Quant interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

53

Firms

15

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsOld Mission Capital12Tower Research Capital10Jump Trading7Akuna Capital5Citadel4DED.E. Shaw3Jane Street3ACAQR Capital Management2DRW2Millennium Management2Schonfeld2SCSquarepoint Capital2Susquehanna International Group2Belvedere Trading1Optiver1

Topic

All topicsProbability10Coins, cards and games6Expected value8Statistics11Market making15Estimation and mental maths4Stochastic processes4Regression5Machine learning6Time series6Programming10Options and derivatives8Fit and motivation7

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyBrainteaserTechnicalCaseMarket viewFit

1. 016You win a hundred dollars if you roll a ten with two dice. How much would you risk to play?Market makingIntermediatetechnicalAkuna CapitalTrading · Chicago · 2025

   Say this

   Fair value is eight dollars and a third. Three of the 36 outcomes make ten, so probability is 1/12 and the expected payoff is 100 over 12. I would pay up to about seven to leave edge, and if I am being asked to make a two-way price I would quote around 7 at 9.

   Then walk it

   1. Count the outcomes: 6-4, 4-6, 5-5. Three ways out of 36, so 1/12, about 8.33 percent.
   2. Expected payoff 100 times 1/12 equals 8.33. That is fair value, and fair value is where you break even, not where you trade.
   3. So I need edge. I would bid 7 and offer 9 if I have to two-way it, which is about a dollar and a half of edge either side, roughly fifteen percent of fair value. That width reflects the fact that I cannot hedge a one-off die roll.
   4. Size matters as much as price. This bet has a standard deviation of about 28 dollars against a mean of 8.33, which is a terrible ratio. I would do it small even at a good price, and I would want to repeat it many times rather than do it once large.
   5. If the game is repeatable and I can do it a thousand times, I pay closer to 8. The edge I demand is compensation for variance I cannot diversify, and repetition diversifies it.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering with the fair value of 8.33 as if that were your bid. A trader never pays fair value, and saying eight and a third is what I would risk tells the interviewer you do not understand where the money comes from. Quote a price below fair value, name your width, and say your size.

   Expect next

   • Now make me a two-way market on it and I will trade you.
   • What if I could roll a hundred times?
   • What is the standard deviation of your P&L on one play?

   Reported by candidates at Akuna Capital (Trading, Chicago, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 062You have made me a market. If the true answer falls inside your market, how much would you risk to win a hundred dollars?Market makingHardtechnicalAkuna CapitalTrading · Chicago · 2025

   Say this

   That depends entirely on how wide I quoted and how confident I am, and those two are linked. If I quoted a tight market I should not be very confident the answer is inside it, so I would risk little. If I quoted wide, I should be confident, and I would risk more. The honest answer is to price my own probability and then bet a fraction of Kelly.

   Then walk it

   1. The question is a consistency check. A tight market is a strong claim, and the interviewer is testing whether my stated width matches my stated confidence. If I said 300 at 310 on the number of Starbucks in New York and then say I am 90 percent sure the truth is inside, one of those is a lie.
   2. So I quantify. Suppose I think there is a 60 percent chance the answer is inside my market. Then risking x to win 100 has expected value 0.6 times 100 minus 0.4 times x, which is positive for x below 150. So fair value is 150 and I would bet meaningfully below that.
   3. Kelly gives the size: bet a fraction of capital equal to edge over odds. At 60 percent on an even-money-ish bet the full Kelly fraction is around 20 percent of capital, and I would take a quarter to a half of that, because my 60 percent is itself an estimate and overbetting Kelly is far more punishing than underbetting.
   4. I would also name the asymmetry in the setup. The interviewer chooses whether to take the bet, so they only take it when they think my price is wrong. That is adverse selection, and it means I should shade my number down from the naive fair value.
   5. So a concrete answer: with a 60 percent belief and an adversary who selects, I would risk around 50 to 70 dollars to win 100, and I would say out loud that I am shading below the 150 fair value because you get to choose whether to trade.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a bravado number like I'd risk a thousand, or refusing to name a figure. Both fail. Also failing to notice that your quoted width already implied a confidence level, so an answer inconsistent with your own market gets picked apart immediately. Name your probability, compute fair value, then shade for adverse selection.

   Expect next

   • So tighten your market and answer again.
   • What if I let you choose which side of the bet to take?
   • Explain why you shaded below fair value.

   Reported by candidates at Akuna Capital (Trading, Chicago, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 064You are long five hundred lots and the market keeps offering below you. What do you do with your quotes?Market makingIntermediatetechnicalProp trading firmsQuant trading

   Say this

   Skew. Lower both my bid and my offer so I am more likely to sell than to buy, because I want to reduce inventory, and widen if the flow suggests the market is informed. Skewing quotes is how a market maker manages inventory without crossing the spread.

   Then walk it

   1. The mechanism: a market maker's reservation price moves against their inventory. Long inventory means I value the next unit less, so my fair value shifts down and my quotes should shift with it. That is the core result of the Avellaneda-Stoikov style inventory models.
   2. Skewing is cheaper than hedging aggressively. If I dump 500 lots at market I pay the spread plus impact immediately. If I skew, I get paid the spread to unwind, just more slowly.
   3. But I need to distinguish two situations. If the offers are noise traders, I keep skewing and unwind profitably. If the offers are informed flow ahead of news, skewing just means I keep buying into a falling market, which is how market makers blow up.
   4. The tell is whether the market comes back. If I sell some and the price recovers, I was providing liquidity. If every trade is followed by the market moving further against me, I am being run over and I should widen, reduce size, or cross the spread and get flat.
   5. So the decision rule I would say out loud: skew first, size down second, and cross the spread third if my position is still growing against me. And I would have a hard limit set in advance, because the one thing you cannot do is decide your maximum loss while you are losing.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering hold and wait for it to come back, which is the losing trader's answer. Also answering just hedge without noting that hedging costs the spread. The interviewer wants to see the skew mechanism named, and wants to hear you distinguish noise flow from informed flow.

   Expect next

   • How do you tell whether the flow is informed?
   • At what point do you cross the spread and get flat?
   • How would you set your position limit in advance?
4. 069You quote a tight market and get lifted on your offer immediately. Are you happy?Market makingIntermediatetechnicalProp trading firmsQuant trading

   Say this

   No, not immediately. An instant fill is usually bad news: it means my offer was the cheapest thing available, which suggests my fair value was too low. I would shift my market up, not celebrate the spread I just earned.

   Then walk it

   1. The right frame is that a fill is information. If the market wanted my offer that fast, my offer was probably below consensus fair value.
   2. The fill I actually want is slow and two-sided: I buy on the bid, sell on the offer, and end the day roughly flat having collected the spread many times. Getting filled on one side only is a warning.
   3. So the immediate action is to move both quotes in the direction of the flow and reconsider the width. The mid moves up, and I may widen because I am now less sure where fair value is.
   4. How to measure whether it was actually bad: markout. Look at the mid a minute later. If the market is above where I sold, I was adversely selected regardless of the spread I booked. Booking the spread and losing on the markout is the classic way a market maker loses money while showing positive spread capture.
   5. The one case where I am genuinely happy is if I know the flow is uninformed, for instance a retail-sized order or a predictable end-of-day hedger. Then an instant fill is exactly the business. So the honest answer is: it depends who traded with me, and I would want to know that before I formed a view.

   Where candidates lose it

   Saying yes, I made the spread. That is the answer of somebody who thinks the spread is profit rather than gross revenue. Instant one-sided fills are the signature of adverse selection, and the interviewer is checking whether your instinct is to update or to congratulate yourself.

   Expect next

   • How would you check whether you were picked off?
   • What do you do with your quotes now?
   • When would an instant fill be good news?
5. 070Something goes badly wrong on your book during the session. How do you react?Market makingIntermediatetechnicalOld Mission CapitalProp Trading · Chicago · 2025

   Say this

   Reduce risk first, diagnose second, and tell someone immediately. In that order. The instinct to understand the problem before acting on it is the wrong instinct when the position is still live and the loss is still growing.

   Then walk it

   1. Step one, stop the bleeding. Pull quotes, flatten or hedge the exposure I did not intend to have, and cap any automated system that might still be adding to it. Getting smaller is almost never the wrong move under uncertainty.
   2. Step two, escalate. Tell the senior trader on the desk and the risk desk straight away, before I know the cause. Every trading floor's disaster stories are about someone who tried to fix it quietly first.
   3. Step three, establish the facts. What is my actual position, what is the realised and unrealised loss, is the pricing wrong or is the position wrong, and is anything still running that I have not stopped.
   4. Step four, only then diagnose and fix. A bad parameter, a stale feed, a hedge that did not go through, a fat finger, a genuine adverse move.
   5. And afterwards, write it up. A one-page post-mortem with a concrete control change is what stops the same failure twice. What a desk actually wants to hear from a junior candidate is that you act to reduce risk without needing permission, and escalate without needing to look competent first. Composure plus disclosure, in that order.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering that you would investigate the cause first. On a live book that is exactly backwards, and a prop trading interviewer is listening for the reduce-then-escalate-then-diagnose sequence. Also do not claim you would stay completely calm. Say you would act on a checklist precisely because you would not be calm.

   Expect next

   • Who do you tell, and how quickly?
   • Tell me about a time you made a real mistake and what you did.
   • What would you put in the post-mortem?

   Reported by candidates at Old Mission Capital (Prop Trading, Chicago, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 071Here is a scenario. Walk me through how you would analyse the trade.Market makingHardcase studySchonfeldQuantitative Research · New York · 2021

   Say this

   I would structure it as five questions: what is the thesis and what would make it wrong, what is the expected value, how do I size it, how do I hedge what I am not trying to be exposed to, and what is my exit. Then say the number, because a trade analysis without a number is an opinion.

   Then walk it

   1. Thesis first, stated as a falsifiable claim with a horizon. Not this looks cheap, but I think this spread compresses from 80 to 50 basis points over three months because of a specific mechanism, and if it is still at 80 in three months I am wrong.
   2. Expected value: probability times payoff on each branch. If there is a 60 percent chance of making 3 and a 40 percent chance of losing 2, that is 1.8 minus 0.8, so plus 1 with a 5-point range of outcomes. The range matters as much as the mean.
   3. Sizing: from the loss branch, not the win branch. I size so that the bad case is a loss I can carry, which in practice means a fraction of my risk budget, and I say what that fraction is.
   4. Hedging: separate the exposure I want from the ones that come attached. If the view is idiosyncratic, hedge out the market beta, the sector, and the rate duration, then check what basis risk remains after hedging, because that is the risk I did not choose.
   5. Exit and monitoring: the level or the date at which I am out, plus the two or three observables that would tell me the thesis is breaking before the P&L does. And I would name the thing I cannot hedge, because every trade has one and being explicit about it is what makes the analysis credible rather than promotional.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing the thesis at length and never getting to sizing, hedging or the exit. Anyone can have a view. What a multi-manager platform is hiring for is the risk framework around it, so spend at least half your answer on size, hedge and exit, and name the unhedgeable residual yourself.

   Expect next

   • What is your stop, and why there?
   • What would make you double the position?
   • What risk are you left with after hedging?

   Reported by candidates at Schonfeld (Quantitative Research, New York, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.