Investment Banking interview preparation
Every question below is either traced to a named firm from a public candidate report, or tagged at desk level when we could not trace it. Answers are written the way you would actually say them out loud — answer first, then the mechanism, then the limitation.
100 questions, mapped to the firms that asked them
- Questions
- 100
- Traced to a firm
- 100
- Firms
- 46
- Updated
- September 2026
063Given this capital structure, what is the recovery on each claim?Houlihan LokeyRestructuring · New York · 2026
Say this
Value the enterprise first, then pay it out down the waterfall in strict seniority until it runs out. Whichever tranche the value runs out in is the fulcrum security, and that is where the equity ends up after the restructuring.
Then walk it
- Establish enterprise value. In distress I would use a distressed multiple on normalised EBITDA and cross-check against a liquidation value, because the two set a range.
- Then the waterfall: super-priority and DIP financing first, then secured claims in order of lien priority, then unsecured bonds, then subordinated debt, then preferred, then common.
- Work down until the value is exhausted. Say enterprise value is $600, the revolver and term loan total $400 and recover in full, and the unsecured bonds are $400. They receive the remaining $200, so a 50 percent recovery.
- Those bonds are the fulcrum. They are the class that gets converted into the new equity, which is why distressed funds buy the fulcrum, not the safest paper.
- Everything below the fulcrum, subordinated debt and common equity, recovers nothing in a strict waterfall. In practice they often receive a small stub or warrants to buy consent and avoid a contested plan, which is a negotiation outcome rather than an entitlement.
Where candidates lose it
Jumping to the waterfall before establishing enterprise value. You cannot allocate what you have not measured. And missing the fulcrum concept entirely, which is the single most important idea in the discipline.
Expect next
- Which security would you buy?
- What is the absolute priority rule and when is it violated?
- What section of the indenture deals with payment waterfalls?
Reported by candidates at Houlihan Lokey (Restructuring, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
066If you were in a meeting with the CFO as the lead analyst, what would you ask?Moody'sCorporate Finance · New York · 2018
Say this
I would ask about the durability of revenue, the operating leverage in the cost base, and what could stop them paying the debt. Three areas: quality of revenue, quality of cost, and capital allocation intent.
Then walk it
- Revenue quality: how much is contracted or recurring, what is the retention rate of last year's customers, what is the concentration in the top five, and how is pricing holding.
- Cost and margin: how much of the cost base is fixed against variable, so I know what happens to margin if volume drops 15 percent. That is the operating leverage question and it drives the downside case.
- One-time costs: what charges hit this year that will not recur, and equally, what recurring costs have been classified as one-time. That is the quality-of-earnings question and CFOs answer it carefully.
- Capital allocation: what is the intent on dividends, buybacks and acquisitions, and where does leverage sit in their priorities. A CFO who will defend the rating behaves very differently from one who will lever up for a buyback.
- And the direct question: what keeps you up at night about the next 18 months? The answer, and the hesitation before it, is usually the most informative thing in the meeting.
Where candidates lose it
Asking for information you could get from the filings. A CFO meeting is for intent, judgement and things not disclosed. Asking 'what was revenue last year' wastes the access and signals you did not read the 10-K.
Expect next
- How would you qualitatively assess an entity?
- What would you do if their answers contradicted the filings?
- Which single answer would most change your rating?
Reported by candidates at Moody's (Corporate Finance, New York, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
076Pitch me a stock to buy and one to sell.Bank of AmericaInvestment Banking · New York · 2023Morgan StanleySales and Trading · Tokyo · 2025Balyasny Asset ManagementEquity Hedge · New York · 2020
Say this
Lead with the recommendation and the target, then give the variant view, then the catalyst, then the risk. Ninety seconds. The variant view is the whole pitch: what do you believe that the market does not?
Then walk it
- One sentence: 'I would buy X at its current level with a target of Y, about 30 percent upside over 12 months.'
- Then the business in two sentences, so the interviewer knows you understand what it actually sells.
- Then the variant view, which is the only part that matters. 'Consensus models margin flat; I think it expands 200 basis points because the pricing taken last year has not annualised yet.' No variant view means no pitch.
- Then the catalyst and the timeline. What event makes the market agree with you, and when.
- Then the two biggest risks and what would make you exit. And on the short side, be rigorous: a short thesis needs a catalyst and a borrow cost, because 'it is expensive' is not a thesis.
- Know the numbers behind it: revenue growth, margin, multiple, and roughly what the market values it at.
Where candidates lose it
Pitching a mega-cap that everyone covers, with a thesis that is just the consensus narrative. If your reason is the reason in the newspaper, there is no edge. And never pitch something you cannot defend on valuation.
Expect next
- What would make you change your mind?
- Are you sure your thesis can be backed up? What if their costs do not fall?
- How would you hedge this name?
Reported by candidates at Bank of America (Investment Banking, New York, 2023); Morgan Stanley (Sales and Trading, Tokyo, 2025); Balyasny Asset Management (Equity Hedge, New York, 2020). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
079How would you value your school's most popular food truck, and what assumptions would you make?CitiInvestment Banking · New York · 2026
Say this
Build up the revenue from observable inputs, estimate margin, then apply a multiple appropriate to a tiny owner-operated business. Say every assumption out loud and keep the numbers round.
Then walk it
- Revenue: it serves maybe 150 customers a day at an average ticket of $12, so about $1,800 a day. Open 300 days a year, so roughly $540,000 of annual revenue.
- Costs: food cost around 30 percent, one or two staff plus the owner at maybe $80,000 total, then permits, fuel, maintenance and the truck payment. Call it $120,000 of operating profit before the owner's own wage.
- Normalise for owner compensation, which is the step people skip. If the owner is working full time, you must charge a market salary, say $50,000, leaving about $70,000 of real EBITDA.
- Multiple: this is a tiny business with total key-person dependency, no contracts, and a licence that may not transfer. Two to three times EBITDA, so $140,000 to $210,000.
- Then the cross-checks: the replacement cost of a used truck and equipment is maybe $60,000 to $100,000, which sets a floor. And the location permit may be the single most valuable asset, in which case you are really valuing the licence, not the business.
Where candidates lose it
Applying a public-market multiple to a food truck. Small, owner-dependent businesses trade at two to four times EBITDA, not ten. And forgetting to charge for the owner's labour, which overstates EBITDA enormously in any small business case.
Expect next
- What if the permit is not transferable?
- How would you value an apple tree?
- What would make you pay more than replacement cost?
Reported by candidates at Citi (Investment Banking, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
080How do you value an apple tree?Lincoln InternationalValuation · New York · 2023Rothschild & CoGeneralist · New York · 2026
Say this
As a finite-life cash-generating asset. Forecast the fruit it yields each year, price it, subtract the cost of harvesting, discount over the tree's productive life, and add any terminal value for the land or the timber.
Then walk it
- Cash flows: say 200 kilos of apples a year at a dollar a kilo, so $200 of revenue, less picking, water and treatment of maybe $80. Call it $120 a year.
- Shape the life curve. A young tree yields little, a mature tree plateaus, an old tree declines. So this is not a flat annuity; it ramps, plateaus for twenty or thirty years, then falls away.
- No perpetuity, because the tree dies. Forecast to the end of the productive life and add salvage, which is the firewood or the cleared land.
- Discount rate: this is a risky agricultural cash flow exposed to weather, disease and commodity price. Something well into double digits.
- Then the three cross-checks that make it a valuation answer rather than an arithmetic one. Market: what do orchards sell for per tree or per acre? Replacement: what does it cost to buy and grow a sapling to maturity, including the years of no yield? And the option value: if the land under it is worth more as building plots, the tree is worth negative, because you would pay to remove it. That last point is the answer they are listening for.
Where candidates lose it
Treating it as a perpetuity. It is a finite-life asset, which is the whole reason the question gets asked. And missing that the highest-value use might be cutting it down, which is the insight that the asset's value depends on the alternative use of what it sits on.
Expect next
- What if the land is worth more as development?
- How does this differ from valuing a mine?
- What discount rate would you use?
Reported by candidates at Lincoln International (Valuation, New York, 2023); Rothschild & Co (Generalist, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
082Why should I buy your college, and how much would you sell it for?Wellington ManagementInvestment Research · Boston · 2024Wellington ManagementEquity Research · Boston · 2024
Say this
Pitch it as a subscription business with pricing power and a real estate portfolio attached. Revenue is tuition times enrolment plus research grants and endowment income; the assets are the campus and the brand.
Then walk it
- The investment case: extremely sticky revenue, since a student enrolled is contracted for three or four years, pricing power that has historically exceeded inflation, and a brand that is effectively impossible to replicate.
- Revenue build: enrolment times net tuition after scholarships, plus housing and dining, plus research funding, plus endowment draw. Be explicit that gross tuition overstates it badly because of discounting.
- Cost base: mostly faculty and staff, largely fixed, which means high operating leverage in both directions. A 10 percent enrolment drop is devastating; a 10 percent rise is almost pure margin.
- Valuation on two bases and take the higher. As a going concern, a DCF or an EBITDA multiple on the operating surplus. As an asset play, the campus real estate plus the endowment, which for many institutions exceeds the operating value.
- Then the risks that make the price: demographic decline in the applicant pool, regulatory dependence on public funding and visa policy for international students, and the fact that you cannot actually cut faculty quickly. And I would flag that the brand is inseparable from the non-profit status, so a buyer might destroy the asset by acquiring it.
Where candidates lose it
Treating it as a whimsical question. It is a full valuation case wearing a joke. The two highest-value moves are separating gross from net tuition, and recognising that the real estate and endowment may be worth more than the operations.
Expect next
- How would you IPO it?
- How would a college increase revenue?
- What would you do in the first year as owner?
Reported by candidates at Wellington Management (Investment Research, Boston, 2024); Wellington Management (Equity Research, Boston, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
083How would a college increase its revenue?Harris WilliamsInvestment Banking · Richmond · 2018
Say this
Price, volume, mix, and new revenue lines. Raise net tuition by discounting less, grow enrolment, shift mix toward full-fee and postgraduate students, and monetise the assets that sit idle.
Then walk it
- Price: the lever is usually the discount rate, not the headline tuition. Most institutions discount heavily; recovering a few points of net tuition is worth more than a sticker price rise and is less visible.
- Volume: more students, but constrained by capacity and by admissions standards, since taking weaker students damages the brand that supports the price.
- Mix is the highest-return lever. International and out-of-state students pay multiples of the domestic rate. Postgraduate and professional programmes carry better margins. Executive education has almost no marginal cost against existing faculty.
- New lines: online programmes that break the capacity constraint entirely, summer and short courses that use the campus in the off-season, conference and event hire, and licensing the brand.
- And the asset side: parking, retail on campus, research commercialisation and licensing, plus the fundraising engine, since alumni giving is a genuine revenue line that responds to investment.
- The reason mix beats price and volume: operating leverage. Faculty cost is already committed, so an incremental full-fee student in an existing class is almost entirely margin.
Where candidates lose it
Listing ideas without ranking them by margin impact. The interviewer wants commercial prioritisation. Naming operating leverage as the reason mix wins turns a brainstorm into an analysis.
Expect next
- Which would you do first?
- What is the risk of the online strategy?
- How would you value the business after those changes?
Reported by candidates at Harris Williams (Investment Banking, Richmond, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
084How would you value an insurance brokerage that operates in one country that has just had a coup and writes only one line of coverage?Perella Weinberg PartnersFinancial Institutions Group · New York · 2026
Say this
Start from the normal brokerage framework, which is a commission stream on premium, then attack it with the two facts they gave you: extreme country risk and total product concentration. The answer is a wide range with a real chance of zero.
Then walk it
- The base framework: a broker earns commission on premium and holds no underwriting risk, so it is a capital-light, high-margin, recurring revenue business that normally trades at a premium multiple on EBITDA.
- Now the coup. The currency may be unconvertible, so you may not be able to repatriate cash at all. That alone can make a profitable business worth little to a foreign buyer.
- Country risk enters the discount rate through a sovereign spread, and in a post-coup situation that could be well over 1,000 basis points. It also enters the cash flows, because premium volumes fall when economic activity stops.
- Single line of coverage means no diversification. If that line is motor and vehicle imports halt, or it is trade credit and trade stops, revenue can go to near zero. So I would model scenarios rather than a base case: functioning state, prolonged instability, and asset seizure.
- So: probability-weight the scenarios, discount at a rate that reflects the sovereign, and cross-check against what a local buyer would pay, because a domestic acquirer does not face the repatriation problem and will value it far higher than a foreign one.
- The honest conclusion is that the identity of the buyer determines the value here more than the cash flows do.
Where candidates lose it
Running a standard brokerage multiple and ignoring the two facts in the question. The coup and the single line are the question. And missing the repatriation point, which is the specific insight that makes the foreign buyer's value different from the local buyer's.
Expect next
- Who would actually buy it?
- How would you size the country risk premium?
- What if the currency is pegged but not convertible?
Reported by candidates at Perella Weinberg Partners (Financial Institutions Group, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
085Given a B2B SaaS company with this EBITDA and this P/E, what would you do to improve its operations and financials?Houlihan LokeyInvestment Banking · New York · 2026
Say this
Work the SaaS levers in order of value: pricing, then retention, then sales efficiency, then cost. In software, a point of net revenue retention is worth more than a point of cost saving, because it compounds.
Then walk it
- Pricing first. Most B2B software is underpriced relative to the value it delivers. Move to value-based or usage-based pricing, introduce tiers, and raise prices on renewal for the existing base. This is near-pure margin.
- Retention second. Net revenue retention above 110 percent means the installed base grows without new sales. Reduce churn in the weakest cohort and upsell modules into the strongest. This changes the growth rate and therefore the multiple.
- Sales efficiency third. Look at customer acquisition cost payback and the magic number. If payback is over 24 months, the problem is targeting or pricing, not effort. Reallocate spend to the segments with the fastest payback.
- Cost fourth, and deliberately last. Consolidate the cloud bill, rationalise the product portfolio, offshore support engineering. Real money, but it does not change the growth story.
- Then the bolt-on question: in a fragmented software vertical, acquiring adjacent modules at a lower multiple and cross-selling them into your base is usually the single largest value-creation lever available.
- One flag on the question itself: P/E is an odd metric for a software company, since GAAP earnings are suppressed by growth spend and stock compensation. I would work off EV/ARR and EV/EBITDA instead, and I would say so.
Where candidates lose it
Jumping to cost cutting. In software, growth and retention drive the multiple, and the multiple drives the value far more than a margin point does. Also worth noticing that P/E is the wrong lens here; naming that is a real signal.
Expect next
- What is the formula for net revenue retention, gross retention and churn?
- Which of those levers moves the multiple?
- How would you verify the pipeline to forecast revenue?
Reported by candidates at Houlihan Lokey (Investment Banking, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
087How would you verify the validity of a client's sales pipeline in order to forecast revenue?Harris WilliamsInvestment Banking · Richmond · 2025
Say this
Test it historically before you believe it prospectively. Take last year's pipeline, see what actually converted by stage, and apply those real conversion rates rather than management's assumed ones.
Then walk it
- Back-test first. Pull the pipeline as it stood 12 months ago and compare it to what closed. If management said 60 percent of late-stage would convert and 30 percent did, you now have the real number and the size of their optimism.
- Test the stage definitions. A verbal indication is not a late-stage opportunity. Ask what evidence is required to move a deal between stages, and whether that discipline is enforced in the CRM.
- Check the vintage of each opportunity. Deals sitting in the pipeline for three times the average sales cycle are usually dead and not yet marked dead. They inflate the total.
- Check concentration. If three opportunities are half the pipeline, the forecast is not a probability distribution, it is three binary bets. Diligence those three individually and talk to those customers if the process allows.
- Cross-check against capacity. Does the forecast require more closed deals per salesperson than the team has ever achieved? And check whether headcount to deliver it is actually in the plan.
- Then rebuild the forecast bottom-up with your own conversion rates, and present it as a range against management's case. The gap between the two is one of the most valuable things you can hand a buyer.
Where candidates lose it
Accepting the pipeline and only sanity-checking the arithmetic. The technique is historical back-testing of conversion by stage. If you do not say that, you have not answered it.
Expect next
- What if they have no historical pipeline data?
- How would that change your valuation?
- What would you do if the top three opportunities were all with one customer?
Reported by candidates at Harris Williams (Investment Banking, Richmond, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.
