85 to 90 percent of NAV, and I would go to 70 if a quarter of the book is level three.' Then name the one piece of information that would move the bid most, which is almost always the valuation policy on the illiquid sleeve.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering NAV. If NAV were the answer there would be no secondary market. The analytical content is the mark quality, the liquidity discount and the inherited high water mark. And the interviewer here is explicitly testing whether you will commit to a price under uncertainty, so produce a number with a range and the reasoning behind it rather than more questions.

   Expect next

   • Why is the seller selling?
   • How much would you pay if a third of the book is level three?
   • How does an inherited high water mark change your bid?

   Reported by candidates at Baupost Group (Equity Hedge, Boston, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 071How would you value an illiquid position for the monthly NAV?Financing, NAV and operationsHardsuperdayDistressed debtFund administration

   Say this

   By a written policy applied consistently, not by judgement each month. Hierarchy: an observable transaction price if there is one, then broker quotes, then a model calibrated to comparable market data, with the manager's own view last. Then document it, get it reviewed independently, and disclose the level.

   Then walk it

   1. Start at the top of the fair value hierarchy. Level one is an exchange price and there is nothing to decide. Level two is observable inputs, so indicative broker quotes on a similar bond or a recent trade in the same issuer's other paper. Level three is a model with unobservable inputs, which is where the real work and the real risk sit.
   2. For a private or restructured equity stake, a defensible approach is a multiple on the latest reported earnings against listed comparables, plus an illiquidity discount, cross-checked against the last primary round or any secondary transaction.
   3. For a stressed loan, recovery analysis: enterprise value, the waterfall, then a discount rate reflecting the time and uncertainty of the process. Mark the claim, not the face amount.
   4. Governance is most of the answer. Broker quotes from at least two independent sources where possible, a pricing committee that signs off, a written valuation policy reviewed by the board, the administrator striking the NAV rather than the manager, and an annual audit that tests the level three marks.
   5. Consistency matters more than precision, and this is the part to say out loud. A defensible method applied every month is better than a more accurate method applied when it suits. Changing methodology when a mark is inconvenient is the classic abuse.
   6. Then the disclosures that let an investor judge: percentage of NAV in each level, the discount applied, and a sensitivity showing what NAV would be at plus or minus a reasonable range on the key input. If the position is large and genuinely unmarkable, the right answer may be to side-pocket it rather than to invent a number.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a valuation technique and no governance. The question is really about controls: who marks it, who checks the marker, and how you stop the method from changing when the number is unhelpful. Also remember to mention that side-pocketing can be the correct answer rather than marking something you cannot mark.

   Expect next

   • What if the two broker quotes differ by 15 points?
   • Who signs off on a level three mark?
   • When should a position be side-pocketed instead?
8. 074You are on an expert network call and the expert starts describing their current employer's unreported quarter. What do you do?Compliance and research processHardsuperdayMulti-manager platformsCompliance

   Say this

   Stop the call immediately, say clearly that you cannot receive that information, and end it rather than steer it. Then report it to compliance the same day, document what was said, and let them decide whether the name goes on a restricted list. You do not get to make that judgement yourself.

   Then walk it

   1. Interrupt, do not redirect. 'I have to stop you there. I cannot discuss unreported financial results for your employer.' Trying to move the conversation along while having already heard it does not help you.
   2. End the call. Continuing after a breach, even on other topics, looks like you kept fishing, and the call is recorded or logged by the network.
   3. Report it immediately and in writing to compliance, with the date, the expert, the network, and what was said. Self-reporting is the single most protective thing you can do, and delaying it is what turns a mistake into a career-ending problem.
   4. Expect the consequence and accept it: compliance will likely restrict the name, meaning nobody at the firm can trade it until they clear it. Even if you were already long, you may be frozen. That is the correct outcome.
   5. Say the structural controls that should have prevented it, because it shows you understand the framework rather than just the etiquette. Pre-approved question lists, chaperoned calls, prohibitions on speaking to current employees of public companies you cover, mandatory network training, and post-call logging.
   6. Then the honest point about incentives. The information would have been valuable, and that is exactly why the rule has to be absolute rather than a judgement call in the moment. Every insider trading case involving expert networks, including the ones that put people in prison, started with someone deciding this once was probably fine.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a soft answer: 'I would change the subject' or 'I would not use it in my model'. Both are wrong. Once you possess material non-public information you are restricted whether you use it or not. The three required beats are stop, end, report. And never say you would check with the PM first; compliance is the escalation path.

   Expect next

   • What if your PM already has a large position in that name?
   • What is the firm's obligation once you report it?
   • How do you structure expert calls to avoid this?
9. 077Walk me through your research process on a new name.Compliance and research processIntermediatetechnicalLong-short equityMulti-manager platforms

   Say this

   I work backwards from the question that decides the stock. Understand the business and what the price implies, find the one or two variables the thesis turns on, then spend almost all the time on those. The goal is not to know everything, it is to have an edge on the thing that matters.

   Then walk it

   1. Day one is the price. What does today's valuation imply about growth, margin and duration? A reverse DCF or an implied-multiple check tells me what I have to disagree with, which stops me doing a month of work on a stock that is fairly priced.
   2. Then the primary documents: the last three annual reports, the segment notes, the accounting policies, and the last eight quarterly transcripts read back to front so I can see which promises were kept. Filings before sell-side notes, always.
   3. Then the industry structure. Who are the competitors, where does the profit pool sit, who has pricing power, what are the barriers, what is the customer's alternative. This is where the durability question gets answered and it is what business judgement actually means.
   4. Then identify the crux and state it as a question with a number attached. 'Does gross margin reach 42 percent by 2028?' Then the work plan follows: channel checks, pricing data, competitor disclosure, supplier commentary, whatever bears on that number specifically.
   5. Then build the model to the drivers, put consensus next to my numbers, and write a one-page thesis with the variant view, the catalyst, the bear case with a price, the falsifiers and the sizing. If I cannot write it in one page, I have not found the crux.
   6. Then the falsification step, which is the part that separates research from advocacy: go and find the best bear argument, ideally from someone short the name, and see if it survives. And say the honest limitation, that time is the constraint, so tier three names get a screen and a model rather than this whole process.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing a linear process that ends with a recommendation. A hedge fund process starts with what the price implies and converges on one crux. Candidates who say 'read the 10-K, build a model, do comps, make a recommendation' have described a training programme, not a research process. Name the crux and the falsification step.

   Expect next

   • How long does that take and what do you cut when you have two days?
   • What is the crux on a name you are following now?
   • How do you find the best bear argument?
10. 078Here are the financial statements of three unnamed companies. Work out what kind of business each one is.Compliance and research processHardcase studyHPS Investment PartnersSpecial Situations · London · 2021

    Say this

    I would read four things in order and narrate as I go: the asset side of the balance sheet, the shape of the cost structure, the working capital cycle, and the capital intensity. Those four together identify a business model within a couple of guesses, and the reasoning is what is being graded, not the final label.

    Then walk it

    1. The balance sheet tells you most of it. Heavy PP&E means manufacturing, utilities, telecom or hotels. Heavy inventory with no PP&E means a retailer or a distributor. Almost no assets but large receivables means services or consulting. Large intangibles and goodwill means an acquisitive or a software business. A balance sheet dominated by financial assets and matched liabilities means a bank, an insurer or a lender.
    2. Then margins and their shape. Gross margin above 70 with heavy sales and marketing is software. Gross margin in single digits on huge revenue is distribution, commodity trading or grocery. High EBITDA margin with heavy depreciation is infrastructure-like, so telecom, towers, pipelines.
    3. Then the working capital cycle, which is the most diagnostic single item. Negative working capital with large payables and fast inventory turns is a supermarket or a restaurant chain. Large deferred revenue is subscription software. Long receivables and inventory days is heavy industry or project work. Receivables that are the business are financial services.
    4. Then capital intensity and leverage. Capex above 15 percent of sales with high depreciation says utility, telecom or semiconductor fab. Very high leverage with stable margins says regulated or contracted cash flows. High leverage with cyclical margins says a leveraged buyout.
    5. Then cross-check with one specific tell per hypothesis. A retailer has operating leases now capitalised as right-of-use assets. An insurer has technical reserves. A hotel has both heavy PP&E and high operating leverage. Say the tell you are looking for before you look for it.
    6. Then commit and quantify your confidence: 'Company A is a grocery retailer, and I am confident because of negative working capital, 25 percent gross margin, 3 percent EBIT margin and inventory turning in under 30 days. If I am wrong, it is a food distributor, and the way to tell them apart is store-level assets versus warehouse assets.' Naming the alternative and the discriminating test is what a credit interviewer is looking for.

    Where candidates lose it

    Guessing early and then defending it. This is a pure reasoning exercise: narrate the evidence in order and let the conclusion fall out. Also, do not neglect the working capital cycle, which is more diagnostic than the income statement. And always name your second-best hypothesis and the test that would separate them.

    Expect next

    • Which of the three would you lend to, and on what terms?
    • Which has the most operating leverage?
    • What single extra disclosure would you ask for?

    Reported by candidates at HPS Investment Partners (Special Situations, London, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.