Private Equity interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

83

Firms

40

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsAdvent International6Apollo Global Management6Audax Group6Carlyle Group6EQT6Silver Lake6Vista Equity Partners6WPWarburg Pincus6HIH.I.G. Capital5Oaktree Capital Management5Platinum Equity5TPTPG5General Atlantic4AMAres Management3Blackstone3Clayton Dubilier and Rice3GSGuggenheim Securities3Insight Partners3Invesco3Lazard3Neuberger Berman3NUNuveen3TSTruist Securities3Bain Capital2HWHarris Williams2Kohlberg Kravis Roberts2Millennium Management2Moody's2Rothschild & Co2WBWilliam Blair2Bessemer Venture Partners1Citi1Evercore1FTFranklin Templeton1Houlihan Lokey1HPS Investment Partners1KKR1Mizuho1MSMorgan Stanley1Sycamore Partners1

Topic

All topicsLBO mechanics7Value creation5Returns2Fund economics9Investment judgement18Valuation6Firm knowledge2Credit and financing9Operations4Due diligence8Career and fit11Sector knowledge4Accounting2Deal structuring7Industry knowledge3Brainteasers3

Level

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Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitMarket viewBrainteaser

1. 015Why are shareholder loans used in a capital structure instead of just cash equity?Credit and financingHardtechnicalNUNuveenPrivate Equity · London · 2024

   Say this

   Mainly tax and flexibility. Interest on a shareholder loan is deductible where equity dividends are not, and a loan can be repaid without the formalities and restrictions that apply to returning share capital.

   Then walk it

   1. Tax efficiency is the primary driver: interest accrued to the sponsor's loan reduces taxable profit at the operating company, creating a shield that pure equity does not.
   2. Repayment flexibility: loan principal and accrued interest can be repaid as cash allows, whereas returning share capital often requires distributable reserves and legal formalities.
   3. Ranking and structuring: shareholder loans sit above equity in the waterfall, which matters when there are multiple equity holders, minority co-investors or management shareholders with different entry points.
   4. Allocation between investors: a loan with a fixed accrual gives the sponsor a preferred return ahead of the ordinary equity, which is how management's incentive equity gets structured to only pay out above a hurdle.
   5. The constraints to name: thin capitalisation rules, interest deductibility caps, and transfer pricing rules on the rate charged. Many jurisdictions have tightened these considerably, and the EU's anti-tax-avoidance rules limit the benefit.
   6. This is standard in European buyouts and infrastructure, and less so in the US, which is worth flagging since the structure is jurisdiction-dependent.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering only 'it is tax efficient'. The ranking and the role in allocating returns between sponsor and management equity are the structuring content, and naming thin capitalisation rules shows you know the limits.

   Expect next

   • What limits the tax benefit?
   • How does this interact with management's incentive equity?
   • Walk me through an SPV model.

   Reported by candidates at Nuveen (Private Equity, London, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 074How would leverage change if the business were cyclical rather than stable?Credit and financingIntermediatetechnicalNUNuveenLeveraged Finance · Chicago · 2019

   Say this

   Materially lower, and sized against trough EBITDA rather than current EBITDA. A cyclical business at five times peak earnings can be at nine times in a downturn without anything else changing.

   Then walk it

   1. The arithmetic: if EBITDA falls 40 percent in a downturn, leverage of five times at the peak becomes over eight times at the trough purely through the denominator. Covenants set against peak earnings breach automatically.
   2. So you underwrite to the trough: what did EBITDA do in the last downturn, and can the structure service interest at that level with headroom?
   3. Practically that might mean three times for a cyclical where a stable business supports five and a half, plus a wider covenant cushion of 30 to 35 percent rather than the standard 25 to 30.
   4. You also want more liquidity: a larger undrawn revolver, more cash on the balance sheet, and lower mandatory amortisation so the fixed cash burden is smaller in a bad year.
   5. The cost structure interacts with this. A cyclical business with high fixed costs is far worse than one with variable costs, because EBITDA falls faster than revenue.
   6. And the exit risk compounds it: cyclicals trade at low multiples at the peak and you cannot sell at the trough, so the hold period is less controllable. That is a real reason sponsors underweight deep cyclicals despite the apparent value.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering with a lower multiple but no reason. The mechanism is that leverage is a ratio and the denominator collapses, so covenants set against current EBITDA breach without any operational failure. Say that explicitly.

   Expect next

   • What covenant cushion would you want?
   • How do you find the trough EBITDA?
   • How does that change the exit plan?

   Reported by candidates at Nuveen (Leveraged Finance, Chicago, 2019). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.