Investment Banking interview preparation

Every question below is either traced to a named firm from a public candidate report, or tagged at desk level when we could not trace it. Answers are written the way you would actually say them out loud — answer first, then the mechanism, then the limitation.

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Question bank

100 questions, mapped to the firms that asked them

Questions
100
Traced to a firm
100
Firms
46
Updated
September 2026
Asked at
All firmsTruist Securities10Rothschild & Co8Centerview Partners7Credit Suisse7Harris Williams6Houlihan Lokey6Lazard6Mizuho6Barclays5Citi5Deutsche Bank5Evercore5Moelis & Company5Morgan Stanley5Piper Sandler5RBC Capital Markets5Goldman Sachs4Nomura4TD Securities4Bank of America3Guggenheim Securities3J.P. Morgan3Jefferies3Moody's3Perella Weinberg Partners3Warburg Pincus3William Blair3HSBC2Lincoln International2Scotiabank2TPG2UBS2Wells Fargo Securities2Advent International1Apollo Global Management1Bain Capital1Balyasny Asset Management1BlackRock1BNP Paribas1General Atlantic1Invesco1Morningstar1PIMCO1Société Générale1State Street1Wellington Management1
Topic
All topicsAccounting14Valuation21M&A10Markets and deals10Capital markets3LBO8Leveraged finance3Restructuring2Credit3Debt capital markets2Capital structure2Case and estimation11Brainteasers6Fit5
Level
AnyCoreIntermediateHard
Type
AnyTechnicalCaseBrainteaserFitMarket view
Showing 11–20 of 34 · filtered from 100Clear filters
  1. 039Would an increase in price or an increase in volume be more preferable when you are trying to deliver synergies?M&AHardsuperdayLazardMergers and Acquisitions · New York · 2026

    Say this

    Price, almost always. A price increase drops straight to the bottom line with no incremental cost, while a volume increase carries variable cost, working capital and often capacity investment with it.

    Then walk it

    1. A dollar of price is a dollar of gross profit. A dollar of volume is a dollar times the gross margin, so at a 40 percent margin you need two and a half times the revenue to get the same profit.
    2. Volume also consumes cash. More units means more inventory and receivables, and eventually more capacity, so free cash flow lags the revenue.
    3. Price is also faster. You can reprice a portfolio in a quarter; winning share takes years.
    4. The counterargument, and I would raise it: price synergies are much harder to defend to regulators, because raising prices post-merger is precisely what antitrust authorities are watching for. Volume and cost synergies are safer ground in a filing.
    5. Price is also fragile. It invites competitive response and it can accelerate customer churn, so the durability is lower even though the immediate flow-through is better.

    Where candidates lose it

    Answering only with the margin arithmetic. The regulatory dimension is what makes this an M&A question rather than a maths question, and at a firm like Lazard that is the half they are listening for.

    Expect next

    • How would you defend price synergies to a regulator?
    • Which synergies do you actually put in the model?
    • Why do most deals miss their synergy targets?

    Reported by candidates at Lazard (Mergers and Acquisitions, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  2. 040Would Blackstone or Nike pay more to acquire Adidas, and why?M&AHardsuperdayNomuraInvestment Banking · New York · 2026

    Say this

    Nike, on economics. A strategic buyer can pay for synergies a sponsor cannot: overlapping supply chain, shared distribution and marketing scale. Blackstone only has financial engineering and whatever operational improvement it can drive alone.

    Then walk it

    1. Nike's ceiling is intrinsic value plus synergies. Procurement, logistics, retail footprint and back office overlap are all real, so the synergy pool is large.
    2. Blackstone's ceiling is whatever price still clears its target return, typically a low-to-mid twenties IRR over five years. No synergies, so the value has to come from leverage, multiple expansion and operational improvement.
    3. So on paper the strategic wins, and that is the standard answer.
    4. But the deal would never happen for Nike. Combining the two largest athletic brands would be blocked on competition grounds in every major market. A buyer who cannot close cannot be the highest bidder in any real sense.
    5. So the honest answer is: Nike can pay more and will not be allowed to; Blackstone can actually transact. And a sponsor can sometimes win anyway on speed, certainty and no antitrust review, which is why sellers do not always take the highest nominal number.

    Where candidates lose it

    Giving the textbook 'strategics pay more' answer without noticing that this particular pairing is an antitrust impossibility. The firm names were chosen deliberately. Spotting that is the whole test.

    Expect next

    • Who typically pays more, a sponsor or a strategic?
    • Who would be a realistic buyer then?
    • When does a seller take the lower bid?

    Reported by candidates at Nomura (Investment Banking, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  3. 042What is the difference between management rollover and management incentives?M&AHardtechnicalCitiMergers and Acquisitions · New York · 2026

    Say this

    Rollover is management reinvesting its existing equity into the new deal instead of cashing out. Incentives are new equity granted to management going forward, usually options or a management incentive plan that vests on performance.

    Then walk it

    1. Rollover is backward-looking value. Management already owns shares; instead of taking the cash, they roll some percentage into the new capital structure alongside the sponsor.
    2. It reduces the sponsor's cheque size, which is helpful, and it signals confidence, which buyers care about. It can also be tax-deferred, so management has a reason to want it.
    3. Incentives are forward-looking and dilutive to the sponsor. A typical management incentive plan is five to fifteen percent of equity, vesting on time and on a return hurdle.
    4. In a model they sit in different places. Rollover is a source of funds in the sources and uses table. The incentive pool is dilution to the sponsor's exit proceeds, so it reduces the sponsor's IRR, not the entry price.
    5. The reason both exist: rollover aligns management on the downside because their own money is at risk, and the incentive plan aligns them on the upside. A sponsor wants both.

    Where candidates lose it

    Conflating the two, or putting the incentive pool in sources and uses. Rollover funds the deal; incentives dilute the exit. Getting that placement right is what the question is actually testing.

    Expect next

    • How does the incentive pool affect the sponsor's IRR?
    • How much rollover would you expect management to do?
    • Where does rollover sit in the sources and uses?

    Reported by candidates at Citi (Mergers and Acquisitions, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  4. 045Based on the financials in front of you, would you advise this company to sell or not?M&AHardsuperdayHarris WilliamsInvestment Banking · Richmond · 2024Lincoln InternationalMergers and Acquisitions · New York · 2025

    Say this

    I would answer the question directly with a recommendation, then defend it on three axes: where the business is in its own trajectory, where the market is in its cycle, and what the owner actually wants.

    Then walk it

    1. Sell into strength. If margins have just peaked, growth is decelerating, and the sector is trading at a cyclical high multiple, that is the moment. Buyers pay for the next three years, not the last three.
    2. Hold if there is a visible, fundable value-creation step the current owner can capture: a margin programme half done, a new facility about to come online, a contract about to be signed. Let the buyer pay for the result, not the plan.
    3. Then the owner's own position. A founder with all their net worth in one asset has a diversification reason to sell that has nothing to do with the multiple. A partial sale can solve that.
    4. Test the buyer universe before recommending a process. A thin buyer list means a weak auction and a weak price, whatever the financials say.
    5. Then commit. Something like: given decelerating growth, peak margins and a deep strategic buyer list, I would run a process now and target the strategics.

    Where candidates lose it

    Hedging. Middle-market bankers ask this to see whether you can make a recommendation on incomplete information. Saying 'it depends' and stopping is a fail. Pick a side, then name what would change your mind.

    Expect next

    • Who would be a dark horse buyer?
    • Build me the buyer universe.
    • What would change your recommendation?

    Reported by candidates at Harris Williams (Investment Banking, Richmond, 2024); Lincoln International (Mergers and Acquisitions, New York, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  5. 046Who would be a dark horse candidate to buy a pen manufacturer?M&AHardsuperdayHarris WilliamsMergers and Acquisitions · Richmond · 2025

    Say this

    I would look for buyers who want the capability rather than the product. An injection-moulding or precision-plastics group buying for the manufacturing asset, or a promotional-products and corporate-gifting business buying for the channel.

    Then walk it

    1. The obvious buyers are other stationery brands and their sponsors. Those are not dark horses, so I would name them and move past them.
    2. The manufacturing angle: a pen is a high-volume precision plastics and micro-assembly business. A contract manufacturer in medical devices or cosmetics packaging could want that capacity and tolerance capability.
    3. The channel angle: whoever owns the shelf. A promotional products distributor, or a corporate gifting platform, buys the brand as a hook for a much larger merchandising catalogue.
    4. The brand angle: luxury. If the target has any premium line, a luxury goods group could take the brand and abandon the volume business entirely. That is a different valuation basis, brand not EBITDA.
    5. And the adjacency angle: an office-products distributor integrating backwards, or an Asian manufacturer buying Western distribution and brand. Each of these values a different asset inside the same company, which is the whole point of building a buyer universe properly.

    Where candidates lose it

    Naming only competitors. The word 'dark horse' means they want to see whether you can decompose the company into its separate assets, manufacturing, brand, channel, and find who values each one most. Structure the answer by asset, not by company.

    Expect next

    • Which of those pays the most?
    • How would you approach them differently in a process?
    • How would you value it for a luxury buyer versus a manufacturer?

    Reported by candidates at Harris Williams (Mergers and Acquisitions, Richmond, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  6. 048If a company is dual listed, which market should it raise in?Capital marketsHardtechnicalCredit SuisseInvestment Banking · Mumbai · 2021

    Say this

    Wherever the cost of capital is lowest after all frictions, which in practice means wherever the natural investor base is. That is usually the market with deeper liquidity in your sector and better sector comparables.

    Then walk it

    1. Start with valuation. If your sector trades at a higher multiple in one market because that market has the specialist investors and analysts, you raise there. Issuing where you are better understood is cheaper capital.
    2. Then liquidity. A deeper market absorbs a large primary issue with less price impact and a tighter discount to the last close.
    3. Then the frictions: listing and ongoing compliance cost, disclosure regime, index eligibility, and withholding tax treatment for the investors you are targeting.
    4. Currency and use of proceeds matter too. If you are funding capital expenditure in rupees, raising dollars creates an exposure you then have to hedge or live with.
    5. For an Indian issuer the concrete version of this is: domestic listing gives you index inclusion and a domestic mutual fund and retail bid, while an overseas raise can offer a better multiple for a technology story and access to larger institutional tickets. The answer follows the investor base, not national pride.

    Where candidates lose it

    Answering 'whichever has the higher share price'. Price levels across listings converge through arbitrage. The real question is where the marginal investor is and what the all-in cost of capital is after tax and compliance.

    Expect next

    • What are the differences between an India listing and a US listing?
    • What makes a good IPO environment?
    • How would fungibility between the two lines affect your answer?

    Reported by candidates at Credit Suisse (Investment Banking, Mumbai, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  7. 054Do a paper LBO. EBITDA of $100, bought at 10x, five times leverage, exit at 10x in five years, EBITDA grows to $150, all cash sweeps to debt.LBOHardsuperdayBain CapitalGeneralist · Boston · 2024Warburg PincusPrivate Equity · New York · 2014

    Say this

    Entry equity is $500. Exit enterprise value is $1,500 less remaining debt. If the business repays roughly $250 of the $500 of debt over five years, exit equity is about $1,250, so 2.5 times the money and roughly a 20 percent IRR.

    Then walk it

    1. Entry: $100 EBITDA at 10 times is $1,000 enterprise value. Debt at five times EBITDA is $500, so the sponsor puts in $500.
    2. Cash flow: EBITDA ramps from $100 to $150. Say average EBITDA over the period is $125. Interest on $500 at 8 percent is about $40. Take off CapEx of $25, working capital of $5, and tax on EBIT.
    3. That leaves roughly $50 a year of cash to sweep, so about $250 of debt repaid over five years. Ending debt is $250.
    4. Exit: $150 EBITDA at 10 times is $1,500 enterprise value, less $250 debt, equals $1,250 of equity.
    5. Return: $1,250 on $500 is 2.5 times. The rule of thumb is that 2.0 times over five years is about 15 percent and 2.5 times is about 20 percent, so call it 20 percent.
    6. Then attribute it: EBITDA grew 50 percent and debt halved. No multiple expansion needed, which is why this deal would clear an investment committee.

    Where candidates lose it

    Getting lost in precision. Round aggressively, announce every assumption, and keep the arithmetic in whole numbers you can do out loud. And know the IRR rule of thumb, because reaching for a calculator is the tell that you have never done one.

    Expect next

    • What if you exit at 8 times instead?
    • If I make 8 times my money in 6 years, what is my IRR?
    • Which would you rather have, 25 percent IRR over 5 years or 30 percent over 3?

    Reported by candidates at Bain Capital (Generalist, Boston, 2024); Warburg Pincus (Private Equity, New York, 2014). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  8. 058What type of company is a good candidate for a dividend recapitalisation?LBOHardtechnicalRothschild & CoInvestment Banking · London · 2026

    Say this

    One that has already deleveraged meaningfully, has very stable cash flow, and has no near-term need for its balance sheet. Typically a sponsor-owned asset two or three years into the hold where the exit has been delayed.

    Then walk it

    1. The mechanical precondition is headroom. The company must have paid down enough debt that re-levering back to its original multiple is still something the credit market will fund.
    2. Cash flow has to be genuinely stable, because you are removing the cushion. Contracted revenue, low cyclicality, low CapEx.
    3. No competing call on capital. If the company needs to fund a plant or an acquisition, the cash should go there instead.
    4. The motivation is almost always sponsor-side: fund life is advancing, the exit window is shut, and the sponsor wants to de-risk and crystallise part of the return. It resets the IRR clock because cash returned early is heavily weighted.
    5. And the honest downside: nothing about the operating business improved. Leverage went back up, the equity cushion is thinner, and if the cycle turns the company is more fragile. Lenders price that, and the covenant package usually tightens.

    Where candidates lose it

    Describing the mechanics but not the motive. This question is really asking whether you understand sponsor incentives and fund life. And you should name the downside, because a banker who pitches a recap without acknowledging the fragility is not credible.

    Expect next

    • How does it affect the sponsor's IRR?
    • Why would lenders agree to it?
    • What happens if the cycle turns afterwards?

    Reported by candidates at Rothschild & Co (Investment Banking, London, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  9. 059Why would a sponsor prefer to take on high yield debt to finance an LBO rather than bank debt?Leveraged financeHardtechnicalLazardGeneralist · Amsterdam · 2025

    Say this

    Flexibility. High yield bonds are typically fixed rate, bullet maturity, with no maintenance covenants and no mandatory amortisation. You pay more in coupon to buy freedom and certainty of cash flow.

    Then walk it

    1. No amortisation. Bank term loans grind down cash with mandatory repayments and a cash sweep; bonds are bullet, so all the cash stays in the business for growth or bolt-ons.
    2. Covenant-light. Bonds carry incurrence covenants that only bite when you do something, rather than maintenance covenants tested every quarter. A sponsor running a turnaround does not want a quarterly leverage test.
    3. Fixed rate. Bonds lock the coupon, so a rising rate environment does not eat the equity. Floating-rate term loans expose the deal to rate risk unless hedged.
    4. Longer tenor, usually seven to ten years against five to seven for a term loan, so no refinancing wall mid-hold.
    5. The costs, which you should name: a higher coupon, call protection that makes early repayment expensive, and a public disclosure burden. So the real answer is that sponsors use both, bank debt for the cheap senior layer and bonds for the flexible layer, and the mix depends on whether the thesis needs cash flexibility or the lowest possible cost.

    Where candidates lose it

    Answering 'because banks will not lend that much'. Sometimes true, but it misses the point. The trade is cost against flexibility, and naming covenant structure and bullet maturity is what shows leveraged finance literacy.

    Expect next

    • What is the difference between incurrence and maintenance covenants?
    • Describe the differences between private credit and bank syndicated debt.
    • What is call protection?

    Reported by candidates at Lazard (Generalist, Amsterdam, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

  10. 060Describe the differences between private credit and bank syndicated debt.Leveraged financeHardtechnicalMizuhoInvestment Banking · New York · 2026MizuhoGeneralist · New York · 2026

    Say this

    A private credit loan is held by one or a handful of funds, negotiated bilaterally, priced higher but certain and fast. Syndicated debt is arranged by a bank and sold to many institutional investors, cheaper but subject to market conditions.

    Then walk it

    1. Execution certainty is the big one. A direct lender commits and holds. A bank underwrites and then has to syndicate, so the borrower carries flex risk if the market moves against them.
    2. Price: private credit typically costs 100 to 300 basis points more. You pay for speed, confidentiality and certainty.
    3. Documentation and relationship: a small lender group means you can renegotiate in a downturn with people you know. A broadly syndicated loan means hundreds of holders, some of them distressed funds who bought in at a discount and want a different outcome.
    4. Size and liquidity: the syndicated market handles the largest deals and trades in a secondary market, which matters for pricing transparency. Private credit paper is illiquid and marked by the manager.
    5. Structurally, private credit has taken a large share of mid-market and increasingly large-cap leveraged lending, which is why the market can now fund deals when the syndicated window is shut. The systemic question people are watching is whether valuations in an illiquid, manager-marked asset class are honest through a real default cycle.

    Where candidates lose it

    Describing only the price difference. The reason private credit won share is certainty of execution and flexibility of documentation, not price. If you can also name the concern about mark-to-model valuations, you sound like someone who reads the market.

    Expect next

    • Why has private credit taken share from the banks?
    • Which would you advise a sponsor to use?
    • Tell me about the two different types of loans in the broadly syndicated loan market.

    Reported by candidates at Mizuho (Investment Banking, New York, 2026); Mizuho (Generalist, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.