Private Equity interview preparation
Buyout, growth and credit. Every question is either traced to a named firm from a public candidate report, or tagged at desk level when we could not trace it. Answers lead with the point, then the mechanism, then the limitation.
100 questions, mapped to the firms that asked them
- Questions
- 100
- Traced to a firm
- 83
- Firms
- 40
- Updated
- September 2026
031What are the ways a sponsor can exit an investment?
Say this
Sale to a strategic buyer, sale to another sponsor, an IPO, a recapitalisation, or a continuation vehicle. Strategic sales usually price best; sponsor-to-sponsor is the most common in practice.
Then walk it
- Strategic sale: typically the highest price because the buyer captures synergies, but the process is slower, antitrust review is possible, and the buyer universe can be thin.
- Secondary buyout, selling to another sponsor: fast, familiar counterparties, and a clean exit. It is now a large share of all exits, though limited partners sometimes note they are effectively buying the same asset twice.
- IPO: can achieve a good valuation in the right window but rarely gives a full exit. The sponsor retains a stake subject to lock-up and then sells down over years, so it is a path to exit rather than an exit.
- Dividend recapitalisation: returns capital without selling, used when the exit market is closed.
- Continuation vehicle: the sponsor moves the asset into a new fund it also manages, with existing limited partners choosing to cash out or roll. Useful for a good asset the fund has run out of time to hold, and structurally conflicted, which is why pricing has to be validated by a new third-party investor.
- The choice depends on the asset, the market window and the fund's own timing. A fund near the end of its life has less optionality, which is itself a negotiating weakness.
Where candidates lose it
Forgetting continuation vehicles, which have become a major feature of the market. And describing an IPO as a full exit, which it is not.
Expect next
- What is a continuation vehicle and what is the conflict?
- Why has sponsor-to-sponsor become so common?
- How does fund life affect exit decisions?
032How would you assess a fund's performance, and what metrics would you use?Neuberger BermanPrivate Equity · London · 2022
Say this
IRR, multiple on invested capital, and distributions to paid-in capital, benchmarked against a public market equivalent. The key is distinguishing realised from unrealised, because unrealised value is the manager's own estimate.
Then walk it
- IRR is time-weighted and can be flattered by early distributions or by subscription line facilities that delay calling capital. Treat it sceptically on its own.
- MOIC, multiple on invested capital, measures total value over capital invested and ignores timing. Reporting both together makes gaming obvious.
- DPI, distributions to paid-in, is the honest one: actual cash returned relative to cash called. A fund with high IRR and low DPI has not actually given anybody money yet.
- RVPI, residual value to paid-in, is the unrealised portion, marked by the manager. In a slow exit environment this can be most of the reported value, and it is an estimate, not a fact.
- Public market equivalent: compare against what the same cash flows would have earned in a public index. This is the test of whether illiquidity was rewarded, and it is the benchmark sophisticated allocators use.
- Then the qualitative work: return attribution across leverage, multiple and operations; loss ratio and how many deals were written off; consistency across vintages; and whether the team that produced the record is still there.
Where candidates lose it
Quoting IRR alone. The examinable content is the DPI versus RVPI split and the public market equivalent comparison. Also naming subscription lines as a way IRR gets flattered is a strong signal of real knowledge.
Expect next
- How do subscription lines flatter IRR?
- What is a public market equivalent?
- How would you compare two funds of different vintages?
Reported by candidates at Neuberger Berman (Private Equity, London, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
036Why would a distressed company have a high equity value?Silver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022
Say this
Because equity in a levered company is a call option on the enterprise. Even when the option is deep out of the money, it has time value, so the market prices the chance that the business recovers before the debt comes due.
Then walk it
- Equity holders have limited liability and a residual claim, which is exactly the payoff of a call option struck at the face value of the debt.
- So when enterprise value is below debt, the intrinsic value is zero but the option still has time value. Volatility and time to maturity both increase it.
- That has a counterintuitive consequence: higher volatility increases equity value in a distressed company, which is why shareholders of a failing business rationally prefer risky strategies. The lenders bear the downside.
- There are also more mundane explanations: the market may disagree with the accounting distress, there may be a valuable non-operating asset, or a rescue refinancing may be expected.
- And sometimes it is just a small float with retail buyers and constrained short interest, which is a market microstructure story rather than a valuation one.
- The practical read for an investor: a distressed equity with meaningful market value is a levered bet on recovery, and it should be sized like an option, not like equity.
Where candidates lose it
Answering that the market is simply wrong. The option framing is what the question is testing, and the follow-on insight, that volatility helps distressed equity and hurts the lenders, is the part that shows genuine understanding.
Expect next
- So what does that imply about management's incentives in distress?
- How does that affect the lenders?
- How would you value the fulcrum security instead?
Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
037If a company raises $100 of debt to buy back $100 of shares, what happens to enterprise value and equity value?Silver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022
Say this
Enterprise value is unchanged, because the operating business did not change. Equity value falls by $100 and net debt rises by $100, so the two offset exactly.
Then walk it
- Enterprise value is the value of the operating assets. Issuing debt and retiring stock rearranges the claims on those assets without touching them.
- Equity value falls by the $100 spent on the buyback. Net debt rises by the $100 raised. EV equals equity plus net debt, so it is unchanged.
- Share count falls, so value per share need not fall. If the buyback was executed at fair value, per-share value is unchanged; above fair value it destroys per-share value, below it creates it.
- The second-order effects are where it gets interesting: the tax shield on the new debt adds some value, while higher leverage increases distress risk and the cost of equity. In the Modigliani-Miller frame with taxes, the tax shield dominates at moderate leverage.
- EPS usually rises because the share count fell more than net income did, but as always that is arithmetic rather than value creation.
- So the clean answer: EV flat, equity down $100, net debt up $100, per-share value depends entirely on the price paid.
Where candidates lose it
Saying enterprise value falls because debt went up. Debt is part of the bridge, not part of enterprise value. This is the single most common enterprise value misunderstanding and it gets tested constantly.
Expect next
- What happens to value per share?
- When is the buyback value-destructive?
- What happens to WACC?
Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
040What metrics would you look at when valuing a retail company?Silver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022
Say this
Same-store sales decomposed into traffic and ticket, gross margin, sales per square foot, inventory turns, and the four-wall economics of a store. Then lease liabilities, because that is where retail leverage hides.
Then walk it
- Comparable store sales is the quality signal, because total revenue growth can be manufactured by opening stores. Break it into transactions and average ticket, and ticket into units and price.
- Gross margin trend against comps tells you whether sales are being bought with discounting.
- Sales per square foot and four-wall EBITDA, meaning store-level profit before corporate overhead. That determines whether new stores create value and what the payback period on a new store is.
- Inventory turns and the inventory-to-sales relationship. Inventory building faster than sales is the earliest reliable warning of markdowns to come.
- Online mix and its profitability, including returns and delivery cost, because e-commerce margin is often far worse than the store channel once fulfilment is loaded.
- For a sponsor specifically: the lease portfolio. Rent is a fixed obligation and the lease liability behaves like debt, so a retailer with a long lease estate is far more levered than its net debt suggests. And the real estate itself may be worth more than the operating business, which changes the whole thesis.
Where candidates lose it
Giving generic metrics with no retail specificity. Four-wall economics, inventory turns and the lease liability are the three that mark out someone who has looked at a retail deal.
Expect next
- How do you treat lease liabilities in leverage?
- What is four-wall EBITDA?
- Would you rather own the real estate or the operating company?
Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
041If margin goes down by 5 percent, how much would you need to increase revenue to hold profit flat?Sycamore PartnersConsumer and Retail · New York · 2026
Say this
It depends on whether the 5 percent is relative or absolute, so I would clarify first. If margin falls from 20 percent to 15 percent, an absolute 5 point drop, you need revenue to rise by a third to hold profit flat.
Then walk it
- Take revenue of 100 and a 20 percent margin, so profit is 20.
- If margin falls 5 percentage points to 15 percent, you need revenue R where 0.15R equals 20, so R is 133. That is a 33 percent increase.
- If the 5 percent is relative, so margin goes from 20 percent to 19 percent, you need 0.19R equals 20, so R is 105. About a 5 percent increase.
- The general rule for the relative case: a relative margin decline of x percent requires roughly x percent more revenue, since profit is margin times revenue.
- The absolute case is far more punishing, and the lower the starting margin the worse it gets. At a 5 percent starting margin, losing 2 points means you need to grow revenue by two thirds.
- The commercial insight: this is why low-margin businesses cannot discount their way out of trouble. Volume almost never compensates for the price given up, which is the maths behind resisting a price war.
Where candidates lose it
Not clarifying absolute versus relative. The two answers differ by a factor of six and the interviewer is watching whether you ask. Then do the arithmetic with round numbers out loud.
Expect next
- What if the starting margin were 5 percent?
- So would you ever discount to defend share?
- How does operating leverage change your answer?
Reported by candidates at Sycamore Partners (Consumer and Retail, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
042How does operating leverage affect debt holders versus equity holders?Oaktree Capital ManagementCredit · Los Angeles · 2024
Say this
High operating leverage amplifies the volatility of EBITDA, which is good for equity and bad for debt. Equity holds the upside option; debt holds a fixed claim and only experiences the extra volatility as risk.
Then walk it
- Operating leverage is the share of fixed costs in the cost base. High fixed costs mean a small revenue change produces a large EBITDA change in both directions.
- For equity, that asymmetry is valuable. Upside flows entirely to shareholders, downside is capped at losing the equity. More volatility means a more valuable option.
- For debt, the payoff is capped at par plus coupon. Extra volatility adds no upside and materially increases the probability of default, so the lender is strictly worse off.
- This is the classic agency conflict between debt and equity: shareholders of a levered company prefer more risk than lenders would choose, and the conflict sharpens as the company approaches distress.
- Which is why credit documents restrict exactly these choices: covenants on leverage, restrictions on asset sales and dividends, and limits on acquisitions are all attempts to stop the equity taking risk with the lender's money.
- Practically for underwriting: a high-fixed-cost business supports less leverage than a variable-cost business with the same EBITDA, because the downside case is so much worse. That is why lenders price manufacturing and airlines differently from services.
Where candidates lose it
Describing operating leverage correctly but not linking it to the option payoffs. The debt-equity agency conflict is the intellectual content, and the practical conclusion, that fixed-cost businesses support less debt, is what shows you can underwrite.
Expect next
- So how much leverage would you lend to an airline?
- What covenants would you want?
- How does that conflict behave near distress?
Reported by candidates at Oaktree Capital Management (Credit, Los Angeles, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
043How does depreciation flow through the three statements?Oaktree Capital ManagementDebt Capital Markets · New York · 2026Moody'sGeneralist · New York · 2022
Say this
Take $10 at a 25 percent tax rate. Pre-tax income falls $10, net income falls $7.50, but cash rises $2.50 because depreciation is non-cash and the only real effect is the tax saved.
Then walk it
- Income statement: $10 of depreciation reduces EBIT by $10, so net income is down $7.50 after tax.
- Cash flow statement: start at minus $7.50, add back the $10 non-cash charge, so cash from operations rises $2.50.
- Balance sheet: cash up $2.50, net PP&E down $10, total assets down $7.50. Retained earnings down $7.50. It balances.
- The economic point is the depreciation tax shield: a non-cash charge that generates real cash by reducing tax.
- For a sponsor this matters at entry, because purchase accounting writes assets up, which creates additional depreciation and amortisation and therefore an additional tax shield. That step-up is worth real money and gets negotiated.
- And for a credit analyst the point is the opposite direction: depreciation approximates the capital the business must eventually respend, so EBITDA overstates the cash available to service debt by roughly the maintenance CapEx.
Where candidates lose it
Saying cash falls. It does not. And for a private equity or credit interview specifically, the expected addition is the link to the purchase accounting step-up or to maintenance CapEx. The bare mechanics alone read as a banking answer.
Expect next
- Now do $10 of CapEx.
- How does the step-up in an asset deal change this?
- Why is EBITDA a poor proxy for cash available to service debt?
Reported by candidates at Oaktree Capital Management (Debt Capital Markets, New York, 2026); Moody's (Generalist, New York, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.
044Why is EBITDA a poor proxy for cash flow, and what would you use instead?Private creditLeveraged finance
Say this
Because it ignores the three things that actually consume cash: capital expenditure, working capital and taxes, plus interest itself. A business can grow EBITDA every year and never generate a dollar of free cash.
Then walk it
- CapEx is the biggest omission. EBITDA adds back depreciation, which is a proxy for the capital the business must eventually respend. For a capital-intensive business, maintenance CapEx alone can absorb most of EBITDA.
- Working capital: a growing business funds receivables and inventory, so cash lags EBITDA persistently.
- Cash taxes are real, and they differ from book taxes because of timing differences and loss carryforwards.
- Interest and mandatory amortisation come before anything reaches the equity, which is precisely what matters when the business is levered.
- And adjusted EBITDA compounds the problem, because the adjustments are the company's own judgement. Recurring restructuring charges and run-rate synergies routinely inflate it.
- What I would use: unlevered free cash flow for valuation, and for credit, EBITDA less maintenance CapEx less cash taxes less working capital change, compared against debt service. That is the number that tells you whether the structure survives.
Where candidates lose it
Reciting the Buffett line about EBITDA without the specific omissions. Name CapEx, working capital and cash taxes explicitly, and name adjusted EBITDA as a separate problem of judgement rather than of definition.
Expect next
- How do you split maintenance from growth CapEx?
- Which add-backs would you refuse?
- What coverage ratio would you actually underwrite to?
045How do you separate maintenance capital expenditure from growth capital expenditure?Private credit
Say this
There is no disclosed split, so you triangulate. Compare CapEx to depreciation over a cycle, ask management for a project-level breakdown, and test whether revenue would decline if spending stopped.
Then walk it
- The rule of thumb: maintenance CapEx approximates depreciation over a long enough period, because depreciation measures the consumption of the existing asset base. Anything above that, sustained, is growth.
- That rule breaks in inflation, since depreciation is on historic cost while replacement is at today's prices. So it understates maintenance in a high-inflation environment.
- Better: get the project-level CapEx budget and classify each line. Management knows the split even though they do not disclose it, and in diligence you can ask.
- The conceptual test: what is the minimum spend that keeps revenue and capacity flat? Anything beyond that is discretionary.
- For a retailer or restaurant chain there is a clean version: new store CapEx is growth, refurbishment of existing sites is maintenance, and both are disclosed at unit level.
- Why it matters for a sponsor: the split determines how much cash is genuinely available to service debt in a downside case, because growth CapEx can be switched off and maintenance cannot. That flexibility is worth a turn of leverage.
Where candidates lose it
Accepting management's split without testing it. Management has an incentive to classify spend as growth, because that makes the business look more cash-generative. The depreciation cross-check and the project-level review are the defences.
Expect next
- What does the split do to your leverage capacity?
- Why does the depreciation rule break in inflation?
- How would you test it for a manufacturer?
Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.
