Venture Capital interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

31

Firms

12

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsGeneral Atlantic9Insight Partners7Silver Lake6Vista Equity Partners4Bessemer Venture Partners3ACAccel2Advent International2Battery Ventures2Andreessen Horowitz1Coatue Management1Sequoia Capital1WPWarburg Pincus1

Topic

All topicsSourcing and deal flow5Market sizing and estimation8Founders and teams5Unit economics and cohorts11Term sheets12Cap table and dilution7Early-stage valuation7Portfolio construction6Board and governance4Down rounds and secondaries4Exits and liquidity4Fund economics5Sector theses and markets6India venture market6Fit and motivation10

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalFitCaseMarket viewBrainteaser

1. 003You get two hundred inbound decks a month. How do you triage them?Sourcing and deal flowIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCSeed funds

   Say this

   Two filters in sequence. First a hard screen on fund fit that takes thirty seconds, then a judgement screen on the three things that actually predict an outcome. Most of the two hundred die on the first one, and that is fine.

   Then walk it

   1. Hard screen, mechanical: stage, cheque size, geography, sector mandate, and whether the round is already led. If the fund writes $2m seed cheques in India and this is a $40m Series C in Brazil, it is a polite no in one line. That is maybe 70 percent of the pile.
   2. Second screen, three questions only: is the market big enough to return the fund on its own, is there something about this team that makes them the right people for it, and is there evidence anybody actually wants this.
   3. Evidence beats narrative at this stage. Twenty paying customers with a two-week sales cycle tells me more than a beautiful market slide. For consumer, a retention curve that flattens.
   4. Then a deliberate 'weird pile'. Companies that fail the screen but where something is genuinely strange in an interesting way. In a power-law business the outliers rarely look sensible on a first pass, so a purely mechanical filter is a good way to miss the one that matters.
   5. Reply to everyone within a few days, including the noes, with one line of real reason. The cost is low and the reputational return is high, because founders route deals to VCs who answer.
   6. And I would track my own passes. Writing down why I said no, then reviewing those names a year later, is the only way to find out whether my filter is any good.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing only the mechanical filter. Any associate can build a screen. The interesting half of the answer is how you keep the screen from killing the outlier, and that you close the loop by tracking your own passes.

   Expect next

   • What would make you take a meeting with a company that fails your screen?
   • How would you review your own passes a year later?
   • Which single signal would you keep if you could only keep one?
2. 008A founder tells you their TAM is fifty billion dollars. How do you stress-test that?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCGrowth equity

   Say this

   Rebuild it bottom-up in front of them and see where the two numbers diverge. Then test the three places TAM claims usually break: who actually has a budget, what they actually pay, and whether the product they are buying is the one that reaches all of those customers.

   Then walk it

   1. Ask how they built it. If the answer is a research-house report, the number is not theirs and they have not thought about it. If they can build it live, that alone is most of the signal I need about the founder.
   2. Test the customer count. 'All small businesses' is not an addressable base. How many have the problem acutely, have the budget, and are reachable through a channel you can afford? That usually cuts the base by 80 to 90 percent.
   3. Test the price. Founders assume enterprise pricing on an SMB base. If the claimed ACV is $30,000 and the customers are 20-person firms, the pricing and the segment contradict each other.
   4. Test the product boundary. A $50bn TAM often assumes three products they have not built. Ask what share of it today's product addresses, and you frequently get from $50bn to $400m in one question.
   5. Then the important reframe, and I would say it kindly: the size of the TAM barely matters at seed. What matters is whether the first $10m of revenue is reachable from one segment with one product. A huge TAM with no beachhead is a worse company than a $1bn market with an obvious wedge.
   6. And I would not treat a bad TAM slide as disqualifying. Plenty of great companies had absurd TAM slides. It is a probe into how the founder thinks, not a scorecard item.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating this as gotcha — catching the founder out and feeling clever. Diligence is not cross-examination. The useful output is a defensible number and a read on how the founder reasons under pressure, and you get neither if you turn it into an argument.

   Expect next

   • What is the smallest market you would still invest in?
   • How do you find the beachhead segment?
   • What if they refuse to rebuild it with you?
3. 010If you were to open a restaurant, what would be your key concerns?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalGeneral AtlanticGeneralist · Beijing · 2014

   Say this

   Treat it as an investment, not a hobby: location economics, the unit-level P&L, working capital, and whether the concept is repeatable. The concerns in order are rent as a share of revenue, labour, food cost, and whether I can get a second site to work.

   Then walk it

   1. Unit economics first. Restaurant maths is brutal and well known: food cost around 30 percent of revenue, labour 25 to 30, rent under 10, leaving a single-digit to low-teens operating margin if everything goes right.
   2. So the binding constraint is revenue per square foot, which is really seats times turns times average ticket. Forty seats, two turns at lunch and two at dinner, ₹600 average ticket, 26 days — that is about ₹2.5m a month, or ₹30m a year. Every cost decision has to fit inside that.
   3. Then the capital question: fit-out and deposit are largely sunk and unrecoverable, payback on a new site typically runs 18 to 30 months, and the lease term has to be long enough to earn that back. A three-year lease on a five-year payback is not a business.
   4. Working capital is the thing people miss. Suppliers on short credit, aggregators paying out on a lag, staff paid monthly, plus perishable inventory. A profitable restaurant can die on a cash timing mismatch.
   5. Then the concern I would lead with as an investor: is it repeatable without me? A single great restaurant is a job, not an asset. What makes it scalable is a standardised menu, a central kitchen, a manager who is not the founder, and a site-selection model that has worked twice.
   6. And the delivery question, which changed the maths: aggregator commissions of 20 to 30 percent turn a thin dine-in margin negative unless you price a separate delivery menu. Cloud kitchens exist because that one number is so punishing.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering as a diner — menu, ambience, chef. The interviewer is testing whether you naturally reach for a unit-level P&L and a payback period on an unfamiliar business. Lead with the cost structure and the repeatability, then let the concept discussion follow.

   Expect next

   • How long before you open a second location?
   • Would you ever invest in a restaurant chain? What would you need to see?
   • What is the payback period on a new site and how would you shorten it?

   Reported by candidates at General Atlantic (Generalist, Beijing, 2014). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 016A brilliant solo founder, no technical co-founder, strong early traction. Invest or pass?Founders and teamsIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCSeed funds

   Say this

   It depends on whether the missing capability is on the critical path and whether they can hire it. Solo founders are not disqualifying — the data is roughly neutral — but a non-technical solo founder in a deep-technology business is a real problem, and the same person in a distribution-led business often is not.

   Then walk it

   1. First: is the hard part of this company technical or commercial? A compliance-workflow product where the moat is regulatory relationships and sales can survive an outsourced build. A new database cannot.
   2. Second: what has the traction actually proven? If they got to $500k of revenue with contractors and no CTO, they have proven demand and they have taken on technical debt. Both are true and both get priced.
   3. Third, and decisive: can they recruit? Ask who they have already tried to hire as CTO, what happened, and who is in the pipeline. A founder with two credible engineering leaders in late-stage conversation is a different risk from one who has not started.
   4. The structural risk is single point of failure. No one to argue with, no one to cover when they burn out, and a key-person dependency that shows up in every later diligence. That does get priced, usually in ownership or in a vesting and governance structure.
   5. How I would actually do it: invest with the round sized and milestoned to a senior technical hire, help run that search as the main value-add, and reserve for a bridge if it takes longer. Possibly a slightly larger option pool to fund the hire.
   6. And the honest data point: solo-founder companies are well represented among large outcomes, so a blanket rule against them is a filter that costs you more than it saves. The real question is capability gap, not headcount.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a policy answer either way. 'We never back solo founders' is a lazy heuristic the interviewer will push back on, and 'traction solves everything' ignores the execution risk. The answer is conditional on where the hard part of the business sits, and it ends with a structure, not a verdict.

   Expect next

   • How would you structure the round to manage that risk?
   • What if they refuse to give up the CTO title?
   • Name a solo-founder company that worked and say why.
5. 018Two co-founders, a fifty-fifty split, no vesting. What do you say to them?Founders and teamsIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCSeed funds

   Say this

   The split I can live with; the absence of vesting I cannot. Any round I lead will put both founders on four-year vesting with a one-year cliff, with credit for time already served, and that is a condition rather than a negotiation.

   Then walk it

   1. Why vesting is non-negotiable: if a founder leaves in month eight with 50 percent of the company unvested-but-owned, the remaining founder is running a business where half the equity belongs to someone who has gone. No later investor will fund that, and no new hire can be paid properly out of what is left.
   2. Mechanics: four years, one-year cliff, monthly thereafter, with acceleration only on a change of control and usually double-trigger. Credit for time already worked is the fair concession — if they have been at it 18 months, they start 18 months vested.
   3. On the fifty-fifty split itself: it is fine and often healthy, but it is worth asking how they break a tie. Companies with no decision-maker stall at exactly the moment speed matters. I would want to hear a real answer, even an informal one.
   4. The deeper thing the question is really testing: how the founders react to being told. A pair who immediately understand why an investor needs it are much easier to work with than a pair who treat it as distrust. This is genuinely diagnostic.
   5. And frame it for them in their own interest, because that is the truthful framing: vesting protects the founder who stays, not the investor. Ask them which of them would want to be the one left holding 50 percent of a company they cannot fund.
   6. One nuance: acceleration on termination without cause is a reasonable founder ask and I would give some of it. Full single-trigger acceleration on any acquisition is not, because it strips the acquirer of retention.

   Where candidates lose it

   Focusing the answer on the fifty-fifty split. The split is a talking point; the missing vesting is the actual deal issue and it will be the first thing your investment committee asks about. Lead there, then say how you would give credit for time served so it does not read as a power grab.

   Expect next

   • What is single versus double-trigger acceleration?
   • What if one founder has already checked out?
   • Would you invest in a company where one founder has left and kept their shares?
6. 026If revenues get hit in a quarter, what would you do as CFO to preserve cash flow?Unit economics and cohortsIntermediatetechnicalSilver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022

   Say this

   Work in order of reversibility and speed: first the levers that cost nothing to pull and can be undone, then working capital, then discretionary spend, then headcount last. And before any of it, establish whether the quarter is a timing issue or a demand issue, because the answer is completely different.

   Then walk it

   1. Diagnose first. A slipped enterprise deal that closes in six weeks is a timing problem and you do not restructure the company around it. A cohort that stopped converting is a demand problem and you act hard.
   2. Fastest reversible levers: freeze discretionary spend — travel, events, consultants, new tooling — and pause the hiring pipeline without touching existing staff. That typically finds 10 to 15 percent of operating expense within a quarter and can be switched back on.
   3. Working capital next, because it is cash without cutting the business. Tighten collections and chase the ageing receivables, move new contracts to annual upfront with a discount rather than monthly, and stretch payables where the supplier relationship tolerates it. Annual prepay is the single biggest lever in a software business.
   4. Then capital expenditure and committed spend: defer the office build-out, renegotiate the cloud commitment, and look hard at the software stack, where most companies are paying for 30 percent more seats than they use.
   5. Headcount last, and if you do it, do it once and deeply enough that you do not have to come back. Repeated small cuts destroy more value through uncertainty than the cash they save. And protect the revenue-generating and product functions, because you still have to grow out of this.
   6. Then the financing side, which is the real CFO job: extend runway to at least eighteen months, open a venture debt or revolver conversation while the numbers still look fine rather than after they do not, and tell the board in the quarter it happens, not the quarter after.

   Where candidates lose it

   Going straight to layoffs. It signals no sense of sequencing and it is the slowest source of cash once you account for severance. The structure they want is reversible-before-irreversible, and the diagnosis — timing versus demand — before any of it. Mentioning annual prepay and receivables is what marks out someone who has actually looked at a cash flow.

   Expect next

   • How much runway would you insist on holding?
   • When would you take venture debt instead of cutting?
   • How do you decide whether it is a timing problem or a demand problem?

   Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 050How do you value a pre-revenue company?Early-stage valuationIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCSeed funds

   Say this

   Backwards from the exit, not forwards from the fundamentals. Pick a plausible exit value and multiple, work out the ownership you need at exit to make the return your fund requires, gross that up for future dilution, and that tells you the entry price you can pay.

   Then walk it

   1. This is the venture method. Say a plausible exit is $500m in eight years. My fund needs this position to return $100m, so I need 20 percent at exit.
   2. Gross up for dilution. Three more rounds at 20 percent each means my position shrinks by a factor of about 0.51, so I need roughly 39 percent today to hold 20 percent at exit — or I need pro rata rights and reserves to defend it, which is usually the more realistic path.
   3. If 39 percent is unbuyable, which it normally is, then either the exit assumption is too small for the cheque size, or I write a smaller cheque, or I pass. That is a useful, disciplined conclusion and it is what the method is for.
   4. Cross-check against three market anchors: what comparable rounds at this stage and geography are clearing at this quarter, the last round price if there was one, and replacement cost — what it would cost to build this team and product from scratch, which sets a rough floor for an acquihire.
   5. Then the qualitative adjustments that actually move seed prices: team pedigree, competitive tension in the round, and whether a brand-name fund is circling. A seed round with two term sheets prices 40 percent higher than the same company with one, and pretending otherwise is dishonest about how the market works.
   6. And say the limitation plainly: this produces a range, not a number, and the range is wide. The honest version is that seed valuation is a negotiation anchored on round size and convention, and the venture method is a discipline for knowing when to walk away rather than a pricing model.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reaching for a DCF. With no revenue, a DCF is a terminal value with a decorative forecast in front of it. And building the venture method without grossing up for future dilution — that step is what makes the answer usable, and skipping it is the most common error.

   Expect next

   • How much dilution would you assume between now and exit?
   • How does the answer change for a deep tech company with a ten-year horizon?
   • What if a competitor is bidding and the price is 50 percent higher?
8. 089What are the realistic exit options for an Indian venture portfolio?India venture marketIntermediatetechnicalIndian venture capitalSecondaries

   Say this

   Four routes, and the mix has shifted a lot: a domestic IPO, which has become the headline exit for scaled consumer and fintech companies; strategic M&A, mostly from domestic corporates and global acquirers of SaaS; secondary sales to later-stage and crossover funds, which now do a large share of the work; and buyout funds acquiring control of mature software assets.

   Then walk it

   1. Domestic IPOs are the genuine change. A run of listings since 2021 across consumer internet, fintech, insurance distribution, food delivery and travel has absorbed billions of dollars of venture stock, supported by deep domestic institutional and retail demand. The bar is real revenue scale and a credible profitability path, but the route exists.
   2. Strategic M&A: domestic conglomerates buying digital capability, global strategics buying Indian SaaS, and consolidation within sectors. It is more active than a decade ago but the price discipline is tighter — Indian strategic buyers rarely pay the multiples a US acquirer would.
   3. Secondaries carry a lot of the load, and this is the underappreciated answer. Early investors selling to growth and crossover funds at Series D and E, plus continuation vehicles and employee tender offers, is now a routine way an Indian seed fund returns capital without waiting for a listing.
   4. Buyouts: software-focused control funds acquiring profitable Indian SaaS assets, which gives a floor price for companies whose growth has slowed but whose cash flow is real.
   5. The structural constraint to name honestly: outcome scale. India produces fewer multi-billion-dollar exits than the US, so a fund's model has to work on more mid-sized outcomes, which in turn requires higher entry ownership — and that is available, because entry prices are lower. The two facts are linked and a good answer connects them.
   6. And the timing reality: Indian holds run long, often nine to twelve years, so DPI arrives late. That is why the good India-focused funds now plan liquidity actively — taking partial secondary at Series D rather than holding everything to a listing — instead of waiting for an exit event to happen to them.

   Where candidates lose it

   The outdated claim that India has no exits. It was true and it is not now, and saying it will cost you the room. The other error is naming only IPOs and M&A while missing secondaries, which do a large share of the actual liquidity. And tie the smaller exit scale back to the higher entry ownership, because that connection is the fund-level insight.

   Expect next

   • What revenue scale does an Indian company need to list domestically?
   • Would you rather hold to an IPO or sell secondary at Series D?
   • Why don't Indian strategics pay US multiples?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.