Venture Capital interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

31

Firms

12

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsGeneral Atlantic9Insight Partners7Silver Lake6Vista Equity Partners4Bessemer Venture Partners3ACAccel2Advent International2Battery Ventures2Andreessen Horowitz1Coatue Management1Sequoia Capital1WPWarburg Pincus1

Topic

All topicsSourcing and deal flow5Market sizing and estimation8Founders and teams5Unit economics and cohorts11Term sheets12Cap table and dilution7Early-stage valuation7Portfolio construction6Board and governance4Down rounds and secondaries4Exits and liquidity4Fund economics5Sector theses and markets6India venture market6Fit and motivation10

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalFitCaseMarket viewBrainteaser

1. 008A founder tells you their TAM is fifty billion dollars. How do you stress-test that?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCGrowth equity

   Say this

   Rebuild it bottom-up in front of them and see where the two numbers diverge. Then test the three places TAM claims usually break: who actually has a budget, what they actually pay, and whether the product they are buying is the one that reaches all of those customers.

   Then walk it

   1. Ask how they built it. If the answer is a research-house report, the number is not theirs and they have not thought about it. If they can build it live, that alone is most of the signal I need about the founder.
   2. Test the customer count. 'All small businesses' is not an addressable base. How many have the problem acutely, have the budget, and are reachable through a channel you can afford? That usually cuts the base by 80 to 90 percent.
   3. Test the price. Founders assume enterprise pricing on an SMB base. If the claimed ACV is $30,000 and the customers are 20-person firms, the pricing and the segment contradict each other.
   4. Test the product boundary. A $50bn TAM often assumes three products they have not built. Ask what share of it today's product addresses, and you frequently get from $50bn to $400m in one question.
   5. Then the important reframe, and I would say it kindly: the size of the TAM barely matters at seed. What matters is whether the first $10m of revenue is reachable from one segment with one product. A huge TAM with no beachhead is a worse company than a $1bn market with an obvious wedge.
   6. And I would not treat a bad TAM slide as disqualifying. Plenty of great companies had absurd TAM slides. It is a probe into how the founder thinks, not a scorecard item.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating this as gotcha — catching the founder out and feeling clever. Diligence is not cross-examination. The useful output is a defensible number and a read on how the founder reasons under pressure, and you get neither if you turn it into an argument.

   Expect next

   • What is the smallest market you would still invest in?
   • How do you find the beachhead segment?
   • What if they refuse to rebuild it with you?
2. 010If you were to open a restaurant, what would be your key concerns?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalGeneral AtlanticGeneralist · Beijing · 2014

   Say this

   Treat it as an investment, not a hobby: location economics, the unit-level P&L, working capital, and whether the concept is repeatable. The concerns in order are rent as a share of revenue, labour, food cost, and whether I can get a second site to work.

   Then walk it

   1. Unit economics first. Restaurant maths is brutal and well known: food cost around 30 percent of revenue, labour 25 to 30, rent under 10, leaving a single-digit to low-teens operating margin if everything goes right.
   2. So the binding constraint is revenue per square foot, which is really seats times turns times average ticket. Forty seats, two turns at lunch and two at dinner, ₹600 average ticket, 26 days — that is about ₹2.5m a month, or ₹30m a year. Every cost decision has to fit inside that.
   3. Then the capital question: fit-out and deposit are largely sunk and unrecoverable, payback on a new site typically runs 18 to 30 months, and the lease term has to be long enough to earn that back. A three-year lease on a five-year payback is not a business.
   4. Working capital is the thing people miss. Suppliers on short credit, aggregators paying out on a lag, staff paid monthly, plus perishable inventory. A profitable restaurant can die on a cash timing mismatch.
   5. Then the concern I would lead with as an investor: is it repeatable without me? A single great restaurant is a job, not an asset. What makes it scalable is a standardised menu, a central kitchen, a manager who is not the founder, and a site-selection model that has worked twice.
   6. And the delivery question, which changed the maths: aggregator commissions of 20 to 30 percent turn a thin dine-in margin negative unless you price a separate delivery menu. Cloud kitchens exist because that one number is so punishing.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering as a diner — menu, ambience, chef. The interviewer is testing whether you naturally reach for a unit-level P&L and a payback period on an unfamiliar business. Lead with the cost structure and the repeatability, then let the concept discussion follow.

   Expect next

   • How long before you open a second location?
   • Would you ever invest in a restaurant chain? What would you need to see?
   • What is the payback period on a new site and how would you shorten it?

   Reported by candidates at General Atlantic (Generalist, Beijing, 2014). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 011Size the market for electric two-wheelers in India.Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalIndian venture capitalGrowth equity

   Say this

   Start from the total two-wheeler market, take the realistic electric penetration curve, then convert to revenue at the electric price point. India sells roughly 17 to 18 million two-wheelers a year, electric is in the high single digits of that today, and the plausible path is 25 to 30 percent within five to seven years.

   Then walk it

   1. Base: about 17 million two-wheelers a year, in a country with roughly 300 million households, so penetration is already high and the market is mostly replacement plus first-time urban buyers.
   2. Penetration: electric is around 6 to 10 percent of new sales now, concentrated in scooters rather than motorcycles, because urban short-trip use suits the range and the drivetrain.
   3. So at 25 percent penetration that is roughly 4.5 million units a year. At an average selling price of ₹1.1 lakh, that is about ₹500bn, call it $6bn of annual vehicle revenue.
   4. Then the segments that matter more for a venture return, because the vehicle itself is a low-margin manufacturing business: batteries and swapping, charging infrastructure, and financing. Financing is the interesting one — at 80 percent loan-to-value on $6bn of sales that is roughly $5bn of annual originations.
   5. Then the constraints I would name unprompted: subsidy dependence, since FAME-type incentives have repeatedly moved the price point and demand with it; battery cell import reliance; and the fleet segment, where delivery and ride-hailing operators buy on total cost per kilometre and adopt years ahead of retail.
   6. Cross-check: electric two-wheeler penetration in China ran far higher far earlier, which says the ceiling is not technological. And petrol at ₹105 a litre against electricity means a running cost gap of roughly 80 percent per kilometre, which is why the fleet segment converts first.

   Where candidates lose it

   Producing one unit number and stopping. The investable question is which layer of the stack has venture-scale margin, and for EVs that is usually batteries, swapping or financing rather than assembling vehicles. Also: ignoring subsidy dependence, which has already reset this market twice.

   Expect next

   • Which layer of that value chain would you actually invest in?
   • What happens to the unit economics if the subsidy goes away?
   • How would you diligence a battery-swapping company?

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.