Case study presentation: four valuation methods give four different ranges for a hotel company. Build the football field and present a view on value.

For a sale, the range to stand behind is Rs 1,950 to 2,250 crore, 13x to 15x EBITDA, with a midpoint of Rs 2,100 crore. It sits inside the DCF, above the trading comps because a buyer pays for control, and at the bottom of the precedents because Mahiraj's growth does not justify the top of past deals. The 52-week range is where the shares have traded, not what a buyer pays, and it is the floor the board should not accept.

When you sell a flat you look at three numbers: what similar flats are listed at, what similar flats actually sold for, and what the rent would justify. They differ, and each is right about something. A football field puts four methods on one scale so the board can see that they answer different questions: the DCF says what the plan is worth, trading comps say what the market pays for a minority stake today, precedents say what buyers have paid for whole companies, and the 52-week range says where the shares have been. Mahiraj's four ranges do not overlap at any single value: the highest low is Rs 2,100 crore and the lowest high is Rs 1,900 crore. That is normal, and the presentation is about explaining why rather than hiding it.

Start from the purpose. The board is selling control, so the trading comps and the 52-week range are floors, not answers; a buyer will pay more than a minority share price, and the precedents at 14x to 16x show by how much. But the top of the precedents was paid for hotel chains growing faster than Mahiraj or by buyers with large cost synergies, so 16x is not Mahiraj's number. The DCF, which captures the plan, brackets 12x to 14.7x. Put together: a buyer with control should pay at least the bottom of the precedents, 14x, and a disciplined view sits 13x to 15x. The control premiumThe extra amount a buyer pays over the market price of a share to acquire the whole company and the right to run it; it reflects control itself and expected synergies. is the reason the chosen range is above the trading comps, and the lack of a strong growth story is the reason it is below the top of the precedents.

Say what you would not do. Averaging the four ranges gives about Rs 1,900 crore, which is below every precedent and treats the share price as if it were a bid. Taking the overlap gives nothing, because there is none. A football field is not a calculator; it is an argument laid out on one axis, and the chosen band is where the argument lands.

One page, three moves. First the picture, with the chosen band drawn on it, so the board sees where you stand before you explain anything. Second, one sentence per bar on what it answers and why it sits where it does. Third, the number: Rs 1,950 to 2,250 crore, midpoint Rs 2,100 crore, and what would move it. What moves it up: a strategic buyer with overlapping hotels who can cut head office cost. What moves it down: a sponsor buyer who prices on leverage and will not pay for synergies it cannot create. The limit: every bar is enterprise value, and the board cares about equity value per share, so the bridge through net debt, leases and minority interests must be on the second page even if nobody asks.