Case 069Term sheets and waterfallsHard
Sarthavik Mobility has two Series B term sheets: a lower price with clean terms, or a higher price with a participating preference and a full ratchet. Compare the founders' proceeds at three exits and after a later down round.
1The situation
Sarthavik Mobility runs electric bus routes for companies' staff. It is raising a Rs 50 crore Series B and has two term sheets. Fund X offers a Rs 100 crore pre-money valuation with a 1x non-participating liquidation preference and standard broad-based weighted average anti-dilution. Fund Y offers Rs 130 crore pre-money with a 1.5x participating preference and full-ratchet anti-dilution.
For simplicity, the founders own all shares before the round, 1 crore shares, and there are no other investors or options. Compare exits of Rs 150, 400 and 1,000 crore, then a later Rs 30 crore round at half the Series B price.
2Your task
Which term sheet leaves the founders better off, at which exits, and what happens after a down round?
Quick check
At a Rs 400 crore exit, which term sheet pays the founders more?
Worked solution
Try it on paper, then open one step at a time.
30-second answerThe answer to give first
Fund X's lower price pays the founders more at every exit below about Rs 975 crore. At Rs 150 crore founders get Rs 100 crore under X and Rs 54 crore under Y; at Rs 400 crore, Rs 267 crore against Rs 235 crore; at Rs 1,000 crore the two are within Rs 1.4 crore. After a later round at half price, Y's full ratchet doubles its shares, and at a Rs 400 crore exit founders would get about Rs 183 crore under X against Rs 146 crore under Y.
Step 1What does each term sheet give the investor?
Imagine two people offering to fund your shop. One wants a third of the profits, or his money back if you close. The other wants slightly less than a third, but also one and a half times his money back first in any sale, before sharing the rest. Fund X buys a third of Sarthavik, 50 over 150, and takes either Rs 50 crore or its third, whichever is larger; Fund Y buys 27.8%, 50 over 180, but takes Rs 75 crore first and then its 27.8% of what is left. That second structure, a participating preferenceA liquidation preference after which the investor also shares in the remaining proceeds as if it had converted, so it is paid twice on the same shares., is why the higher headline can pay founders less.
Step 2What do founders receive at Rs 150, 400 and 1,000 crore?
Under Fund X, at Rs 150 crore the fund is indifferent between Rs 50 crore and its third, so founders get Rs 100 crore; above that it converts and founders keep two thirds. Under Fund Y, founders always get 72.2% of the exit less Rs 75 crore: Rs 54.2 crore at 150, Rs 234.7 crore at 400 and Rs 668.1 crore at 1,000. The two lines meet where two thirds of the exit equals 72.2% of the exit less Rs 75 crore, at about Rs 975 crore. Below that, the founders give up more to participation than they gain from the higher price.
| Exit, Rs crore | Fund X takes | Founders under X | Fund Y takes | Founders under Y |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 150 | 50.0 | 100.0 | 95.8 | 54.2 |
| 400 | 133.3 | 266.7 | 165.3 | 234.7 |
| 1,000 | 333.3 | 666.7 | 331.9 | 668.1 |
Step 3What happens after a later round at half the price?
Suppose Sarthavik later raises Rs 30 crore at half the Series B price. Under X, the round is at Rs 50 a share and weighted average moves Fund X's conversion price from Rs 100 to about Rs 85.71, so its 50 lakh shares become 58.3 lakh. Under Y, the round is at Rs 65 and the full ratchet resets Fund Y's price all the way down, doubling its shares from 38.5 lakh to 76.9 lakh. Founders end at 45.8% under X and 44.8% under Y. At a later Rs 400 crore exit where everyone converts under X, founders get about Rs 183 crore; under Y, Fund Y still takes its Rs 75 crore first, leaving founders about Rs 146 crore.
Step 4Which term sheet should the founders take?
Fund X's, unless they are confident of an exit well above Rs 1,000 crore with no down round on the way. Fund Y's 30% higher headline is paid for with participation, which costs the founders money at every realistic exit, and a ratchet, which costs them most exactly when things go badly. A founder who takes Y is betting on the best case to win a vanity number. If they prefer Y's investor for other reasons, the trade to ask for is clean terms at a price in between, or participation capped at a total return of, say, 2x, after which Fund Y must choose between its preference and converting. The limitation: this ignores who the two funds are, and the better partner can be worth more than these differences.
Where candidates lose it
The usual miss is comparing pre-money valuations and choosing Rs 130 crore. Valuation is the price of the shares; the preference and anti-dilution terms decide how much of each rupee of exit the founders actually keep.
The second is treating a 1.5x participating preference like a 1.5x non-participating one. Participation means Fund Y never has to choose; it takes its Rs 75 crore and its share of the rest, which is why its line sits below Fund X's for so long.
What the interviewer asks next
- Fund Y agrees to cap participation at 3x its money. Where do the lines cross now?
- Why do later-stage investors ask for a ratchet, and when would a founder accept one?
- How would the comparison change if earlier investors held non-participating preferences too?
Company names and figures are illustrative.
