Equity Research interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

72

Firms

45

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMorningstar12Man Group6Balyasny Asset Management5BLBlackRock5FTFranklin Templeton5MSCI5Jefferies4CSCredit Suisse3Fidelity Investments3Moody's3Perella Weinberg Partners3Point723S&P Global3The Vanguard Group3WMWellington Management3Advent International2Apollo Global Management2Bank of America2Carlyle Group2DED.E. Shaw2Houlihan Lokey2HSBC2Piper Sandler2Sequoia Capital2SSState Street2Viking Global Investors2WBWilliam Blair2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1BMBNY Mellon1Centerview Partners1Coatue Management1Goldman Sachs1GSGuggenheim Securities1HWHarris Williams1Insight Partners1Invesco1Mizuho1Moelis & Company1MSMorgan Stanley1PIMCO1SCSchroders1Scotiabank1T. Rowe Price1TSTruist Securities1

Topic

All topicsResearch process9Stock pitch6Company analysis8Investment philosophy5Valuation14Modelling2Portfolio and risk8Macro8Sector knowledge2Accounting8Career and fit12Industry knowledge6Quantitative research1Sector: technology3Sector: consumer1Sector: healthcare1Sector: energy1Sector: financials2Sector: industrials1Case and estimation2

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitBrainteaserMarket view

1. 003Analyse whether Boeing is a good stock to invest in. Give me a two-line thesis on the spot.Stock pitchHardsuperdaySCSchrodersEquity Research · New York · 2025

   Say this

   Two lines means one claim and one reason. Something like: Boeing is a duopoly with a decade-long order backlog, so the question is not demand but whether it can execute delivery and repair its balance sheet; I would own it only if you believe free cash flow inflects within two years.

   Then walk it

   1. Line one is the structural fact that makes it investable: a global duopoly with Airbus, enormous switching costs for airlines, and a multi-year backlog that effectively pre-sells the output.
   2. Line two is the controversy, which is where the money is made or lost: production quality, regulatory constraint on output rates, and a balance sheet carrying heavy debt from the crisis years.
   3. So the thesis reduces to a single variable: deliveries per month. Revenue, cash flow and deleveraging all follow from that one number, which is unusual and worth saying because it makes the stock tractable.
   4. Then take a side. If you believe the rate ramps, free cash flow inflects sharply and the equity re-rates off depressed earnings. If you do not, the debt is a problem and you stay away.
   5. Then name the falsifier: monthly delivery data and the regulator's production cap are published, so the thesis is testable in near real time. That is what makes it a good pitch rather than an opinion.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reciting everything you know about Boeing. Two lines means two lines. The skill being tested is compression: finding the one variable the investment turns on and committing to a view on it.

   Expect next

   • What would change your mind?
   • How would you track the thesis?
   • Would you rather own Boeing or Airbus?

   Reported by candidates at Schroders (Equity Research, New York, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 005Are you sure your thesis can be backed up? What if their costs do not fall?Stock pitchHardsuperdayApollo Global ManagementInvestments · Remote · 2021FTFranklin TempletonOil and Gas · San Mateo · 2024

   Say this

   Answer the substance, do not defend the position. Say what evidence supports the cost assumption, quantify what happens if you are wrong, and state at what point you would exit.

   Then walk it

   1. First, give the evidence behind the assumption, specifically. 'Management guided to it' is weak. 'The input contract repriced in Q2 and the run-rate is already visible in the last two quarters of gross margin' is strong.
   2. Then quantify the downside. 'If costs stay flat, EPS is 15 percent below my number and the stock is worth 38 rather than 55, so I lose about 5 percent from here.' That shows you have modelled the bear case, not just the bull.
   3. Then the asymmetry: if the downside is 5 percent and the upside is 35, the position still makes sense even at a 50 percent probability. That is the real defence.
   4. Then the monitoring point: which disclosure tells you early that you are wrong, and by when you would expect to see it.
   5. And be willing to concede. 'You are right that this is the weakest part of the thesis, which is why I would size it at half a normal position' is a far better answer than digging in. Interviewers push to see whether you update on evidence.

   Where candidates lose it

   Defending the pitch emotionally. This is a pressure test of intellectual honesty, not of conviction. The winning response quantifies the downside and names the exit; stubbornness reads as someone who will lose the fund money.

   Expect next

   • At what price would you stop out?
   • How would you size the position?
   • What is the single data point you would watch?

   Reported by candidates at Apollo Global Management (Investments, Remote, 2021); Franklin Templeton (Oil and Gas, San Mateo, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 007Would you rather buy a low quality business at a great price, or a high quality business at an okay price?Investment philosophyHardsuperdayCoatue ManagementTechnology, Media and Telecom · New York · 2023

   Say this

   High quality at an okay price, and the reason is compounding. A great business reinvests at high returns, so time works for you. In a cheap bad business, time works against you and you need the re-rating to happen quickly.

   Then walk it

   1. The mathematical case: if a business earns 25 percent on incremental capital and can reinvest, your return converges on that reinvestment rate over a long hold, almost regardless of a sensible entry multiple.
   2. In a low-return business, the opposite happens. Every year you hold it, the intrinsic value is eroding, so the return depends entirely on the gap closing fast. You are renting a re-rating, not owning a compounder.
   3. So the horizon determines the answer, and I would say that explicitly. For a five-year hold, quality wins. For a six-month event-driven trade with a catalyst, the cheap asset can be the better risk-reward.
   4. The honest counterargument: 'high quality' is often just a description of a stock that has already worked, and paying any price for quality is how people lost money in 2021. Quality at an okay price is fine; quality at any price is not.
   5. My answer would be: quality, with a valuation discipline, because the error that permanently destroys capital is owning a declining business, while the error of overpaying for a good one is usually recoverable with time.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a textbook Buffett answer with no acknowledgement of the horizon or the risk of overpaying for quality. The question is testing whether you have an actual philosophy you can defend, including its weakness.

   Expect next

   • What is your investment philosophy and what formed it?
   • When does the cheap asset win?
   • How do you avoid a value trap?

   Reported by candidates at Coatue Management (Technology, Media and Telecom, New York, 2023). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 009Why did you take a variant view on the multiple you applied to that company, relative to street expectations?ValuationHardsuperdayFTFranklin TempletonOil and Gas · San Mateo · 2024

   Say this

   Because the multiple should reflect the durability and the capital intensity of the earnings, and I think the market is applying a mid-cycle multiple to earnings that are not mid-cycle. Say what the street assumes, then why that assumption is wrong.

   Then walk it

   1. First, state the street's implied assumption in numbers. 'Consensus applies 6 times to a refiner on peak crack spreads, which implies they believe those spreads persist.'
   2. Then your disagreement and its basis. 'I apply 4.5 times because I think those spreads normalise within 18 months as capacity comes back, so I am valuing normalised rather than trailing earnings.'
   3. For a cyclical this is the whole game: the multiple and the earnings must be consistent. A low multiple on peak earnings is a value trap; a high multiple on trough earnings is often the correct entry.
   4. Support it with something observable: capacity additions, inventory levels, forward curve, historical spread ranges. The evidence has to be external to your own model.
   5. Then the discipline point: I would show the valuation across the cycle rather than a point estimate, and say what spread assumption is embedded in today's price. Reverse-engineering the market's assumption is the most persuasive thing in a research note.

   Where candidates lose it

   Justifying a multiple by peer comparison alone. That is circular. The multiple has to be defended by the economics, and for cyclicals specifically by where in the cycle the earnings sit.

   Expect next

   • What earnings are you applying that multiple to?
   • How do you normalise a cyclical?
   • What is priced in today?

   Reported by candidates at Franklin Templeton (Oil and Gas, San Mateo, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

5. 010How do you build a model that is detailed enough to be useful but simple enough that you can cover a lot of companies?ModellingHardtechnicalBalyasny Asset ManagementEquity Research · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Model deeply only where the variance is. For most companies two or three line items drive the outcome, so those get detailed driver builds and everything else gets a margin assumption or a percentage of sales.

   Then walk it

   1. Identify the swing factors first. For a retailer it is same-store sales and gross margin. For a bank it is net interest margin and provisions. For a software company it is net retention and sales efficiency. Model those properly.
   2. Everything else goes to ratios: other opex as a percent of revenue, working capital as days, tax at the guided rate. Precision there adds nothing and costs you maintenance time.
   3. Standardise the template across the coverage universe so the same row does the same thing in every file. That is what actually makes 15 names maintainable, because updating a quarter becomes mechanical.
   4. Build it around the disclosure you will actually receive. If the company only reports two segments, a five-segment model will be broken every quarter.
   5. And keep a one-page output: the drivers, the earnings bridge versus consensus, and the valuation. If the summary tab tells the story, the depth underneath can stay limited.
   6. The test I would apply: can I update this model in 20 minutes on results day? If not, it is too complex to cover 15 names with.

   Where candidates lose it

   Saying you would build the most detailed model possible. On the buy side, model complexity is a liability. The insight being tested is that modelling effort should be allocated to variance, not spread evenly.

   Expect next

   • How many names can one analyst realistically cover?
   • What goes on your summary tab?
   • How do you update on results day?

   Reported by candidates at Balyasny Asset Management (Equity Research, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 011How would you hedge a name that does not have a close public comparable?Portfolio and riskHardsuperdayBalyasny Asset ManagementEquity Research · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Hedge the exposures rather than the company. Decompose the position into its factor risks, market beta, sector, style, currency, commodity input, then hedge each with whatever liquid instrument matches it.

   Then walk it

   1. Start by decomposing: run the stock against factor returns and see what it is actually exposed to. Often a 'unique' business is really a bundle of common exposures.
   2. Hedge the market beta with an index future, sized on the regression beta rather than one.
   3. Hedge sector exposure with the closest sector ETF, accepting that the fit is imperfect. An imperfect hedge that removes 60 percent of the variance is better than no hedge.
   4. Hedge the specific input if there is one: a fuel-exposed business can be partly hedged with the commodity, a foreign earner with FX forwards.
   5. Then accept and size for the residual. The leftover idiosyncratic risk is the part you are actually being paid for, so the honest answer is that you hedge what you do not have a view on and hold what you do.
   6. And the practical constraint on a multi-manager platform: the risk system will impose factor limits anyway, so the hedge is often not optional. Saying that shows you understand how these seats actually operate.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reaching for a single 'closest competitor' short. If there were a close comp the question would not have been asked. The expected answer is factor decomposition, and naming the residual idiosyncratic risk as the intended exposure.

   Expect next

   • What residual risk are you left with?
   • How would you size the position?
   • What factor limits would you expect to operate under?

   Reported by candidates at Balyasny Asset Management (Equity Research, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 017How would you value a bank?ValuationHardtechnicalPerella Weinberg PartnersFinancial Institutions Group · New York · 2026Man GroupEquity Hedge · Boston · 2019

   Say this

   Price to tangible book against return on tangible equity, plus a dividend discount or residual income model. You do not use enterprise value or EBITDA, because for a bank debt is raw material and interest is revenue.

   Then walk it

   1. The core relationship: a bank should trade around book value if its return on equity equals its cost of equity, above book if it earns more, below if it earns less. The regression of price to book against ROTE across a peer group is the single most useful chart in the sector.
   2. Use tangible book, stripping goodwill and intangibles, because that is the capital actually supporting the balance sheet.
   3. For an intrinsic value, use a dividend discount model or residual income, since dividends are constrained by regulatory capital and that constraint is the real driver of distributable cash.
   4. The forecast drivers are net interest margin, loan growth, fee income, the cost-to-income ratio, and the provision charge. Provisions are where the cycle shows up and where forecasts go wrong.
   5. Capital is the binding constraint on everything. CET1 ratio against the regulatory requirement determines whether the bank can grow, buy back stock or must raise equity, so I would model capital explicitly rather than treating it as an output.
   6. And the thing that actually breaks bank valuations: credit losses are non-linear. A small deterioration in the macro can wipe out several years of earnings, which is why banks trade below book in a downturn regardless of reported profit.

   Where candidates lose it

   Applying EV/EBITDA or a standard unlevered DCF. It is meaningless for a bank and it is an instant fail in a financials interview. Lead with price to tangible book versus ROTE and the reason enterprise value does not apply.

   Expect next

   • Why can you not use enterprise value?
   • What happens to the valuation if rates fall 200 basis points?
   • How do you forecast provisions?

   Reported by candidates at Perella Weinberg Partners (Financial Institutions Group, New York, 2026); Man Group (Equity Hedge, Boston, 2019). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

8. 019How do you assess earnings quality?AccountingHardtechnicalMoody'sCorporate Finance · New York · 2018MorningstarEquity Research · Chicago · 2023

   Say this

   Compare earnings to cash. If net income is consistently above cash from operations, something is being recognised that has not been collected. Then check the accruals, the adjustments and the one-offs.

   Then walk it

   1. The headline test: cash conversion. Cash from operations divided by net income, tracked over several years. Persistent divergence is the single best red flag available from published accounts.
   2. Then working capital. Receivable days rising faster than revenue means revenue is being pushed to customers or collection is deteriorating. Inventory days rising means a write-down is coming.
   3. Then the adjustments. Compare GAAP to the company's adjusted figures and see what is being excluded. Restructuring charges taken every year for five years are not one-off, they are operating costs in disguise.
   4. Then capitalisation choices: capitalised development costs, capitalised interest, and the depreciation life. Extending useful lives flatters earnings with no economic change.
   5. Then the tax rate and the below-the-line items, since a sudden drop in the effective tax rate can manufacture an EPS beat.
   6. For a note, the useful summary is a bridge from reported earnings to what I think the sustainable earnings power is, with each adjustment listed. That bridge is often the most valuable page in a research report.

   Where candidates lose it

   Listing ratios without the organising idea. The organising idea is that accounting earnings involve judgement and cash does not, so every test is a version of comparing the two. Say that first.

   Expect next

   • What is the single best red flag?
   • How do you treat stock-based compensation?
   • Walk me through a company you thought had poor earnings quality.

   Reported by candidates at Moody's (Corporate Finance, New York, 2018); Morningstar (Equity Research, Chicago, 2023). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

9. 020Should stock-based compensation be treated as a real expense?AccountingHardtechnicalTechnology coverageLong-only asset management

   Say this

   Yes. It is a genuine cost to existing shareholders even though no cash leaves the company, because it transfers ownership. Adding it back to get to adjusted EBITDA or free cash flow overstates what shareholders actually keep.

   Then walk it

   1. The economic argument: if the company paid those employees in cash and then issued shares to raise the same amount, nobody would argue the salary was not an expense. The two are identical in substance.
   2. It shows up as dilution. Share count creeps up every year, so per-share metrics deteriorate even when totals look fine. That is the cost, and it is real.
   3. Companies obscure it by buying back stock to offset dilution and then describing the buyback as capital return. It is not; it is paying cash for compensation already granted.
   4. The practical treatment I would use: expense it fully in the earnings I value, and if I want a cash-based measure, subtract the buyback needed to keep share count flat rather than adding SBC back.
   5. The counterargument worth acknowledging: the accounting charge is based on grant-date fair value, which can be a poor estimate of the eventual cost, and the expense is lumpy. So the number is imperfect even if the principle is clear.
   6. In practice this matters most in software, where SBC can be 15 to 25 percent of revenue. Whether you expense it decides whether a company is profitable at all.

   Where candidates lose it

   Accepting the company's adjusted figure because it is what consensus uses. Research is supposed to be the check on that. Have a view, and know roughly how large SBC is as a percentage of revenue for the sector you claim to follow.

   Expect next

   • How large is it as a percentage of revenue in software?
   • How do you handle it in a DCF?
   • What does that do to the sector's valuation?
10. 027How would you evaluate an LP stake in a fund, and how much would you pay for it?ValuationHardsuperdayBGBaupost GroupEquity Hedge · Boston · 2018

    Say this

    Start from reported NAV, then adjust it. You are buying the underlying assets plus the unfunded commitment and minus the fees, so the price is NAV adjusted for your own view of the marks, liquidity and remaining fee drag.

    Then walk it

    1. Reported NAV is the starting point, not the answer. Look through to the underlying positions and form your own view on the marks, especially anything illiquid or level three.
    2. Adjust for the fee drag on the remaining life: management fees on committed capital plus carry on future gains. That can be several percent of value in a fund with years left.
    3. For a closed-end structure, factor the unfunded commitment. You are buying an obligation to put in more money, and that has a cost and a risk.
    4. Then discount for illiquidity and for information asymmetry. The seller knows more than you, and there is a reason they are selling. Secondaries typically transact at a discount to NAV for exactly this reason, though quality assets can clear at or above.
    5. Then the vintage and the J-curve position. A fund three years in with assets marked at cost is a very different proposition from one seven years in with a clear path to exit.
    6. So my answer would be a percentage of NAV with the adjustments itemised, and I would say which adjustment I am least confident about.

    Where candidates lose it

    Answering 'NAV'. If it were NAV there would be no question. The expected content is the fee drag, the unfunded commitment, the illiquidity discount and adverse selection. Name the seller's information advantage explicitly.

    Expect next

    • Why is the seller selling?
    • How would you diligence the marks?
    • What discount to NAV would you want?

    Reported by candidates at Baupost Group (Equity Hedge, Boston, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.