Hedge Funds interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

39

Firms

16

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMan Group10Balyasny Asset Management7Bridgewater Associates3DED.E. Shaw3Apollo Global Management2KKR2Oaktree Capital Management2Point722SCSquarepoint Capital2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1Coatue Management1HPS Investment Partners1Northern Trust1Viking Global Investors1Wolverine Trading1

Topic

All topicsStrategy taxonomy8Stock pitch10Short selling6Portfolio construction8Risk and drawdown8Performance and alpha7Event-driven and merger arb8Distressed and credit5Fund structure and economics7Financing, NAV and operations6Compliance and research process5Quant and systematic6India and Category III AIFs5Career and fit11

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalMarket viewBrainteaserCaseFit

1. 065What is a side pocket, and when is it used?Fund structure and economicsIntermediatetechnicalFund of fundsDistressed debt

   Say this

   A side pocket is a separate share class holding illiquid or hard-to-value positions, carved out of the main fund so that redemptions can be paid from the liquid book without touching them. Investors in the pocket at the time of the carve-out keep their share and get paid when those assets are realised.

   Then walk it

   1. The legitimate use case: a liquid fund ends up owning something genuinely illiquid, a private stake from a restructuring, a litigation claim, a stub security with no market. Side-pocketing it stops a redeeming investor from getting paid out at a mark nobody can verify.
   2. Mechanically it becomes a separate series. Existing investors are allocated their pro rata share, new investors do not participate, and the pocket is not redeemable. It is valued periodically and distributed as the assets realise.
   3. Fee treatment is the thing to ask about. The investor-friendly version charges a management fee on the side pocket at cost and only crystallises the performance fee on actual realisation. The unfriendly version charges performance fees on unrealised marks the manager sets themselves.
   4. It also solves a fairness problem in both directions. Without it, either the redeemer is overpaid on a stale mark at the expense of the stayers, or underpaid because the fund had to dump liquid assets.
   5. The abuse is well documented. 2008 saw funds move impaired assets into side pockets, which converted a temporary liquidity problem into a permanent one for investors, and some marks proved to be fiction. That is why LPs now negotiate hard caps on what percentage of the fund can be side-pocketed.
   6. So in diligence I would ask three things: the cap as a percentage of NAV, who values the pocket and whether the auditor signs the mark, and the manager's actual history of using them. A fund with a repeated pattern of side-pocketing losers is telling you something.

   Where candidates lose it

   Explaining the mechanics and missing the governance question. Every serious investor's question about side pockets is about who marks them and how fees are charged on unrealised value. Also make the fairness point in both directions; candidates usually only see that it protects the manager.

   Expect next

   • Who should value a side-pocketed asset?
   • How would you cap this in the fund documents?
   • What is the difference between a side pocket and a gate?
2. 066Explain a hurdle rate, a clawback and a crystallisation period to an investor.Fund structure and economicsHardtechnicalFund of funds

   Say this

   A hurdle is the return the fund must beat before any performance fee is earned. A clawback returns fees already paid if later losses show they were not deserved. A crystallisation period is how often the performance fee is locked in and taken. All three exist because the performance fee is an option and investors are trying to make it less of one.

   Then walk it

   1. Hurdle: typically cash, SOFR plus a spread, or a benchmark. With a 5 percent hurdle and a 12 percent return, the 20 percent fee applies to 7 points, not 12. Then ask whether it is a hard hurdle, fee on the excess only, or a soft hurdle, fee on everything once cleared. The difference is real money.
   2. Crystallisation: monthly, quarterly or annual. More frequent crystallisation favours the manager, because fees are locked in on a good quarter even if the year ends flat. Annual with a genuine high water mark is the investor-friendly standard.
   3. Worked example of why frequency matters: up 10 percent in the first half, down 10 percent in the second, roughly flat for the year. With quarterly crystallisation the manager has banked a performance fee on the first half. With annual, nothing is due.
   4. Clawback is more common in private funds than hedge funds, and it is the fix for that problem: fees paid on interim gains are returned if the final outcome does not support them, usually held in escrow.
   5. The equalisation problem sits behind all of it. Investors subscribing at different times have different high water marks, so funds either run separate series per subscription or use equalisation accounting with depreciation deposits. It is administratively ugly and it is why the administrator matters.
   6. The plain conclusion for an investor: the headline two and twenty tells you almost nothing. Hurdle type, crystallisation frequency, high water mark treatment and the expense load determine what you actually pay, and two funds with identical headline terms can differ by hundreds of basis points a year.

   Where candidates lose it

   Defining the three terms in isolation. The value of this answer is showing how they interact and which combinations transfer money to the manager. The hard-versus-soft hurdle distinction and the crystallisation frequency example are the two specifics that make it convincing.

   Expect next

   • Which is better for the investor, a hard or a soft hurdle?
   • Why is crystallisation frequency worth arguing over?
   • What is equalisation and why does it exist?
3. 068What makes up a NAV?Financing, NAV and operationsIntermediatetechnicalMan GroupEquity Hedge · Boston · 2019

   Say this

   Total assets at fair value, minus total liabilities, divided by units outstanding. On a hedge fund the interesting parts are all in the details: how positions are priced, and everything that sits in liabilities, which includes the short book, the financing and the accrued fees.

   Then walk it

   1. Assets: long positions at fair value, cash and cash equivalents, margin and collateral posted at the prime broker, receivables from unsettled trades, dividends and interest receivable, and the positive mark-to-market on derivatives.
   2. Liabilities, which is where hedge funds differ from a mutual fund: the market value of short positions, margin loans and repo borrowings, negative derivative marks, payables on unsettled trades, dividends payable on shorts, accrued borrow fees, plus accrued management and performance fees and fund expenses.
   3. So the accruals are a real part of the number. An accrued performance fee is a liability that reduces NAV even though it has not been paid, which is why NAV can be quoted gross and net of fees and the difference matters.
   4. Pricing policy is the substance of the answer. Exchange-traded positions at the official close, over-the-counter instruments from broker quotes or a model, and illiquid positions by a documented valuation policy. The hierarchy is level one, two and three, and the percentage in each tells you how much of the NAV is opinion.
   5. Governance is the other half. An independent administrator strikes the NAV, the prime broker's records are reconciled against it, a pricing committee approves level three marks, and the auditor tests them annually. The manager should not be the sole source of a price.
   6. One practical detail worth having: NAV is usually struck monthly for subscriptions and redemptions but estimated daily for risk, and the two can differ. Investors transact on the official NAV, so the gap between the daily estimate and the final struck number is itself a control worth monitoring.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving the mutual fund answer, assets minus liabilities, and missing that the short book and the financing sit in liabilities. Also missing the accrued performance fee. The question in a hedge fund interview is really about pricing policy and who strikes the number, so say level one, two and three, and say the administrator's role.

   Expect next

   • Who should strike the NAV and why not the manager?
   • How would you value a level three position?
   • What is the difference between gross and net NAV?

   Reported by candidates at Man Group (Equity Hedge, Boston, 2019). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 069What does a prime broker actually do for a hedge fund?Financing, NAV and operationsIntermediatetechnicalPrime brokerageLong-short equity

   Say this

   It is the fund's financing and operations counterparty. It lends against the long book, sources stock to borrow for the shorts, clears and settles trades, holds custody, provides consolidated reporting and margin calculation, and often introduces the fund to investors. Without a prime broker a long-short fund cannot function.

   Then walk it

   1. Financing first, because that is the core service. The PB extends margin against the long portfolio and rehypothecates the collateral, which is how a fund gets to 3 or 4 times gross on its equity.
   2. Securities lending second. The PB locates borrow for shorts and sets the fee, and that pricing power is a real cost line for the fund. Access to hard-to-borrow names is one of the main reasons funds pay up for a top-tier prime.
   3. Then operations: clearing, settlement, custody, corporate actions, stock loan administration, portfolio reporting, and the risk and margin system the fund reconciles to daily.
   4. Then the relationship services: capital introduction to allocators, research access, and sometimes seed or working capital. Cap intro is a genuine reason emerging managers choose a particular prime.
   5. Multi-priming is standard for anything of size, and the reason is the lesson of 2008. Lehman's prime brokerage clients found their assets frozen in administration and their rehypothecated collateral entangled in the estate. So funds now split balances across two or three primes and negotiate asset protection and segregation terms.
   6. The dependency to name honestly: the PB sets your margin terms and can change them. A prime that raises haircuts in a stress event forces you to delever exactly when you least want to, which is how a financing relationship becomes the real source of risk. Archegos is the recent illustration from the other side of the same relationship.

   Where candidates lose it

   Listing services without naming the dependency. The interesting part of prime brokerage is that the fund's leverage, borrow and continued operation all sit with a counterparty whose terms can change. Mention multi-priming and the Lehman lesson; that is what separates an operational answer from a brochure.

   Expect next

   • Why would a fund use more than one prime broker?
   • What is rehypothecation and why did it matter in 2008?
   • What happens if your prime raises your haircuts overnight?
5. 070How does margin financing on a long-short book actually work?Financing, NAV and operationsHardtechnicalPrime brokerageLong-short equity

   Say this

   The prime broker requires margin against your total positions, long and short, calculated either by a fixed rule like Reg T or by a risk-based portfolio model. Your equity supports the whole book, so the constraint on gross exposure is the margin requirement, and the cost is the spread you pay on the borrowed amount.

   Then walk it

   1. Two regimes. Reg T is rules-based: 50 percent initial margin on longs and 150 percent of the short's value including proceeds, which caps you at roughly 2 times gross. Portfolio margin or a risk-based model looks at the net risk of the whole book and can allow 6 to 8 times for a hedged, diversified portfolio.
   2. That is why hedged books get more leverage. Under a risk model, a long and an offsetting short in the same industry attract far less margin than two directional positions, so factor neutrality is rewarded by the financing as well as by the risk team.
   3. The economics: you pay a financing rate on the long borrowings, roughly the overnight rate plus a spread of maybe 40 to 100 basis points, and you receive a rebate below the overnight rate on short proceeds. On a 300 percent gross book the net financing line is a large, recurring cost.
   4. Margin is marked daily. Losses reduce equity, which raises the required margin as a fraction of what is left, so the constraint tightens exactly as you lose money. That reflexivity is the core mechanic to understand.
   5. Hence the margin spiral: losses, margin call, forced selling, more losses. It is the same mechanism in LTCM, in 2008, in the 2020 basis unwind and in Archegos. The trade did not have to be wrong for the fund to die; the financing ran out first.
   6. The defences are practical and worth naming: hold an excess cash buffer above the requirement, negotiate term financing or locked haircuts where you can, multi-prime so no single counterparty can force you, and stress test the margin requirement rather than just the P&L. Most funds stress the portfolio and forget to stress the financing.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing leverage as a single number. The insight is that the margin requirement rises as your equity falls, so leverage is reflexive rather than static. And stress testing the margin requirement, not just the portfolio value, is the answer that sounds like someone who has watched a treasurer work.

   Expect next

   • How much gross could you run under portfolio margin versus Reg T?
   • What happened at Archegos, in financing terms?
   • How would you stress test your financing?
6. 072What is the difference between holding a position in cash equity and through a swap?Financing, NAV and operationsIntermediatetechnicalLong-short equityPrime brokerage

   Say this

   Cash equity means you own the shares. A total return swap gives you the same economic exposure without owning them: the counterparty holds the stock and pays you the return, you pay a financing spread. The economics are similar, the ownership, disclosure, financing and counterparty risk are not.

   Then walk it

   1. Mechanically, the swap pays you price return plus dividends and you pay a floating rate plus a spread, against posted collateral. Your exposure is the full notional while your outlay is the margin, which is where the leverage comes from.
   2. Reasons funds use swaps: access to markets where direct ownership is restricted or operationally painful, notably parts of Asia and specifically the foreign investor route into some Indian instruments; simpler shorting because the borrow is embedded in the counterparty's book; and a single financing relationship across many positions.
   3. Disclosure is the big structural difference and the one interviewers probe. Economic exposure through a swap has historically not triggered the same beneficial ownership disclosure as shares, which is how large positions can be built quietly. Rules have tightened after several incidents, but the asymmetry is the reason the instrument is popular for stake-building.
   4. You also give up the shareholder rights. No vote, no ability to engage, no standing in a restructuring. For an activist or an event-driven investor that can matter more than the financing saving.
   5. Counterparty risk replaces settlement simplicity. If the dealer fails you are an unsecured creditor for the mark-to-market above your collateral, so you care about the dealer's credit and about netting agreements.
   6. Archegos is the case study that ties it together: enormous swap-based exposure spread across several dealers, each of whom could not see the whole position, with margin that proved thin. The lesson is that swap leverage plus fragmented dealer visibility hides concentration from everyone including the dealers.

   Where candidates lose it

   Saying they are economically identical and stopping. The differences that matter in practice are disclosure, voting rights, counterparty exposure and how the margin is set. Naming the Archegos dynamic shows you understand why regulators now care, rather than just how the instrument is priced.

   Expect next

   • Why would you use a swap rather than buying the stock?
   • What is the counterparty risk on a swap, exactly?
   • Why do swaps matter for stake-building disclosure?
7. 075What is material non-public information, and where exactly is the line?Compliance and research processHardtechnicalComplianceMulti-manager platforms

   Say this

   Material means a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding whether to trade, which in practice means it would move the price. Non-public means it has not been broadly disseminated. Both tests have to be met, and the difficulty in real life is almost never the definition, it is the mosaic question.

   Then walk it

   1. Materiality examples that are clearly over the line: unreported results or guidance, an unannounced deal, a pending regulatory decision, a major customer loss, a CEO departure, an unannounced buyback.
   2. Non-public means not broadly disseminated. A fact told to one hedge fund, or sitting in a document that was not distributed, is non-public even if it was not marked confidential. Being told it by accident does not make it public.
   3. The legitimate discipline is the mosaic theory: assembling many individually non-material, public or lawfully obtained pieces into a conclusion nobody else has. Channel checks, satellite imagery, credit card panels, job postings, pricing scrapes. That is the entire alternative data industry and it is legal precisely because no single piece is material and non-public.
   4. Where the line actually blurs: a supplier telling you their shipments to a customer are down sharply. Non-public, arguably material, and the supplier may have a duty. The test involves how you got it and whether anyone breached a duty in passing it on, which is the misappropriation and tipping analysis.
   5. So the practical rules are procedural, not intellectual. Restricted and watch lists, pre-clearance of personal trades, chaperoned expert calls, information barriers between pods at platforms, and a habit of escalating anything ambiguous rather than resolving it yourself.
   6. The honest thing to say: the rule is asymmetric on purpose. The cost of escalating something harmless is an hour of compliance time; the cost of being wrong is criminal. So I would rather be the analyst compliance hears from too often than the one they hear about from a regulator.

   Where candidates lose it

   Trying to look sophisticated by arguing about grey areas. Interviewers are checking your instinct, and the correct instinct is to escalate rather than adjudicate. Do mention the mosaic theory, because it shows you know where the legitimate edge lives, but pair it with the procedural controls.

   Expect next

   • Is a sell-side analyst's unpublished view MNPI?
   • How do information barriers work between pods?
   • Where does alternative data cross the line?
8. 076How can you make a financial model detailed enough to be useful but simple enough that you can cover a lot of companies?Compliance and research processHardtechnicalBalyasny Asset ManagementEquity Research · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Model the two or three drivers that actually move the stock in detail and leave everything else as a ratio. The rule I use is that a line gets its own build only if a reasonable disagreement about it changes my target price by more than a few percent. Everything else is a percentage of sales.

   Then walk it

   1. Start from the drivers, not the statements. For a subscription business that is subscribers, ARPU and net retention. For a retailer it is store count, sales per square foot and gross margin. Those get real builds with monthly or segment granularity.
   2. Everything else gets a ratio: SG&A as a percentage of sales, D&A off a simple schedule, working capital on days, capex as a percentage of sales, tax at the guided rate. Resist the urge to build a full three-statement cascade for a name you are screening.
   3. Standardise the template across the coverage universe. Same rows, same order, same colour convention for inputs, same output block. Then updating twenty models after earnings is a mechanical exercise, and you can compare names line by line without re-reading each file.
   4. Tier the coverage explicitly. Five or six core names get deep models with segment detail and a channel-check overlay; twenty to thirty monitored names get a driver model with consensus alongside; the rest get a screen. Coverage breadth comes from the tiering, not from making every model thinner.
   5. Build the comparison in rather than bolting it on. Every model should show consensus next to my numbers and the implied valuation at a range of multiples, because the output I actually need is the gap versus the street, not a standalone forecast.
   6. The limitation to state: a simplified model will miss the thing that was in the footnote, so the trade-off is real. I manage it by re-reading the filings on the core names properly and accepting that on tier three I am running a screen, not a thesis. Pretending a thin model is a deep one is how people get caught.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering 'keep it simple' with no decision rule. The interviewer wants the criterion you use to choose what gets detail. The materiality test, the driver-versus-ratio split and the tiered coverage model are the substance. And say the cost of simplification honestly, because at a platform you will be asked to cover more names than you can model deeply.

   Expect next

   • How many names can you genuinely cover properly?
   • What would you always model in detail regardless of the sector?
   • How do you update twenty models in an earnings week?

   Reported by candidates at Balyasny Asset Management (Equity Research, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

9. 079Explain the construction of a factor. Why that method, and how would you optimise it?Quant and systematicHardtechnicalACAQR Capital ManagementInvestment Research · New York · 2021

   Say this

   Take value as the example. Define the signal, in this case book to price or a composite of several value measures; clean and winsorise it; standardise it cross-sectionally within industry; then build a long-short portfolio from the ranks, usually top minus bottom quintile, weighted and rebalanced on a defined schedule. Every one of those steps is a choice, and the choices matter as much as the signal.

   Then walk it

   1. Signal definition first, and use a composite rather than a single ratio. Book to price, earnings to price, cash flow to price and sales to enterprise value capture the same idea with different noise, so the average is more robust than any one. That is the main argument for composites over single metrics.
   2. Then the cleaning: point-in-time data with the correct reporting lag so you are not using numbers before they were published, delisted returns included so you are not survivorship biased, winsorise or rank-transform the outliers, and handle negative book values explicitly.
   3. Then neutralisation. Standardise within industry, because a raw value screen just buys banks and sells software. Neutralise size too, or the factor becomes a small-cap bet. The choice of what to neutralise defines what the factor actually measures.
   4. Then portfolio construction: quintile or decile spreads, equal weight versus value weight, rebalance monthly or quarterly. Equal weight shows a stronger factor premium and is much harder to trade. Say that trade-off out loud, because it is where academic factors and investable factors part company.
   5. On optimisation, define the objective honestly: maximise net-of-cost information ratio, not gross return, with constraints on turnover, capacity and exposure to other factors. Then use cross-validation across time and across regions rather than optimising a single sample.
   6. And say the limitation before being asked, because this is the real question inside the question. With enough parameters you can produce any backtest you like. The defences are economic priors before data mining, a small number of specification choices, out-of-sample and out-of-region testing, sensitivity analysis showing the result is not knife-edge, and a documented count of how many specifications you tried. A factor that only works with one lookback and one weighting scheme is a coincidence.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing the signal and skipping the construction choices. Neutralisation, point-in-time data and the equal-versus-value weighting decision are where the real work is. And on 'how would you optimise it', a candidate who does not immediately raise overfitting has failed the question at a firm built on factor research.

   Expect next

   • How would you know you had overfitted?
   • Why neutralise by industry?
   • How would you test whether your new factor is distinct from momentum?

   Reported by candidates at AQR Capital Management (Investment Research, New York, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

10. 080What are the assumptions of linear regression?Quant and systematicIntermediatetechnicalSCSquarepoint CapitalHedge Fund · Montreal · 2024

    Say this

    Linearity in the parameters, exogenous errors with zero conditional mean, no perfect multicollinearity, homoscedastic and uncorrelated errors, and for exact small-sample inference, normally distributed errors. The first two give you unbiasedness; the rest are about whether your standard errors mean anything.

    Then walk it

    1. Separate the tiers, because that is what distinguishes someone who has used regression from someone who memorised a list. Linearity and exogeneity are needed for the coefficients to be unbiased. Homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation are needed for the usual standard errors to be correct. Normality is only needed for exact t and F inference in small samples.
    2. So a violation of homoscedasticity does not bias your beta, it biases your confidence in it. That distinction matters enormously in practice: you can still use the estimate, you just cannot trust the t-statistic.
    3. In financial time series the assumptions that actually break are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, because volatility clusters and returns overlap. The standard fixes are Newey-West or White standard errors, and clustered errors in panel data.
    4. Endogeneity is the serious one. If a regressor is correlated with the error, the coefficient is biased and no standard error fix helps. In finance this usually arises from omitted variables or from a feedback loop where price affects the supposed predictor.
    5. Multicollinearity does not bias anything, it just inflates variances, so coefficients become unstable and flip sign between samples. That is very common with factor exposures, and the tell is a large R-squared with no individually significant coefficient.
    6. Practical additions I would name: outliers dominate least squares because it minimises squared errors, so winsorise or use robust regression; and out-of-sample performance matters more than any in-sample diagnostic, because for a trading signal I care about prediction, not about the p-value.

    Where candidates lose it

    Reciting the list without saying what each assumption buys you. Tiering them into unbiasedness versus valid inference is the differentiator. Also, do not claim normality of the dependent variable is required; it is normality of the errors, and only for small-sample inference.

    Expect next

    • Which assumption is most often violated in financial data, and what do you do about it?
    • What is the consequence of multicollinearity?
    • How would you detect endogeneity?

    Reported by candidates at Squarepoint Capital (Hedge Fund, Montreal, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.