Hedge Funds interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

39

Firms

16

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMan Group10Balyasny Asset Management7Bridgewater Associates3DED.E. Shaw3Apollo Global Management2KKR2Oaktree Capital Management2Point722SCSquarepoint Capital2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1Coatue Management1HPS Investment Partners1Northern Trust1Viking Global Investors1Wolverine Trading1

Topic

All topicsStrategy taxonomy8Stock pitch10Short selling6Portfolio construction8Risk and drawdown8Performance and alpha7Event-driven and merger arb8Distressed and credit5Fund structure and economics7Financing, NAV and operations6Compliance and research process5Quant and systematic6India and Category III AIFs5Career and fit11

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalMarket viewBrainteaserCaseFit

1. 049Explain merger arbitrage and how the spread works.Event-driven and merger arbCoretechnicalEvent-drivenMerger arbitrage

   Say this

   You buy the target after a deal is announced at a discount to the offer and collect the gap when it closes. The spread exists because the deal might not close and because your capital is tied up until it does. So the spread is the market's price for break risk plus a time value of money.

   Then walk it

   1. The set-up for a cash deal: offer is 50, stock trades at 47.50, so the gross spread is 2.50 or about 5.3 percent. If it closes in four months, that is roughly 16 percent annualised before financing.
   2. The spread decomposes into three things: probability of break times the downside if it breaks, the time to close, and the financing cost of holding the position. You can invert it to extract the market-implied probability.
   3. That inversion is the standard piece of analysis and it is worth doing out loud. If the undisturbed price was 38, downside on a break is 9.50 and upside is 2.50, so the implied break probability is roughly 2.50 divided by 12, about 21 percent. Now you can compare the market's view with your own.
   4. The spread narrows as the deal clears hurdles: shareholder vote, financing, each regulatory approval. The P&L is earned in steps at those milestones, not smoothly.
   5. A stock-for-stock deal is different mechanically. You go long the target and short the acquirer at the exchange ratio, so you are trading the ratio rather than an absolute price, and you must handle the borrow on the acquirer and any dividends.
   6. The honest description of the payoff: you are writing insurance on deal completion. Low volatility, positive carry, and occasionally you lose several years of spread in one morning when a deal breaks. Which is why sizing, not spread hunting, is the skill.

   Where candidates lose it

   Calling it risk-free arbitrage. It is a short volatility, short tail trade. The two things that make an answer credible are computing the market-implied break probability from the spread and the undisturbed price, and naming the asymmetry of the payoff. Also get the annualisation right; a 5 percent spread over four months is not a 5 percent return.

   Expect next

   • What is the implied probability of completion in that example?
   • How does a stock-for-stock deal change the trade?
   • What is the undisturbed price and why does it matter?
2. 051How do you assess deal-break risk?Event-driven and merger arbHardsuperdayMerger arbitrageEvent-driven

   Say this

   By working through the conditions in the merger agreement one at a time and asking which one could actually fail. In practice almost all breaks come from four places: antitrust or regulatory, financing, the shareholder vote, or a material adverse change claim by a buyer who wants out.

   Then walk it

   1. Regulatory is the biggest and the slowest. Overlap between the parties, market share in the relevant definition, which agencies have jurisdiction, whether a second request or a phase two review is likely, and whether remedies are available. Cross-border adds Chinese and European approvals, which have their own political weather.
   2. Financing next. Is it fully committed, is there a financing condition, is there a ticking fee, and has the credit market moved against the buyer since signing. A buyer whose debt got 300 basis points more expensive has an incentive to find a problem.
   3. Then the vote. Who owns the target, are there activist holders arguing the price is too low, is a proxy adviser recommending against, and is the premium defensible against the unaffected price.
   4. Then the contract itself, which is where the real work is. Read the definition of a material adverse effect and the carve-outs, look at the outside date and extension mechanics, the break fee in both directions, and whether there is specific performance.
   5. Then read the incentives. Strategic buyers close; the risk is regulatory. Sponsor buyers have financing risk and a history of renegotiating price when the world changes. A buyer who has walked before is a different underwriting.
   6. Then price the downside honestly. Undisturbed price, adjusted for how the market has moved since, plus the chance of another bidder. And say the base rate: historically around 5 to 8 percent of announced deals break, so any model implying a 1 percent break probability is wrong.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering with 'regulatory risk' and stopping. Merger arb is a documents business. Naming the material adverse effect definition, the outside date, the break fee and whether specific performance is available is what distinguishes someone who has read an agreement from someone who has read a headline. Also know the historical break base rate.

   Expect next

   • What is in a typical MAE carve-out list?
   • Would you rather own a spread with a strategic or a sponsor buyer?
   • What do you do when the spread widens on news you already knew?
3. 052How does a stock-for-stock merger arb trade differ mechanically from a cash deal?Event-driven and merger arbIntermediatetechnicalMerger arbitrageEvent-driven

   Say this

   In a cash deal you only own the target and you are trading an absolute spread. In a stock deal you go long the target and short the acquirer at the exchange ratio, so you are trading the ratio itself, and you inherit a borrow, a dividend obligation and the risk that the ratio is not fixed.

   Then walk it

   1. Set it up concretely. The offer is 0.8 acquirer shares per target share, the acquirer trades at 60, so the implied offer is 48. The target trades at 46, so the spread is 2. You buy 100 target and short 80 acquirer.
   2. Now your P&L is the ratio, not the price. If both stocks fall 20 percent, the spread is roughly intact and you have lost little. That is the attraction: the trade is naturally hedged against market direction.
   3. Borrow becomes central. You need the acquirer borrow for the life of the deal, and it usually gets tight and expensive, because every arb in the trade needs the same short. A recall on the acquirer leg is a real operational risk.
   4. You owe the acquirer's dividends and receive the target's. Net dividend carry can be a meaningful part of the expected return over a nine-month deal, positive or negative.
   5. Collars and floating ratios change everything. A fixed-value collar means the number of shares adjusts within a band, which makes the hedge ratio dynamic and gives the position embedded optionality you have to delta hedge.
   6. And the asymmetry to name: because arbs are systematically short the acquirer, acquirer stocks are pressured after announcement, which is part of why acquirers underperform. That is also why a deal break is doubly painful: the target falls and the acquirer often rallies as the short base covers.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating the short leg as a detail. The acquirer short is where the operational risk lives: borrow cost, recall, dividends and the arb crowd all being on the same side. Also, if the deal has a collar, the hedge ratio is not static, and missing that means your hedge is wrong from day one.

   Expect next

   • What happens to your hedge if the deal has a fixed-value collar?
   • Why do acquirer shares often fall after announcement?
   • What do you do if the acquirer borrow gets recalled?
4. 054What is a catalyst, and what makes a good one?Event-driven and merger arbIntermediatetechnicalLong-short equityEvent-driven

   Say this

   A catalyst is a dated, identifiable event that forces the market to reprice. A good one has three properties: it happens on a known timeline, it is material enough to move the numbers, and it resolves your specific disagreement with consensus rather than just being news.

   Then walk it

   1. Dated matters most. 'Eventually the market will notice' is not a catalyst, it is a hope, and it is how a thesis becomes a value trap that ties up capital for three years.
   2. The good ones in practice: an earnings print where your variant number becomes visible, a capacity ramp or product launch, a contract renewal, a refinancing or covenant test, a capital markets day, index inclusion or exclusion, a spin-off, a lock-up expiry, a regulatory decision.
   3. Materiality: it has to change the numbers people model, not just the narrative. A new disclosure that reveals segment profitability can be a bigger catalyst than a product announcement, because it changes the input rather than the story.
   4. Resolution is the subtle one. A good catalyst settles your disagreement either way. If the event can happen and leave the debate exactly where it was, it is not a catalyst for your thesis even if it moves the stock.
   5. Catalysts also enable risk management, which is the hedge fund reason they matter. A dated event gives you a review point and a natural place to size up or cut, so the position has a defined lifespan instead of drifting.
   6. The limitation to say: catalysts get anticipated. If the trade is well known, the move happens before the event and you get the classic sell-the-news outcome. So I would also ask how the stock is positioned going in, not just what is going to happen.

   Where candidates lose it

   Listing events without the dated and resolving criteria. Every stock has news coming. What makes something a catalyst for your position is that it tests your specific variant view on a known date. And do not ignore positioning: a widely anticipated catalyst in a crowded name is a reason to be smaller, not larger.

   Expect next

   • Give me a catalyst on a name you follow and the date.
   • What do you do when a catalyst passes and nothing happens?
   • How does positioning into a catalyst change the trade?
5. 056Describe what distressed debt is.Distressed and creditIntermediatetechnicalOaktree Capital ManagementRisk · Los Angeles · 2022

   Say this

   Debt of a company that the market believes will not be repaid in full, so it trades at a large discount to par, conventionally below 70 cents or at a spread above 1,000 basis points. You are not buying a yield, you are buying a claim on a restructuring and underwriting what that claim recovers.

   Then walk it

   1. The analytical shift is the point. In performing credit you ask whether the company can pay the coupon. In distressed you assume it cannot, value the enterprise, and work out where your claim sits against that value.
   2. So the work is a waterfall exercise. Enterprise value first, then apply it down the capital structure in priority order: super-senior and DIP, secured bank debt, senior unsecured, subordinated, then equity. Wherever the value runs out, that is the fulcrum.
   3. Two distinct approaches, and it is worth naming both. Trading distressed is buying mispriced paper for a recovery, in and out. Loan-to-own is buying the fulcrum deliberately to convert into equity and control the reorganised business.
   4. It is a legal business as much as a financial one. Intercreditor agreements, covenants, collateral perfection, credit bidding rights, voting classes and the cramdown rules determine the outcome more often than the operating forecast does.
   5. The classic mistake is to buy on price alone. Paper at 30 cents is not cheap if the claim is structurally subordinated and recovers 10. Cheapness is expressed relative to modelled recovery, never relative to par.
   6. Say the limitations honestly: illiquid, so marks are estimates and can be stale; the timeline is long and legally uncertain, often 18 months or more; and the supply of opportunities is entirely cyclical, which is why a distressed fund can wait years with dry powder. Oaktree's own framing about the primacy of risk control rather than return maximisation is exactly the right register for this desk.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing it as high-yield investing with more risk. It is a different discipline: recovery analysis and legal process rather than spread and coupon. If you cannot say the word fulcrum and sketch the waterfall, you have not answered a distressed interviewer's question, and at a firm with a documented risk-first philosophy you should also say what could go wrong before being asked.

   Expect next

   • What is the fulcrum security and how would you find it?
   • How do you value a company in bankruptcy?
   • What is the difference between trading distressed and loan-to-own?

   Reported by candidates at Oaktree Capital Management (Risk, Los Angeles, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 057What is the fulcrum security, and how do you find it?Distressed and creditHardsuperdayDistressed debtSpecial situations

   Say this

   The fulcrum is the most senior claim that does not get paid in full, so it is the layer that converts into the equity of the reorganised company. You find it by valuing the business, then walking the capital structure down in priority order until the value runs out. Whichever tranche is sitting where the money stops is the fulcrum.

   Then walk it

   1. Worked example. Enterprise value 800. Secured bank debt 500, senior unsecured 400, subordinated 200. The banks are covered in full, the seniors receive 300 against 400 claims, so they recover 75 cents and take the new equity. Senior unsecured is the fulcrum; the subs and old equity get nothing or a nuisance tip.
   2. So the first job is the enterprise value, and the whole answer hinges on it. Use a multiple on normalised through-cycle EBITDA plus a liquidation floor on hard assets, and be explicit that you are valuing a restructured business without the current debt burden.
   3. Then build the waterfall properly, which means reading the documents. Structural seniority from where debt sits in the group, collateral and whether the lien is perfected, guarantees from operating subsidiaries, intercompany claims, and any leakage from drop-down or J. Crew style transactions that moved assets away from lenders.
   4. Then add the claims people forget: DIP financing, which is super-priority; administrative and professional fees, which in a long case are enormous; pension deficits; tax claims; and rejected lease and litigation claims that crystallise in the process.
   5. Why it matters: owning the fulcrum means owning the equity upside for a debt price, and it gives you a seat at the negotiating table because your class has to vote on the plan. That control is often worth more than the recovery arithmetic.
   6. The honest limitation: the fulcrum moves. A change in the EBITDA estimate or the exit multiple of one turn can shift it a whole layer, and the process itself can reallocate value through negotiation rather than arithmetic. So I would buy the fulcrum with a margin of safety, or buy the layer just above it and give up some upside for structural protection.

   Where candidates lose it

   Identifying the fulcrum from the capital structure table without an enterprise value. The fulcrum is defined by where the value breaks, so no valuation means no answer. Second trap: ignoring administrative costs and DIP priority, which routinely push the break a layer higher than a clean model suggests.

   Expect next

   • What happens to the fulcrum if your EBITDA estimate is 20 percent too high?
   • What is a DIP loan and why does it price so well?
   • How does a drop-down transaction hurt existing lenders?
7. 058What is the difference between credit and equity investments?Distressed and creditIntermediatetechnicalKKRDistressed Debt · New York · 2025

   Say this

   Credit has a capped upside and a contractual claim; equity has unlimited upside and no claim at all. That changes the question you ask. In equity you underwrite how good it can get; in credit you underwrite how bad it can get and still get paid.

   Then walk it

   1. The payoff shape drives everything. A bond at par returns the coupon if things go well and nothing extra if they go brilliantly. So credit work is asymmetric downside analysis: the base case is already known, and your job is to price the tail.
   2. Which makes the analytical emphasis different. Equity cares about growth, TAM, reinvestment and multiple expansion. Credit cares about free cash flow versus fixed charges, the maturity wall, covenant headroom, liquidity, and asset coverage in a liquidation.
   3. Credit also has documents and equity does not. Covenants, collateral, guarantees, restricted payment baskets and intercreditor terms are enforceable rights. A credit investor with a blocking position can shape outcomes that an equity holder can only watch.
   4. Priority is the other structural difference. In a downside scenario credit gets paid first and can end up owning the business, which is why distressed credit is the one place where credit investors capture equity-like returns.
   5. Metrics I would actually use: for credit, net leverage, interest coverage, fixed charge cover, free cash flow after capex and interest, and the maturity schedule. For equity, return on incremental capital, growth durability and free cash flow per share.
   6. The honest overlap to name: at a distressed price, credit is an equity investment wearing a bond's clothing, and at a stretched leverage level, equity is a call option on the enterprise. The frameworks converge in the extremes, which is exactly why a credit solutions group inside a firm like KKR sits next to the private equity team rather than away from it.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering only with 'debt is safer'. The distinctive content is capped upside, contractual rights and priority, plus the different metric set. If you are interviewing for a credit seat, make sure you can name covenants and fixed charge coverage, and say what actually attracts you to a capped-upside payoff.

   Expect next

   • Why would you choose an asset class with capped upside?
   • What covenants would you want in a loan to a cyclical business?
   • When does credit analysis become equity analysis?

   Reported by candidates at KKR (Distressed Debt, New York, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

8. 061Explain two and twenty.Fund structure and economicsCorephone / first roundFund of funds

   Say this

   A 2 percent annual management fee on assets plus a 20 percent performance fee on profits. The management fee runs the business regardless of returns; the performance fee is the incentive, and it usually only applies above the high water mark and sometimes above a hurdle.

   Then walk it

   1. Work an example so the asymmetry is visible. On 1 billion of assets that earn 10 percent gross: the management fee is 20 million, the performance fee is 20 percent of the remaining 80, so 16 million. The investor keeps 64 million, or 6.4 percent net from a 10 percent gross return. Roughly a third of the gross return goes to fees.
   2. The management fee is on assets, so it scales with asset gathering rather than with performance. That is the structural conflict at the heart of the industry, and it is why capacity discipline is a genuine signal about a manager.
   3. The performance fee is an option, not a share. The manager participates in the upside and does not pay for the downside, which is why the high water mark exists as a partial fix.
   4. Two and twenty is no longer the standard. Large institutional mandates negotiate closer to 1 and a half and 15 to 20 with hurdles, while the very best capacity-constrained funds charge much more, occasionally 3 and 30 or higher.
   5. And the pass-through model at platforms is a different animal entirely: instead of a fixed management fee, the fund charges its actual operating costs to investors, which can land well above 2 percent, and then takes a performance fee on top.
   6. The honest limitation: the headline rate tells you very little. What matters is the expense load, whether there is a hurdle, whether the high water mark is real, how often fees crystallise, and whether the fee is charged on levered or unlevered assets.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reciting the percentages without doing the arithmetic. An interviewer wants to see that you understand how much of the gross return leaves the investor, and that the management fee creates an asset-gathering incentive. Also know that pass-through expenses have largely replaced the flat 2 at the big platforms.

   Expect next

   • What gross return do you need to deliver 8 percent net?
   • What is a high water mark?
   • Why would a fund charge 3 and 30?
9. 062What is a high water mark, and why does it matter to the manager?Fund structure and economicsIntermediatetechnicalFund of funds

   Say this

   It is the highest NAV an investor's capital has previously reached, and the manager earns no performance fee until the fund climbs back above it. It matters because it turns a drawdown into a direct hit on the manager's revenue for years, not just for one bad quarter.

   Then walk it

   1. Mechanically it is per investor and per subscription, not per fund. Someone who invested at the peak and someone who invested at the trough have different high water marks, which is why the accounting is done in series or with equalisation.
   2. Worked example: the fund falls 20 percent, then rises 15 percent. The investor is still below where they started, so no performance fee is earned even though the manager had a good year. They need roughly 25 percent to get back to the mark.
   3. The business consequence is severe. A fund deep below its high water mark is running on management fee alone, so it cannot pay the team, and the good people leave. That is why funds close after a bad year instead of grinding back, and investors should read a fund closure as an economic decision, not a confession.
   4. It also creates a live incentive problem. A manager far below the mark has an option that is deep out of the money, and the rational move for the option is more volatility. Investors watch for exactly that behaviour after a bad drawdown.
   5. Partial fixes exist. Some funds offer a reduced fee below the mark to keep the team funded, some use modified marks that reset over time, and a few reset after a set period, which investors dislike for obvious reasons.
   6. Related mechanics worth naming: a hurdle rate means the fee only applies above a threshold such as cash or a benchmark, and crystallisation frequency determines how often fees lock in. Annual crystallisation with a genuine high water mark is the investor-friendly version.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing it as a nice investor protection and stopping. The interesting content is what it does to the manager's behaviour and business: staff retention, fund closures, and the incentive to take more risk when the fee option is far out of the money. Also note it is per investor, which candidates almost always miss.

   Expect next

   • What is the incentive problem for a manager far below the mark?
   • What is a hurdle rate?
   • Why do funds close rather than trade back to the mark?
10. 064Explain lock-ups, gates and redemption notice, and why a fund needs them.Fund structure and economicsIntermediatetechnicalFund of funds

    Say this

    They are the tools that match the liquidity the fund offers investors to the liquidity of what it owns. A lock-up is a period you cannot redeem at all, notice is how far ahead you must tell them, and a gate caps how much can leave at once. Without them a liquid promise on an illiquid book forces fire sales.

    Then walk it

    1. Typical terms on a liquid equity fund: monthly or quarterly liquidity, 30 to 90 days notice, maybe a one-year soft lock with a 2 to 5 percent early redemption fee that is usually paid to the remaining investors rather than the manager.
    2. Less liquid strategies ask for more: a two or three year hard lock for distressed or structured credit, annual liquidity, and longer notice. That is appropriate, not predatory, when the assets take that long to realise.
    3. A gate caps redemptions, either at the fund level, say 20 percent of NAV per quarter, or investor level, so each holder can only take a fraction of their stake at a time. It exists so that early redeemers do not force the sale of the most liquid assets and leave the stayers with the illiquid residue.
    4. That last point is the real principle: the terms protect remaining investors from each other, not just the manager from investors. Redemption is a first-mover advantage problem, exactly like a bank run.
    5. 2008 is the reference. Funds that had offered monthly liquidity on illiquid books either gated, side-pocketed or sold their best assets to raise cash. Investors learned to read the liquidity terms as carefully as the strategy description.
    6. The abuse to name, because it shows judgement: a manager who gates a genuinely liquid book to preserve fee income is a governance failure. So the real test is whether the liquidity terms match the asset liquidity. A mismatch in either direction is the warning sign.

    Where candidates lose it

    Defining the three terms and stopping, or framing them as manager-friendly restrictions. The insight is the liquidity mismatch and the first-mover problem among investors. And the diligence question is not whether a fund has gates, it is whether its terms match what it owns.

    Expect next

    • How would you test whether the terms match the assets?
    • What is an early redemption fee and who receives it?
    • What happened to funds that had gates in 2008?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.