Case 083Risk management and limit breachesCore
A volatility spike pushes a fund's value at risk from 1.6% to 2.4% against a 2% limit. Do you cut every position proportionally or cut the largest contributor?
1The situation
Meghdoot Absolute Return Fund has a NAV of Rs 1,200 crore and a one-day 99% value at riskA loss the fund should exceed on only one day in a hundred, estimated from the volatility and correlation of its positions. limit of 2% of NAV, Rs 24 crore. Last month value at risk was 1.6%. The positions have not changed, but market volatility has risen by half across the book, taking value at risk to 2.4%.
The risk system shows four positions: long private banks, 27.6% of NAV; long IT services, 17.2%; short consumer staples, 13.8%; and long government bond futures, 20.7%. The fund must be back under the limit by tomorrow's close. Trading costs are about 0.15% of value traded.
2Your task
Compare cutting every position proportionally with cutting the largest contributor to value at risk. Which do you do, and what do you tell the risk committee?
Quick check
To get from 2.4% back to 2.0% by cutting everything equally, how much of each position must you keep?
Worked solution
Try it on paper, then open one step at a time.
30-second answerThe answer to give first
Cut the private banks position, not everything. A proportional cut keeps 83.3% of every position and sells about Rs 159 crore. Banks alone contribute 1.42 of the 2.40 points of value at risk, 59% of the risk from 35% of the gross exposure. Trimming banks from 27.6% to 19.7% of NAV restores the limit while selling only Rs 95 crore, and it leaves the hedges that were lowering risk intact.
Step 1Why did value at risk jump when nothing was traded?
Value at risk is built from position sizes and volatility. If every volatility rises by half and correlations hold, value at risk rises by exactly half, from 1.6% to 2.4%, with no trade at all. It is like a speed limit on a wet road: you did not press the accelerator, but the safe speed fell under you. The breach is still a breach; the committee will ask what you are doing about it, not whose fault the rain was.
Step 2What does the proportional cut cost?
Scaling every position by the same factor scales value at risk by that factor. Keeping 83.3% of everything brings value at risk to exactly 2.0%, but sells 16.7% of a gross book of 79% of NAV, about Rs 159 crore. That includes cutting the staples short and the bond futures, which were contributing little risk, and pays about Rs 24 lakh in costs. It is simple and defensible, and it treats every rupee of exposure as equally risky, which it is not.
| Position | % of NAV | Rs crore | VaR contribution now | Share of VaR | After cutting banks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Long private banks | +27.6% | +331 | 1.42% | 59% | 0.98% |
| Long IT services | +17.2% | +207 | 0.70% | 29% | 0.73% |
| Short consumer staples | -13.8% | -166 | 0.24% | 10% | 0.26% |
| Long government bond futures | +20.7% | +248 | 0.03% | 1% | 0.03% |
| Total | 2.40% | 100% | 2.00% |
Step 3Why is the targeted cut cheaper?
Contribution to value at risk is not the same as size. A position's contribution is its size times how much it moves with the whole book. Banks are large, volatile and correlated with IT, so they carry 59% of the risk; the staples short and bond futures move against or apart from the rest and add almost nothing. Cutting banks from 27.6% to 19.7% of NAV sells Rs 95 crore, 60% of the proportional route, and keeps the positions that diversify the book.
Step 4When would you choose the proportional cut anyway?
When the targeted cut would gut your best idea. The cheapest risk reduction is not always the right portfolio: if banks are the highest-conviction position, cutting them alone changes what the fund is betting on. Tell the committee three things: the breach came from volatility, not new trades; you are cutting banks to 19.7% because they carry most of the risk; and you will review whether a 2% limit set in calm markets still fits, rather than asking for a waiver today. Say the limit of the tool too: value at risk from recent volatility will fall again when markets calm, and the fund should not re-lever the moment it does.
Where candidates lose it
The common loss is cutting 20% of everything because the limit is 20% below the reading. The right scale factor is 2.0 over 2.4, and the right question is which positions carry the risk, not how big each one is.
The second is cutting the positions that were hedging. Selling part of the staples short or the bond futures barely lowers value at risk and can even raise it, because they were offsetting the long book.
What the interviewer asks next
- Would cutting the IT position alone get the fund under the limit? What does that tell you?
- The risk committee offers a temporary limit of 2.5%. Do you take it?
- How would you change the limit framework so a volatility spike does not force selling at the worst time?
- Which position has the highest marginal value at risk per rupee, and why?
Company names and figures are illustrative.
