Case 031Debt fund credit decisionsHard
A credit fund holds NCDs in three real estate projects with different loan-to-value, interest cover and unsold inventory. Rates have risen 100 basis points. Rank the three exposures and say which you would cut.
1The situation
A Rs 2,400 crore credit risk fund holds non-convertible debentures issued against three residential projects of Aranyak Realty, a mid-sized developer. Each NCD is the project's only borrowing, matures in 24 months, and carries a coupon that resets with a benchmark rate, today 11%.
| Project | NCD held | Loan-to-value | Interest cover | Unsold stock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pune | Rs 90 crore | 45% | 2.3x | 14 months of sales |
| Hyderabad | Rs 110 crore | 68% | 1.1x | 30 months of sales |
| Nagpur | Rs 80 crore | 55% | 1.6x | 20 months of sales |
Rates have just risen 100 basis points, so the coupon resets to 12%. Your house view, an assumption for this case, is that home loan rates rise too, bookings slow by 15% and prices soften by 5%. Interest cover here means the project's yearly sales collections available for debt service divided by its interest bill.
2Your task
Rank the three exposures after the rate shock, say which you would cut and how, and what you would ask for on the ones you keep.
Quick check
Which metric changes most for the Hyderabad project after the shock?
Worked solution
Try it on paper, then open one step at a time.
30-second answerThe answer to give first
Rank Pune first, Nagpur second and Hyderabad last, and cut Hyderabad. After the shock Hyderabad's cover falls to 0.86x, so sales no longer pay its interest, and at the slower pace its flats take about 35 months to sell against a 24-month maturity. Pune keeps cover near 1.8x. Nagpur holds at 1.25x with its sales finishing right at maturity, so keep it only with an escrow and a cash sweep.
Step 1Why is loan-to-value the wrong place to start after a rate rise?
A family with a house worth twice its mortgage can still miss payments if the earner's income drops; the equity in the house only helps once the house is sold. Loan-to-value tells you how much cushion exists if the project is sold; interest cover and sales speed tell you whether the project reaches that point without defaulting. A rate rise barely moves the first and hits the other two directly, through a higher coupon and through buyers who now face dearer home loans.
Work Hyderabad through. Interest at 11% on Rs 110 crore is Rs 12.1 crore, and cover of 1.1x means collections of about Rs 13.31 crore a year. After the shock the coupon is 12%, Rs 13.2 crore, while collections fall 15% to Rs 11.31 crore. Cover is 0.86x and the project is short about Rs 1.9 crore a year, which it can only fund by borrowing more or cutting prices further.
Step 2Will each project sell its flats before the NCD falls due?
Unsold stock measured in months of sales is a clock. At 15% slower bookings, Pune needs about 16.5 months, Nagpur about 23.5 and Hyderabad about 35.3, against a 24-month maturity. Hyderabad therefore cannot repay from sales; it has to refinance in a market where lenders have just become more cautious. That is refinancing riskThe danger that a borrower who cannot repay from its own cash flow also cannot find a new lender when the old debt falls due., and it is the usual way real estate credit fails.
Step 3How much would the fund lose if Hyderabad defaults?
Now loan-to-value earns its place, as the recovery cushion. Assume a forced sale fetches 70% of the softened value. Pune's land and flats would cover its NCD 1.48 times, Nagpur's 1.21 times, Hyderabad's only 0.98 times. And recovery through enforcement in Indian real estate typically takes years: received three years out and discounted at 12%, Hyderabad's recovery is worth about 70 paise per rupee today.
| After the shock | Pune | Hyderabad | Nagpur |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interest cover | 1.79x | 0.86x | 1.25x |
| Loan-to-value | 47.4% | 71.6% | 57.9% |
| Months to sell stock | 16.5 | 35.3 | 23.5 |
| Forced-sale value over debt | 1.48x | 0.98x | 1.21x |
| Rank | 1 | 3 | 2 |
Step 4So which do you cut, and how?
Cut Hyderabad, even at a price. An illiquid NCD may only sell at a discount; say 6%, about Rs 6.6 crore or 0.27% of the fund's NAV. Holding instead carries an expected loss of roughly 9% of face if you put the default chance at 30% and the recovery at 70 paise, before counting the bigger risk: an open-ended fund holding a paper it cannot sell while investors redeem. If no buyer appears, negotiate a cash sweep of every booking receipt and stop any further lending to the project.
Keep Nagpur with conditions: an escrow over sales receipts, a cover covenant at 1.25x that triggers a sweep, and monthly booking data. Keep Pune. And note the limit of the analysis: the 15% slowdown and 5% price fall are assumptions, so run the ranking again at 25% and 10%. If the order does not change, the decision is robust.
Where candidates lose it
The usual loss is ranking on loan-to-value alone because it is the first number in the deck. At 45%, 68% and 55% the order happens to agree here, but the candidate then cannot say why Hyderabad is urgent rather than merely weakest: the point is that cover drops below 1x and the stock outlasts the maturity.
The second miss is treating the rate rise as a coupon effect only. The bigger channel is the buyers: dearer home loans slow bookings, which hits collections and the sales clock at the same time.
What the interviewer asks next
- Hyderabad offers a coupon step-up to 14% in exchange for a 12-month extension. Do you accept?
- How would you size a new real estate NCD in an open-ended fund given redemption risk?
- What covenants would you write into the Nagpur NCD today, and what triggers each one?
Asked at PIMCO, Real Estate, Munich, 2024 (Wall Street Oasis): how would you assess the attractiveness of real estate backed debt in different emea subregions? what metrics and risk factors would you prioritise
Company names and figures are illustrative.
