Private Wealth Management interview preparation
Client discovery, goals-based planning, asset allocation, tax and estate structuring, products and the commercial reality of building a book, with substantial Indian content on PMS, AIFs, SEBI's adviser rules and family structures. Every question is either traced to a named firm from a public candidate report, or tagged at desk level when we could not trace it.
100 questions, mapped to the firms that asked them
- Questions
- 100
- Traced to a firm
- 22
- Firms
- 13
- Updated
- September 2026
039What is an illiquidity budget, and what happened to people who did not have one in 2022?Family officesPrivate banking
Say this
An illiquidity budget is a hard cap on how much of the portfolio can be locked up, set against spending needs and uncalled commitments, and monitored as a live number rather than a target. In 2022 the people without one hit the denominator effect and became forced sellers of exactly the wrong assets.
Then walk it
- The budget has three components: the illiquid market value, the uncalled commitments, and the liquid assets available to meet calls and spending over the next three years. The cap is on the first two combined.
- The denominator effect is simple and brutal. In 2022 public markets fell 20 percent while private marks lagged, so a portfolio targeting 20 percent privates woke up at 28 percent without buying anything. The numerator was stale, the denominator had shrunk.
- That forced two bad outcomes. Investors stopped making new commitments precisely in the best vintage years, breaking the vintage diversification their whole programme depended on. And some sold on the secondary market at discounts, roughly 10 to 20 percent below carrying value for buyout stakes and much deeper for venture.
- The other half of the squeeze was distributions drying up. Exits stopped, so the self-funding loop where old funds' distributions pay new funds' calls broke, and calls had to be met from the liquid sleeve while it was down.
- How you build the budget: model calls at roughly 25 percent of the commitment a year over four years, assume distributions arrive later and smaller than the manager's model, stress the public sleeve down 30 percent, and check the plan still works. If it does not, the commitment is too big.
- The practical rule I would use: never commit more in a year than the liquid sleeve can absorb in a 30 percent drawdown, and count the commitment against the budget from the day it is signed, not the day it is called.
Where candidates lose it
Defining the denominator effect as an academic curiosity. It had concrete consequences: missed vintages, secondary sales at discounts, and forced selling of public assets at the bottom. Give the 2022 mechanics and the stress test, or the answer is a definition.
Expect next
- How would you model the call schedule?
- What discounts were secondaries trading at?
- What does a continuation vehicle tell you about the exit market?
040A client asks why his private equity fund reports 22 percent IRR when his mutual fund shows 14 percent. How do you answer?Family officesPrivate banking
Say this
They are not the same measure. IRR is money-weighted and depends on when capital was called and returned; the fund return is time-weighted on money that was fully invested throughout. Comparing them directly flatters the private fund, sometimes by a lot.
Then walk it
- The mechanical difference: IRR assumes every rupee is compounding from the moment it is called, but the client's uncalled commitment was sitting in a liquidity fund earning 6 percent. The return on his committed capital is much lower than the return on his called capital.
- IRR is also gameable, legitimately. A subscription line of credit lets the manager delay calling capital, which shortens the measured holding period and lifts IRR without changing a single rupee of profit. Early exits of the best deals do the same.
- So ask for the multiple alongside it. TVPI and DPI tell you how much money came back. A 22 percent IRR with a 1.4 times multiple is a fast flip; 18 percent with 2.3 times is more money. Clients spend multiples, not rates.
- The right comparison is a public market equivalent: what would the same cash flows, invested into an index on the same dates, have produced? If the index PME says 19 percent, the manager's 22 percent is a 3 point premium for eight years of illiquidity and 2 and 20, which is not obviously a good trade.
- Then the valuation caveat: the unrealised portion of that IRR is the manager's own mark. Until DPI is above 1, a large part of the number is an opinion.
- So the sentence I would actually say to the client: 'Your fund has done well, but the honest comparison is not 22 against 14. It is what the whole commitment earned, including the cash waiting to be called, against what an index would have done with the same cash flows. On that basis the gap is smaller.'
Where candidates lose it
Explaining IRR versus time-weighted return correctly and stopping. The examinable extras are the subscription line effect, the need for DPI and TVPI, and PME as the correct comparison. And the client-facing skill is compressing all of that into one honest sentence he can act on.
Expect next
- What is a public market equivalent and how is it computed?
- What is DPI and why do you care about it more over time?
- How does a subscription line flatter IRR?
Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.
