Equity Research interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

72

Firms

45

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMorningstar12Man Group6Balyasny Asset Management5BLBlackRock5FTFranklin Templeton5MSCI5Jefferies4CSCredit Suisse3Fidelity Investments3Moody's3Perella Weinberg Partners3Point723S&P Global3The Vanguard Group3WMWellington Management3Advent International2Apollo Global Management2Bank of America2Carlyle Group2DED.E. Shaw2Houlihan Lokey2HSBC2Piper Sandler2Sequoia Capital2SSState Street2Viking Global Investors2WBWilliam Blair2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1BMBNY Mellon1Centerview Partners1Coatue Management1Goldman Sachs1GSGuggenheim Securities1HWHarris Williams1Insight Partners1Invesco1Mizuho1Moelis & Company1MSMorgan Stanley1PIMCO1SCSchroders1Scotiabank1T. Rowe Price1TSTruist Securities1

Topic

All topicsResearch process9Stock pitch6Company analysis8Investment philosophy5Valuation14Modelling2Portfolio and risk8Macro8Sector knowledge2Accounting8Career and fit12Industry knowledge6Quantitative research1Sector: technology3Sector: consumer1Sector: healthcare1Sector: energy1Sector: financials2Sector: industrials1Case and estimation2

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitBrainteaserMarket view

1. 073How would you analyse an Indian bank versus a US bank?Sector: financialsHardtechnicalCSCredit SuisseInvestment Banking · Mumbai · 2020

   Say this

   The framework is the same, price to book against return on equity, but the drivers differ. Indian banks are a credit growth and asset quality story with a large public sector overhang; US banks are a rate cycle, fee income and capital return story.

   Then walk it

   1. Common framework: net interest margin, loan growth, cost-to-income, credit costs, and capital adequacy. Value on price to adjusted book against sustainable ROE.
   2. India-specific: asset quality dominates. Gross and net non-performing assets, provision coverage, slippage ratio and restructured book are the numbers the market trades on. The 2015 to 2020 asset quality review cycle is the reference point for why.
   3. Structural difference: a large public sector banking system with different governance, capitalisation and lending incentives from the private banks. The valuation gap between the two groups is persistent and is really a governance and growth gap.
   4. Growth profile: Indian banks operate in an underpenetrated credit market with structurally higher nominal loan growth, so the market pays for growth in a way it does not in the US.
   5. Funding: the CASA ratio, the share of low-cost current and savings deposits, is the key competitive advantage in India and is watched closely. In the US the equivalent focus is on deposit beta.
   6. US-specific: fee and trading income is a much larger share of revenue for the large banks, regulatory capital and stress testing drive buybacks, and the rate cycle drives net interest income more sharply.

   Where candidates lose it

   Applying a US framework wholesale. An India-based interviewer will expect CASA, slippages, provision coverage and the public-versus-private distinction by name. Knowing the local vocabulary is the test.

   Expect next

   • What is the CASA ratio and why does it matter?
   • Why do private banks trade at a premium to public sector banks?
   • How do you forecast credit costs through a cycle?

   Reported by candidates at Credit Suisse (Investment Banking, Mumbai, 2020). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 078What is channel stuffing and how would you detect it?AccountingHardtechnicalForensic accounting

   Say this

   Pushing more product into distributors than end demand supports, to book revenue now. You detect it through rising receivables and distributor inventory, quarter-end revenue spikes, and a gap between sell-in and sell-through.

   Then walk it

   1. The mechanism: the company recognises revenue when product ships to the distributor, not when the end customer buys. So it can manufacture a quarter by shipping harder, often with extended payment terms or discounts as the inducement.
   2. Signal one: days sales outstanding rising, because those distributors were given longer to pay.
   3. Signal two: revenue concentrated in the last weeks of the quarter, visible in the shape of quarterly results and sometimes in disclosed monthly data.
   4. Signal three: the gap between sell-in, what the company ships, and sell-through, what end customers buy. Where both are disclosed, a persistent gap is the clearest evidence there is.
   5. Signal four: rising returns and allowances, and a growing reserve for returns, because stuffed channels eventually send product back.
   6. Corroborate externally: distributor commentary, channel checks, and industry data on retail sales. And watch for the reversal, since a stuffed quarter borrows from the next one, so the pattern is a beat followed by a miss.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing the concept without the detection method. The examinable content is the specific evidence, receivable days, quarter-end concentration and the sell-in versus sell-through gap. Name at least three.

   Expect next

   • What other revenue recognition games should you watch for?
   • How would you check distributor inventory?
   • How do you confront management about it?
3. 082How would you handle publishing a sell rating on a company your bank has a relationship with?Career and fitHardsuperdaySell-side research

   Say this

   Publish it, and rely on the structures that exist for exactly this: research is separated from banking, the rating is based on documented analysis, and compliance reviews it. The answer is process, not courage.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with the structural point: research and investment banking are separated by information barriers, and the analyst's rating is not subject to banking sign-off. That separation exists because of past abuses and is enforced by regulation.
   2. Then the professional standard: the rating must follow the analysis, and the analysis must be documented so it can be defended. If the work supports a sell, the rating is a sell.
   3. Then the practical handling: make sure the note is factually impeccable, put the reasoning in the open, and give the company the chance to correct factual errors, not conclusions.
   4. Acknowledge the real cost honestly, because pretending there is none is naive: you may lose management access, which degrades your product. That is a genuine professional cost and it is why the skew exists.
   5. Then the escalation path: if you were pressured, you raise it with compliance and supervisory analysts. Knowing there is a channel is the answer they want.
   6. And the credibility argument: an analyst who never publishes a sell has a rating scale worth nothing. The value of your buy recommendations depends on your willingness to say sell.

   Where candidates lose it

   Either an idealistic 'I would just publish it' with no awareness of the structures, or a suggestion that you would soften the view. Name the information barrier and compliance explicitly; this is partly a regulatory-awareness question.

   Expect next

   • What if a senior banker called you about it?
   • Why do so few sell ratings get published?
   • How do you maintain company access after a downgrade?
4. 083How would you value a company with a large stake in a listed subsidiary?ValuationHardtechnicalIndian research desks

   Say this

   Sum of the parts. Value the core business on its own operating metrics, then add the market value of the listed stake, usually at a holding company discount, and subtract net debt at the parent.

   Then walk it

   1. Value the core operating business separately, using only its own earnings. This means stripping out any consolidated contribution from the subsidiary, which is the step people get wrong.
   2. Value the stake at its observable market value. That is the cleanest input in the whole exercise, so use it rather than modelling the subsidiary again.
   3. Apply a holding company discount, typically 20 to 50 percent, to reflect tax on disposal, the fact that the parent will probably never sell, and the governance discount investors apply to conglomerate structures.
   4. Subtract parent-level net debt and any other claims to get to equity value.
   5. Watch the consolidation treatment carefully. If the subsidiary is consolidated, its revenue and EBITDA are in the group numbers, so applying a group multiple double-counts the stake. Either deconsolidate or do not add the stake.
   6. This is a very common structure in India and Korea, where promoter-led holding companies own listed operating subsidiaries. The persistent discount is one of the most reliable features of those markets and also one of the most persistent value traps, because the discount rarely closes without a structural event.

   Where candidates lose it

   Double-counting by applying a group multiple to consolidated earnings and then adding the market value of the stake. That is the classic error and it is why this question gets asked.

   Expect next

   • What discount would you apply and why?
   • What would cause the discount to close?
   • How does minority interest affect your bridge?
5. 085How would you analyse a company with related-party transactions or a controlling shareholder?Company analysisHardtechnicalIndian research desksEmerging market research

   Say this

   Treat governance as a valuation input rather than a footnote. Map every related-party flow, ask whether value is leaking out of the listed entity, and apply a discount if minority shareholders are not being treated equally.

   Then walk it

   1. Read the related-party transactions note in full and map the flows: who sells what to whom, at what price, and is there an independent benchmark for that price.
   2. The question is always whether the listed entity is transacting at arm's length. Buying raw materials from a promoter-owned entity above market, or selling output below it, transfers value out of the listed company.
   3. Watch for the classic structures: royalty or brand fees paid to the parent, shared services agreements, loans and guarantees to group companies, and asset purchases from related entities.
   4. Check pledged promoter shares. A promoter who has pledged a large proportion of their holding has an incentive problem and a forced-selling risk that can hit the stock independently of fundamentals.
   5. Look at the board: how many genuinely independent directors, who the auditor is, and whether auditors have resigned. An auditor resignation is one of the strongest negative signals available.
   6. Then price it. A governance discount is real and persistent, so the honest output is a lower multiple rather than a refusal to cover. But if you cannot verify that the cash belongs to minority shareholders, the correct answer is to avoid it, and saying that is a legitimate conclusion.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating governance as a qualitative aside. In emerging markets it is frequently the dominant driver of returns. Naming pledged shares and auditor resignations shows real familiarity with how these situations actually unfold.

   Expect next

   • What is a promoter pledge and why does it matter?
   • How would you size a governance discount?
   • Would you ever refuse to cover a company?
6. 086Give me a two-line thesis on a company you would short.Stock pitchHardsuperdayBalyasny Asset ManagementGeneralist · New York · 2020

   Say this

   One line on the structural problem, one line on the catalyst that forces the market to see it. Something like: the company's growth is funded by discounting that is destroying its unit economics, and the covenant test at the next refinancing will expose it.

   Then walk it

   1. Line one has to be a mechanism, not a valuation. 'Expensive' is not a thesis. 'Gross margin has fallen 600 basis points over six quarters while revenue growth held up, because they are buying volume' is a mechanism.
   2. Line two is the clock: the specific event that makes the market agree. A refinancing, a covenant test, a contract renewal, a patent expiry, a competitor launch, a change in the disclosure that removes the cover.
   3. Then the numbers that support it, in one breath: the trend in the metric, and the gap between what management guides and what the trend implies.
   4. Then the risk: what would squeeze you. A cheap balance sheet, a possible takeover, heavy existing short interest, or a founder who could take it private.
   5. And the practicalities: borrow cost and days to cover, because a 20 percent borrow makes a slow thesis unprofitable even if you are right.
   6. Prepare a real one before you walk in. Being unable to construct a short is a common failure in buy-side interviews, and it reveals that you have only ever thought about why things go up.

   Where candidates lose it

   Not having one prepared. Long-short interviews ask for both sides, and candidates almost always have three longs and no shorts. Prepare one short properly, including the borrow cost and the squeeze risk.

   Expect next

   • What is the borrow?
   • What would squeeze you?
   • How would you size it?

   Reported by candidates at Balyasny Asset Management (Generalist, New York, 2020). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 088How do you avoid confirmation bias in your research?Research processHardsuperdayHedge fundsAsset management

   Say this

   Build the disconfirming case deliberately rather than waiting to encounter it. Write the bear case before you buy, define in advance what would falsify the thesis, and seek out the best argument against you.

   Then walk it

   1. Pre-commit the falsifier. When you initiate, write down the specific observable outcome that would prove you wrong, with a date. Then you cannot rationalise it later.
   2. Write the opposing case yourself, properly, not a straw man. If you cannot write a persuasive bear case, you do not understand the stock well enough to own it.
   3. Actively read the other side: the short reports, the bearish sell-side note, the competitor's investor day. Seek out the smartest person who disagrees.
   4. Structure the review so it starts from the evidence rather than from your note. Re-underwriting the position from scratch once a year, ignoring what you previously wrote, is the most effective single habit.
   5. Use a team process: have someone else argue the other side, or present the bear case yourself to the portfolio manager. Making the disconfirming work someone's explicit job is how good funds handle it.
   6. And watch for the behavioural tell: noticing that you are discounting bad news because it is inconvenient. Catching that in yourself is most of the battle.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a generic 'I try to stay objective'. Everyone believes that; that is what makes the bias work. The answer needs specific mechanisms, pre-commitment and structured disconfirmation, not intentions.

   Expect next

   • What would falsify your current best idea?
   • How do you handle it when a position moves against you?
   • Who do you go to for the other side?
8. 090How did you arrive at the assumptions in your case study?Research processHardcase studyDED.E. ShawGeneralist · New York · 2025Houlihan LokeyInvestment Banking · Richmond · 2025

   Say this

   Each assumption should trace to something external: a historical rate, a disclosed contract, an industry data point, a peer's experience. Name the source for each, and say which ones you are least confident about.

   Then walk it

   1. Go through them in order of importance to the answer, not in model order. The interviewer cares about the two that drive the result.
   2. For each, give the anchor: 'I used 6 percent price growth because that is what they have taken in each of the last four years and the contracts reprice annually to an index.'
   3. Where you had no data, say so explicitly and explain the logic you substituted. Inventing a source is fatal; reasoning openly from a gap is respected.
   4. Distinguish the assumptions that matter from the ones that do not. 'The tax rate assumption is immaterial; the retention assumption drives 70 percent of the value' shows you understand your own model.
   5. Present the sensitivity around the critical ones rather than defending a point estimate. The honest position is a range with a most likely case.
   6. And volunteer your least confident assumption before they find it. Doing so converts a vulnerability into evidence of self-awareness.

   Where candidates lose it

   Defending every assumption equally, or saying 'that is what management guided'. Guidance is an input to be tested, not a source of truth. Trace assumptions to independent evidence wherever possible.

   Expect next

   • Which assumption are you least confident about?
   • What if that assumption is 20 percent wrong?
   • Where did you disagree with management's guidance?

   Reported by candidates at D.E. Shaw (Generalist, New York, 2025); Houlihan Lokey (Investment Banking, Richmond, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

9. 092How much macro view should a bottom-up stock picker have?Investment philosophyHardsuperdayHedge fundsAsset management

   Say this

   Enough to know what macro bet is embedded in the portfolio, but not enough to trade on a forecast. The goal is awareness of unintended exposure, not prediction.

   Then walk it

   1. The case against macro forecasting: the evidence on rate, currency and growth prediction is poor, and a stock picker's edge is in company-level information, not in outguessing the bond market.
   2. But every bottom-up portfolio contains implicit macro positions. Owning five industrials and two banks is a bet on the cycle whether you intended it or not.
   3. So the discipline is measurement rather than forecasting: know your aggregate exposure to rates, to the cycle, to a currency, to a commodity input. A risk system does this, and a good analyst does it mentally.
   4. Then decide whether the exposure is intended. If it is not, hedge or resize. If it is, be explicit that part of the thesis is a macro call, and size accordingly.
   5. Where macro genuinely cannot be avoided is in sectors where the macro variable is the business: banks and rates, miners and commodity prices, homebuilders and mortgage rates. There, a view is unavoidable and pretending otherwise is dishonest.
   6. The formulation I would give: I do not forecast macro, but I refuse to hold an exposure I have not noticed.

   Where candidates lose it

   Either claiming macro is irrelevant, which is naive, or presenting yourself as a macro forecaster in a stock-picking seat. The sophisticated position is measuring embedded exposure rather than predicting.

   Expect next

   • What macro exposure is in your best idea?
   • How would you hedge it?
   • Which sectors force you to take a macro view?
10. 096How would you think about a company that is buying back stock at a high multiple?Company analysisHardtechnicalS&P GlobalDebt Capital Markets · Chicago · 2022

    Say this

    It is value-destructive unless the stock is genuinely below intrinsic value, regardless of what it does to EPS. A buyback is an investment decision and should be judged on the return it earns, like any other use of capital.

    Then walk it

    1. The correct test: buying back stock at price P earns you the company's own earnings yield, one over the P/E. At 40 times, that is a 2.5 percent return. Would you approve any other project at a 2.5 percent return?
    2. EPS still rises because share count falls, which is exactly why this error is so common: the metric management is paid on improves while value is destroyed.
    3. The tell is the pattern over time. A company buying heavily at peak valuations and issuing equity at troughs has management that does not think about value. The ten-year cash flow statement reveals this immediately.
    4. The legitimate exceptions: offsetting dilution from stock compensation is not really capital return but a cost of compensation, and it should be described as such. And returning cash when there is genuinely nothing better to do with it is defensible even at a fair price.
    5. The comparison that matters: buybacks versus dividends versus debt paydown versus reinvestment. Buybacks are only optimal when the shares are cheap and the alternatives are worse.
    6. For a credit analyst the concern is different again: buybacks funded with debt at peak valuations weaken the balance sheet at exactly the wrong point in the cycle.

    Where candidates lose it

    Treating buybacks as automatically good because EPS rises. The earnings-yield framing is the answer, and being able to state it as 'would you approve this as a project' is what makes the point land.

    Expect next

    • When is a buyback the right decision?
    • How do you judge it from the cash flow statement?
    • What if it is debt-funded?

    Reported by candidates at S&P Global (Debt Capital Markets, Chicago, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.