Explain a company we should invest in: a modular kitchen maker growing 25% with a 45% gross margin and four months of orders. Give the thesis and the two diligence questions that would decide it.

The thesis is a category shift from carpenter-built to modular kitchens, captured by a brand whose 45% gross margin shows pricing power, with four months of paid orders proving demand is ahead of capacity. Rs 250 crore growing 25% with Rs 30 crore of EBITDA can fund showrooms from its own cash and customer deposits. The two questions that decide it: how much of the 25% is same-showroom growth rather than new openings, and whether the Rs 83 crore order book converts to invoices on time or is an installation bottleneck.

Each number is a claim about the world, so say the claim, not the number. Think of recommending a restaurant: full tables say demand, the bill says pricing power, a queue says people wait for it rather than go elsewhere. 25% growth says the category is moving from carpenters to factory-made kitchens; a 45% gross margin says customers pay for the brand rather than the plywood; four months of half-paid orders says demand is ahead of what Nirmiti can install. Three claims, each with a number behind it, is a thesis an investment committee can argue with. A list of adjectives is not.

Because 25% can come from two very different places. If 8 new showrooms on a base of 40 each sell at the average Rs 6.25 crore, openings alone add 20%, and same-showroom growth is only about 5%. That is still a fine business, but it is a rollout, where the fund is paying for capital expenditure, rather than a brand gaining share, where the fund is paying for demand. The test is sales by showroom and by vintage over three years, which any company with a till can produce. Same-store growthRevenue growth from outlets open for more than a year, which strips out the effect of new openings. above 10% would confirm the category claim; growth near zero would say the showrooms are cannibalising each other.

Because it can mean opposite things. Rs 83 crore of orders is either demand the factory cannot serve, which is the thesis, or installations running four months late, which is the risk, and the same number describes both. Order age, cancellation rate and days from order to installation separate them in an afternoon with the order ledger. The margin claim matters, but a 45% gross margin after installation labour is already a strong number; the question there is whether dealer channels or the second factory dilute it, which is a forecast rather than a fact you can check today.

With the shape of the deal and what you would pay for. Nirmiti needs growth capital for showrooms and a factory, customers fund working capital with deposits, and Rs 30 crore of EBITDA means the business is not burning cash, so the fund is buying growth, not survival. Say what you do not know: whether the margin holds in a dealer channel, and whether management can open 8 showrooms a year without the quality that justifies the price slipping. A pitch that ends by naming its own open questions sounds like an investor; one that ends with a flourish sounds like a salesperson.