Mutual Fund Mastery interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

32

Firms

19

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsVanguard5BLBlackRock3FTFranklin Templeton3Invesco3PIMCO3Fidelity Investments2J.P. Morgan2Morningstar2Neuberger Berman2SCSchroders2T. Rowe Price2Amundi1BMBNY Mellon1Goldman Sachs1Man Group1Northern Trust1SSState Street1Sycamore Partners1WMWellington Management1

Topic

All topicsFund structure and regulation7NAV and operations6Scheme categorisation4Equity schemes5Debt schemes7Risk, liquidity and disclosure7Index funds and ETFs6Hybrid and solution schemes3Costs, plans and commissions6SIP and investor mechanics5Performance measurement6Taxation5Distribution, compliance and NISM5Portfolio construction and advice5Estimation and numeracy5Markets and industry6Career and fit12

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitBrainteaserMarket view

1. 057Explain the difference between absolute return, CAGR and XIRR, and when you would use each.Performance measurementIntermediatetechnicalIndian AMCsDistribution and sales

   Say this

   Absolute return is the total percentage gain with no reference to time, used only for periods under a year. CAGR annualises a single investment between two dates. XIRR is the internal rate of return on a series of cash flows at different dates, which is the only correct measure for an SIP.

   Then walk it

   1. Absolute: 10 lakh becomes 12 lakh, that is 20 percent. Fine for six months, misleading for five years, and quoting a five-year absolute return of 90 percent is exactly how a fact sheet flatters a mediocre fund.
   2. CAGR: the constant annual rate that takes the start value to the end value. One inflow, one outflow, one answer. Useful and comparable, and it is what SEBI mandates for period returns beyond a year.
   3. XIRR: solves for the discount rate that makes the net present value of all cash flows zero. Each SIP instalment has its own holding period, so a five-year SIP has sixty different holding periods and no single CAGR can describe it.
   4. The intuition for why the two diverge: in an SIP, most of the money has been invested for far less than the full period. A five-year SIP has an average money-weighted holding period of about two and a half years, so a 14 percent XIRR on the SIP and a 14 percent CAGR on the fund are very different achievements.
   5. In practice: a client's own return is always XIRR, because he added and withdrew money. The fund's return is always CAGR on NAV. When a client says his return is lower than the fact sheet, this is almost always why.
   6. The limitation worth naming: XIRR is money-weighted, so it reflects the investor's timing as well as the manager's skill. To judge the manager you want the time-weighted number, which is the NAV CAGR. Use XIRR to measure the investor, CAGR to measure the fund.

   Where candidates lose it

   Using CAGR on an SIP, which overstates or understates the investor's return depending on the market path, and is simply the wrong tool. The insight that wins the question is money-weighted versus time-weighted: XIRR judges the investor, CAGR judges the manager.

   Expect next

   • A client's XIRR is 9 percent and the fund's five-year CAGR is 14. Explain it to him.
   • How would you compute XIRR in a spreadsheet?
   • Which number belongs in a fact sheet?
2. 058Why do point-to-point returns mislead, and what are rolling returns?Performance measurementHardtechnicalIndian AMCsProduct and strategy roles

   Say this

   A point-to-point return depends entirely on the two dates you picked, and fund marketing picks them. Rolling returns compute the return over a fixed window starting on every single day in the history, so you get a distribution of outcomes instead of one lucky path.

   Then walk it

   1. The problem in one example: a five-year return measured from March 2020 starts at the Covid bottom. Almost any Indian equity fund looks extraordinary. Move the start date back three months and the same fund looks ordinary.
   2. Rolling returns fix the start-date bias. For three-year rolling returns over ten years you get roughly 1,800 overlapping three-year observations, each annualised.
   3. What you then look at is the distribution: the median, which is a fairer central estimate than any single window; the worst observation, which tells you the pain a real investor could have experienced; and the proportion of windows that beat the benchmark or cleared, say, 12 percent.
   4. That consistency measure is the useful output. A fund that beat its index in 70 percent of three-year windows is a different proposition from one that beat it in 40 percent but happens to lead the one-year table today.
   5. Rolling returns also expose manager change. If the strong windows all start before a manager left, the distribution will show it while a point-to-point number will not.
   6. Two honest limitations: overlapping windows are highly autocorrelated, so 1,800 observations are nowhere near 1,800 independent data points, and rolling returns still say nothing about whether the strategy will work in the next regime. They fix selection bias, not the fundamental problem of a short Indian track record.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing rolling returns as an averaging technique and stopping. The point is the distribution — median, worst case and hit rate — and the reason is start-date bias. And do not oversell them: overlapping windows are statistically dependent, and saying so is what a research interviewer is waiting for.

   Expect next

   • How many independent observations do you really have?
   • What would you look at other than the median?
   • How do you handle a fund manager change in the history?
3. 060What is alpha, and how do you know it is skill rather than just beta?Performance measurementHardtechnicalIndian AMCsFund research and ratings

   Say this

   Alpha is the return left over after you account for the risk the manager took. Raw outperformance is not alpha — if a fund beat the Nifty by 4 percent while running a beta of 1.3 in a rising market, the market gave him most of it and the correct alpha is close to zero.

   Then walk it

   1. Formally, Jensen's alpha is the fund return minus the return the capital asset pricing model predicts for its beta. Run the regression, and alpha is the intercept.
   2. The single-factor version is not enough in practice. Once you add size, value, momentum and quality factors, most Indian mid and small cap outperformance turns out to be a size and momentum tilt rather than stock selection.
   3. So the test is: regress the fund's excess returns on the factors it is plausibly exposed to, and see what survives. If nothing survives, the manager is running a factor portfolio at active fees, and you can buy that exposure in a smart beta index fund for a fraction of the cost.
   4. Statistical significance matters and is usually ignored. With five years of monthly data, an alpha of 2 percent a year will typically have a t-statistic well below 2. You cannot reject luck, and you should say so.
   5. Also check whether the alpha is in the right place. Alpha from a handful of large positions is a concentrated bet; alpha spread across the book, repeated in different market conditions, looks more like process.
   6. And the survivorship problem. The funds you are analysing are the ones that survived. Merged and closed schemes are gone from the database, which biases every category average upward — in India that effect got a boost from the 2017 merger wave.

   Where candidates lose it

   Equating alpha with beating the benchmark. That is the core error. Also, be ready to admit the statistical weakness: a candidate who claims a five-year alpha proves skill has revealed they have never run the regression.

   Expect next

   • What does a factor regression on an Indian mid cap fund usually show?
   • How does survivorship bias affect category averages?
   • What t-statistic would convince you?
4. 061Sharpe, Sortino, information ratio, Treynor. Which would you report to a client and which to an investment committee?Performance measurementHardtechnicalIndian AMCsFund research and ratings

   Say this

   Sharpe for a client, because it answers the only question they care about: return per unit of total risk. Information ratio for the committee, because it measures the manager against his benchmark rather than against cash, which is what you are actually paying him for.

   Then walk it

   1. Sharpe: excess return over the risk-free rate divided by standard deviation of returns. Simple, universal, and it treats upside and downside volatility identically — which is its main flaw.
   2. Sortino: the same idea but the denominator only counts downside deviation. Better for asymmetric strategies, so it flatters an arbitrage or a covered-call fund and is the right measure for anything with a skewed return profile.
   3. Information ratio: active return divided by tracking error. This is the manager-skill measure, because it asks how much excess return he generated per unit of deviation from the benchmark. A closet indexer can have a good Sharpe and a terrible information ratio.
   4. Treynor: excess return divided by beta rather than total volatility. Relevant when the fund is one sleeve of a diversified portfolio, so only systematic risk matters. Rarely used in Indian retail reporting.
   5. Practical numbers for calibration: a long-run Sharpe of 0.5 to 0.7 is normal for an Indian equity fund over a full cycle, and an information ratio above 0.5 sustained over five years is genuinely good. Anyone quoting a Sharpe of 2 on an equity fund has measured a bull market.
   6. The shared limitation, which I would state before being asked: all four assume returns are roughly normal and stable, all four are computed on a short sample, and all four can be gamed by choosing the period. They are screening tools, not verdicts.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reciting four formulas with no view on which to use where. The differentiator is knowing that Sharpe measures against cash and information ratio measures against the benchmark, so only the second one tells you whether the active fee was earned.

   Expect next

   • A fund has a high Sharpe and a low information ratio. What is going on?
   • Which would you use for an arbitrage fund?
   • What Sharpe would make you suspicious?
5. 062What is portfolio turnover, and why did SEBI insist funds be benchmarked against total return indices?Performance measurementIntermediatetechnicalIndian AMCsFund research and ratings

   Say this

   Turnover is the value of securities traded in a year as a percentage of average net assets — a 100 percent turnover means the manager effectively replaced the whole portfolio once. The total return index rule, effective from February 2018, forced funds to compare themselves against an index including dividends, which removed a free 1 to 1.5 percent a year of fake outperformance.

   Then walk it

   1. What turnover tells you: holding period. Turnover of 200 percent means an average holding period of about six months, which is inconsistent with a manager who claims to buy businesses for the long term.
   2. It also costs money. Every trade pays brokerage, securities transaction tax and market impact, and none of that shows up in the TER — it just reduces NAV. High turnover in a small cap fund is expensive because impact cost is the dominant term.
   3. But high turnover is not automatically bad. It is bad when it is inconsistent with the stated process, or when it is not accompanied by outperformance. A momentum or an arbitrage strategy is supposed to have high turnover.
   4. Read it with flows. A fund receiving heavy SIP money shows turnover from deployment rather than from trading decisions, which is why you compare a fund's turnover to its own history rather than across categories.
   5. On the benchmark rule: before 2018 funds compared themselves to a price index that excluded dividends. Since Indian dividend yields run around 1 to 1.5 percent, every fund got that head start for free. SEBI's total return index mandate removed it, and large cap active outperformance visibly deteriorated overnight.
   6. The honest read of that episode is worth saying: a measurement change, not a change in skill, is what made Indian large cap active management look bad. That is a good reminder that benchmark choice is not a detail.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating high turnover as automatically bad, or not knowing the TRI rule. The TRI change is one of the most consequential Indian regulatory events for performance comparison, and a candidate who can explain why active large cap numbers worsened after February 2018 has demonstrated real familiarity.

   Expect next

   • How would you distinguish turnover from deployment of inflows?
   • What happened to active outperformance after the TRI rule?
   • What turnover would you expect from a momentum fund?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.