Case 015Fixed income, credit and LDICore
A Rs 1,500 crore credit fund holds 9% in bonds of one issuer, which is downgraded from AA to BB and falls 25%. What happens to NAV, why do early redeemers gain at the expense of those who stay, and how does side-pocketing work?
1The situation
Nirmalya Credit Opportunities Fund has Rs 1,500 crore and a NAV of Rs 100 a unit, so 15 crore units. It holds 9% of its assets, Rs 135 crore, in bonds of Kesarigarh Infra Holdings. Kesarigarh is downgraded overnight from AA to BB, below investment grade, and the bonds' fair value falls 25%.
The bonds now barely trade. Investors holding 30% of the units have put in redemption requests, and the fund's other holdings are liquid. Regulatory rules on side-pocketing exist in India; the framework is described here, and the current SEBI conditions should be confirmed before relying on any detail.
2Your task
What happens to the NAV, how can early redeemers take value from investors who stay, and how does a side pocket stop it?
Quick check
By how much does Nirmalya's NAV fall when the bonds are marked down?
Worked solution
Try it on paper, then open one step at a time.
30-second answerThe answer to give first
NAV falls 2.25%, from Rs 100 to Rs 97.75, and a side pocket stops the leavers taking value from the stayers. If the bond is marked too slowly, redeemers exit at too high a price; even at a fair price, they are paid from liquid assets, leaving the stayers holding more of the bad bond. Side-pocketing splits the bond into a separate portfolio in which every current investor keeps an equal share, so redemptions come only from the liquid main portfolio.
Step 1What happens to the NAV?
Mark the bond and divide. Rs 135 crore falls 25%, a loss of Rs 33.75 crore on a Rs 1,500 crore fund. The NAV falls by the weight times the fall, 9% times 25%, 2.25%, to Rs 97.75 a unit. The headline sounds small, but the problem is not the size of the fall, it is who ends up bearing it.
Step 2How do early redeemers gain at the expense of those who stay?
In two ways. First, if the valuation lags: suppose the bond is marked down only 10% for the first few days while the market works out a price. NAV reads Rs 99.10 instead of Rs 97.75, and the 30% of units that leave are paid about Rs 6.1 crore more than they are worth, money that comes out of the stayers' pockets. Second, even at a fair price, redemptions are paid from the liquid bonds, so the stayers own a bigger slice of the illiquid one: its weight rises from 6.9% to about 9.9%, and any further loss lands on them alone. It is the last people at a shared restaurant table being left with the bill for the most expensive dish.
Step 3How does side-pocketing work?
On a credit event, such as a downgrade below investment grade, the fund can move the affected bond into a segregated portfolioA separate portfolio created to hold a distressed security, whose units go to every investor on the record date in proportion to their holding. Also called a side pocket.. Every investor on the record date gets one unit of the segregated portfolio for each unit held, so each unit of Rs 97.75 becomes Rs 91.00 in the main portfolio and Rs 6.75 in the side pocket. Redemptions are paid only from the main portfolio. Whatever Kesarigarh eventually pays goes to everyone who held units on the record date, leavers and stayers alike.
| Per unit, Rs | No side pocket, stale mark | No side pocket, fair mark | Side pocket |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leaver receives now | 99.10 | 97.75 | 91.00 |
| Leaver keeps a claim on Kesarigarh | no | no | yes, 6.75 |
| Stayer's share of the bond | rises | rises | unchanged |
| Value moved from stayers to leavers | Rs 6.1 crore | further losses fall on stayers | none |
Say the limits. A side pocket does not recover any money; it only shares the loss fairly. It needs trustee approval and disclosure, the manager should not earn full fees on the segregated assets, and it can be misused to hide a bad credit call from the headline NAV, which is why regulators attach conditions. The deeper fix is concentration: 9% in one sub-AA issuer was the decision that made the side pocket necessary.
Where candidates lose it
Candidates answer that NAV falls 25%, applying the bond's fall to the whole fund. The fall is 9% of 25%, and the interviewer uses the small number to test whether you see why it still matters.
The second miss is thinking a fair price alone solves the problem. Even at the right price, paying leavers from liquid assets concentrates the bad bond on the stayers; only separating it treats everyone equally.
What the interviewer asks next
- Kesarigarh later pays 60% of face value. What does each segregated unit receive?
- Why might a fund manager resist side-pocketing, and why might that be the wrong instinct?
- How would swing pricing address the same problem, and where does it fall short?
Company names and figures are illustrative.
