A fund house's market share fell from 3.1% to 2.4% in three years while the industry grew. Its flagship slipped to the third quartile and its bank distribution partner moved to a rival. Diagnose the decline consulting-style and prioritise three fixes.

The 0.7 points of lost share are about Rs 31,500 crore of assets, and the diagnostic splits them roughly 0.33 points to the lost bank channel, 0.20 to the flagship's performance and 0.17 to product gaps. Fix them in that order of size but not of sequence: repair the flagship first because the bank left over performance and no new partner signs a third-quartile fund, rebuild distribution second with two replacement partners and a direct channel, and launch a passive range third. Each fix is sized against the assets it can recover.

Start from the definition and break it apart, as a doctor starts from the symptom and works down the causes. Market share is Vishwasa's assets over the industry's. Assets change through three doors: gross sales in, redemptions out, and the market's effect on what is held. So the tree has three branches, and each can be split by channel and by fund: did the house sell less, lose more, or hold a book that grew more slowly than the industry's? The first check is the mix effect: a house heavy in debt funds loses share in an equity rally without doing anything wrong. Assume the diagnostic found that small here. The industry grew about 14% a year and Vishwasa about 5%; had it kept its 3.1%, it would hold Rs 139,500 crore today instead of Rs 108,000 crore, a gap of Rs 31,500 crore to explain.

Size each branch from the data the house already has. Distribution: the bank supplied 30% of gross sales; its flows went to zero two years ago and were only partly replaced, which the sales data puts at about Rs 15,000 crore of assets not gathered, 0.33 points of share. Performance: the flagship's slide to the third quartile turned its net flows negative and cost it the market growth its peers enjoyed, about Rs 9,000 crore, 0.20 points. Product: industry growth that came through passive funds and new fund offers, where Vishwasa had nothing to sell, about Rs 7,500 crore, 0.17 points. These are estimates with overlap: some of the bank's lost flows would have gone into the flagship, and some into products that do not exist. The sizing is to rank the causes, not to audit them.

Order by size, then correct for dependence. The largest cause is distribution, but the bank left two years ago, after the flagship had already slipped, and no replacement partner will put a third-quartile fund on its shelf. So the sequence is: first, repair the flagship, with a review of its process and risk, a co-manager or a change if the review warrants it, and clear communication to distributors about what changed; second, rebuild distribution with two replacement bank or NBFC partners, a push on independent advisers and a direct digital channel that does not depend on any one partner; third, launch a passive range of index funds and ETFs and one or two new funds in categories where the house has none. The first fix is a precondition for the second, the second is where the most assets are, and the third stops the next three years of industry growth passing the house by.

Close with the view and the limits. Vishwasa's decline is not one failure but three that compounded: performance cost it the bank, the lost bank cost it the flows, and the absent product range meant the industry's growth went elsewhere. The board should set a target for the house's share of gross sales by channel, not of assets, because gross sales respond to fixes within quarters and assets within years. The limits: the sizing of each cause rests on estimates that overlap, the flagship may take two or three years to climb back into the second quartile, and a new exclusive partner is likely to want pricing the house will have to weigh against the margin it has left.