Venture Capital interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

31

Firms

12

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsGeneral Atlantic9Insight Partners7Silver Lake6Vista Equity Partners4Bessemer Venture Partners3ACAccel2Advent International2Battery Ventures2Andreessen Horowitz1Coatue Management1Sequoia Capital1WPWarburg Pincus1

Topic

All topicsSourcing and deal flow5Market sizing and estimation8Founders and teams5Unit economics and cohorts11Term sheets12Cap table and dilution7Early-stage valuation7Portfolio construction6Board and governance4Down rounds and secondaries4Exits and liquidity4Fund economics5Sector theses and markets6India venture market6Fit and motivation10

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalFitCaseMarket viewBrainteaser

1. 006How do you size a market for a company that is creating a category that does not exist yet?Market sizing and estimationHardtechnicalEarly-stage VC

   Say this

   You cannot size the category, so you size the behaviour it replaces and then size the behaviour it unlocks. Two numbers: the budget or time being spent on the old way today, and the population that could not participate before because the old way was too expensive.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with substitution. Find the spend that already exists in an adjacent, ugly form — the agency fee, the manual process, the spreadsheet plus two analysts. That is a floor you can defend with real data.
   2. Then expansion, which is where the real answer lives. New categories are usually big because they drop the price by an order of magnitude and bring in users who were priced out. Ride hailing was not sized correctly off the taxi market; it was several times bigger because at half the price people stopped taking the bus.
   3. So build it as price times units at the new price point, not at the old one. That single step is what separates a serious estimate from a top-down slide.
   4. Sanity-check with a revenue-per-user bound. If you claim a billion users at $50 a year in a country where average annual discretionary spend on that category is $8, the number is wrong and you should say so.
   5. Then reverse the question, which is the answer interviewers actually want: forget TAM, what does this company have to be true to return my fund? If I need a $3bn exit, that is roughly $300m of revenue at a 10x multiple, which is 3 million users at $100. Is 3 million users plausible in ten years? That question is answerable; 'what is the TAM' is not.
   6. And say the limitation out loud: for genuinely new categories the TAM number is theatre. It is a test of whether your reasoning holds, not a forecast anyone believes.

   Where candidates lose it

   Pulling a Gartner number off a slide. The interviewer wants to watch you build it. And sizing the incumbent market only — that is the error that made every early taxi-market analysis of ride hailing too small by a factor of five.

   Expect next

   • So what does this company need to look like for us to make 10x?
   • When is a small market actually fine?
   • How would you size the market for an AI coding agent?
2. 007Bottom-up or top-down market sizing — which do you trust, and why?Market sizing and estimationCorephone / first roundGrowth equity

   Say this

   Bottom-up, always, and I use top-down only as a sanity check. Bottom-up is units times price, built from things you can count. Top-down is a big industry number times a percentage you made up, and that percentage is doing all the work.

   Then walk it

   1. Bottom-up: number of potential customers, times the share you can realistically win, times what each one pays. Every input is arguable on its own terms, which is the point — the interviewer can push on one number rather than the whole thing.
   2. Top-down: 'the global logistics market is $10 trillion and we only need 1 percent.' That sentence has appeared in every failed pitch deck ever written. The 1 percent is unjustified and usually off by a factor of ten.
   3. Worked example. Indian restaurant POS software: roughly 500,000 addressable organised restaurants, maybe 40 percent can pay for software, at ₹2,000 a month that is ₹4.8bn a year, call it $58m of Indian SaaS revenue. Now you can argue about penetration and price with real edges.
   4. And notice what bottom-up just told you: a $58m market cannot support a venture-scale outcome on software alone, which is exactly why every Indian restaurant-tech company ends up in payments or lending. Top-down would never have surfaced that.
   5. Use top-down to check the order of magnitude. If bottom-up gives you $58m and the top-down says $6bn, one of them is wrong and finding out which is the real work.
   6. The honest limitation: bottom-up systematically underestimates genuinely new categories, because it prices at today's price point. So for a category-creating company I build bottom-up at the new price, not the old one.

   Where candidates lose it

   Saying 'both, they're complementary' and stopping. That is true and empty. Commit to bottom-up, then show one worked build with real numbers. The follow-up is always 'size it for me now', so have a live example ready.

   Expect next

   • Size the Indian SaaS market for restaurants, out loud, right now.
   • When does bottom-up mislead you?
   • What is the difference between TAM, SAM and SOM?
3. 008A founder tells you their TAM is fifty billion dollars. How do you stress-test that?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalEarly-stage VCGrowth equity

   Say this

   Rebuild it bottom-up in front of them and see where the two numbers diverge. Then test the three places TAM claims usually break: who actually has a budget, what they actually pay, and whether the product they are buying is the one that reaches all of those customers.

   Then walk it

   1. Ask how they built it. If the answer is a research-house report, the number is not theirs and they have not thought about it. If they can build it live, that alone is most of the signal I need about the founder.
   2. Test the customer count. 'All small businesses' is not an addressable base. How many have the problem acutely, have the budget, and are reachable through a channel you can afford? That usually cuts the base by 80 to 90 percent.
   3. Test the price. Founders assume enterprise pricing on an SMB base. If the claimed ACV is $30,000 and the customers are 20-person firms, the pricing and the segment contradict each other.
   4. Test the product boundary. A $50bn TAM often assumes three products they have not built. Ask what share of it today's product addresses, and you frequently get from $50bn to $400m in one question.
   5. Then the important reframe, and I would say it kindly: the size of the TAM barely matters at seed. What matters is whether the first $10m of revenue is reachable from one segment with one product. A huge TAM with no beachhead is a worse company than a $1bn market with an obvious wedge.
   6. And I would not treat a bad TAM slide as disqualifying. Plenty of great companies had absurd TAM slides. It is a probe into how the founder thinks, not a scorecard item.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating this as gotcha — catching the founder out and feeling clever. Diligence is not cross-examination. The useful output is a defensible number and a read on how the founder reasons under pressure, and you get neither if you turn it into an argument.

   Expect next

   • What is the smallest market you would still invest in?
   • How do you find the beachhead segment?
   • What if they refuse to rebuild it with you?
4. 009What is the difference between TAM, SAM and SOM, and which one actually matters?Market sizing and estimationCorephone / first roundGrowth equity

   Say this

   TAM is everyone who could conceivably buy the category, SAM is the slice this product and business model can actually serve, and SOM is the share you can realistically win in your planning horizon. SAM is the one that matters for the investment decision.

   Then walk it

   1. TAM: total addressable market, the whole category with no constraints. Useful only for establishing that the ceiling is not the binding problem.
   2. SAM: serviceable addressable market. Constrained by geography, segment, regulation, language, price point and what your product does today. This is where the honest number lives.
   3. SOM: serviceable obtainable market, your realistic share given competition and your distribution. For a seed company this is the five-year revenue ceiling, and it should be big enough to return the fund.
   4. Worked example. Global payroll software might be a $30bn TAM. Payroll for Indian companies with 50 to 500 employees is maybe a $250m SAM. Winning 15 percent of that is a $38m revenue business — a real company, and possibly too small for a $500m fund. That comparison is the entire decision.
   5. So the question I actually answer is: does the SOM support an outcome that returns the fund at the ownership I can get? Everything else is framing.
   6. The limitation worth naming: these boundaries are soft and companies move between them. Every great company's SAM expanded — Amazon's was books. So I hold the SAM number loosely and ask whether the expansion path is credible rather than assumed.

   Where candidates lose it

   Getting the definitions right and then failing to say which one drives the decision. Definitions are a two-mark question; the judgement is in connecting SOM to fund returns at your likely ownership. And do not confuse SAM with 'the market we're targeting first' — that is the beachhead, which is smaller again.

   Expect next

   • What SOM do you need for this to return a $200m fund?
   • Give me a company whose SAM expanded dramatically.
   • How would you size this bottom-up?
5. 010If you were to open a restaurant, what would be your key concerns?Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalGeneral AtlanticGeneralist · Beijing · 2014

   Say this

   Treat it as an investment, not a hobby: location economics, the unit-level P&L, working capital, and whether the concept is repeatable. The concerns in order are rent as a share of revenue, labour, food cost, and whether I can get a second site to work.

   Then walk it

   1. Unit economics first. Restaurant maths is brutal and well known: food cost around 30 percent of revenue, labour 25 to 30, rent under 10, leaving a single-digit to low-teens operating margin if everything goes right.
   2. So the binding constraint is revenue per square foot, which is really seats times turns times average ticket. Forty seats, two turns at lunch and two at dinner, ₹600 average ticket, 26 days — that is about ₹2.5m a month, or ₹30m a year. Every cost decision has to fit inside that.
   3. Then the capital question: fit-out and deposit are largely sunk and unrecoverable, payback on a new site typically runs 18 to 30 months, and the lease term has to be long enough to earn that back. A three-year lease on a five-year payback is not a business.
   4. Working capital is the thing people miss. Suppliers on short credit, aggregators paying out on a lag, staff paid monthly, plus perishable inventory. A profitable restaurant can die on a cash timing mismatch.
   5. Then the concern I would lead with as an investor: is it repeatable without me? A single great restaurant is a job, not an asset. What makes it scalable is a standardised menu, a central kitchen, a manager who is not the founder, and a site-selection model that has worked twice.
   6. And the delivery question, which changed the maths: aggregator commissions of 20 to 30 percent turn a thin dine-in margin negative unless you price a separate delivery menu. Cloud kitchens exist because that one number is so punishing.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering as a diner — menu, ambience, chef. The interviewer is testing whether you naturally reach for a unit-level P&L and a payback period on an unfamiliar business. Lead with the cost structure and the repeatability, then let the concept discussion follow.

   Expect next

   • How long before you open a second location?
   • Would you ever invest in a restaurant chain? What would you need to see?
   • What is the payback period on a new site and how would you shorten it?

   Reported by candidates at General Atlantic (Generalist, Beijing, 2014). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 011Size the market for electric two-wheelers in India.Market sizing and estimationIntermediatetechnicalIndian venture capitalGrowth equity

   Say this

   Start from the total two-wheeler market, take the realistic electric penetration curve, then convert to revenue at the electric price point. India sells roughly 17 to 18 million two-wheelers a year, electric is in the high single digits of that today, and the plausible path is 25 to 30 percent within five to seven years.

   Then walk it

   1. Base: about 17 million two-wheelers a year, in a country with roughly 300 million households, so penetration is already high and the market is mostly replacement plus first-time urban buyers.
   2. Penetration: electric is around 6 to 10 percent of new sales now, concentrated in scooters rather than motorcycles, because urban short-trip use suits the range and the drivetrain.
   3. So at 25 percent penetration that is roughly 4.5 million units a year. At an average selling price of ₹1.1 lakh, that is about ₹500bn, call it $6bn of annual vehicle revenue.
   4. Then the segments that matter more for a venture return, because the vehicle itself is a low-margin manufacturing business: batteries and swapping, charging infrastructure, and financing. Financing is the interesting one — at 80 percent loan-to-value on $6bn of sales that is roughly $5bn of annual originations.
   5. Then the constraints I would name unprompted: subsidy dependence, since FAME-type incentives have repeatedly moved the price point and demand with it; battery cell import reliance; and the fleet segment, where delivery and ride-hailing operators buy on total cost per kilometre and adopt years ahead of retail.
   6. Cross-check: electric two-wheeler penetration in China ran far higher far earlier, which says the ceiling is not technological. And petrol at ₹105 a litre against electricity means a running cost gap of roughly 80 percent per kilometre, which is why the fleet segment converts first.

   Where candidates lose it

   Producing one unit number and stopping. The investable question is which layer of the stack has venture-scale margin, and for EVs that is usually batteries, swapping or financing rather than assembling vehicles. Also: ignoring subsidy dependence, which has already reset this market twice.

   Expect next

   • Which layer of that value chain would you actually invest in?
   • What happens to the unit economics if the subsidy goes away?
   • How would you diligence a battery-swapping company?
7. 012You have ten minutes with a founder and no deck. What do you ask?Market sizing and estimationHardsuperdayEarly-stage VCSeed funds

   Say this

   Five questions, each designed to be hard to rehearse. Why you, why now, what did you learn last month that you did not know before, what does your best cohort do, and what would have to be true for this to be worth ten billion dollars.

   Then walk it

   1. 'Why are you the person to build this?' Founder-market fit in their own words. I am listening for specific earned insight, not a career summary.
   2. 'Why is this possible now and not in 2019?' If there is no real answer, the company is probably a feature or a timing bet with no tailwind. This question kills more pitches than any other.
   3. 'What did you learn in the last month that changed your plan?' This is the highest-signal question I know, because it cannot be prepped and it reveals whether they are actually running experiments or just executing a deck.
   4. 'Show me your best cohort.' Not aggregate growth — one cohort, month by month. Retention curves do not lie and founders who know theirs by heart are usually the ones running the business off the data.
   5. 'What has to be true for this to be a ten-billion-dollar company?' I want to hear them reason about their own ceiling. Founders who have never thought about it are usually optimising for the next round, not the outcome.
   6. And I would spend at least two of the ten minutes shutting up. The questions matter less than whether they ask me anything sharp back, and whether they say 'I don't know' when they don't know.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reeling off fifteen diligence questions. Ten minutes means five questions and real listening. Also asking anything that a deck already answers — you learn nothing from 'what does the product do'. Pick questions that only the founder can answer.

   Expect next

   • Which of those five is most predictive, in your view?
   • What answer would make you pass immediately?
   • How do you avoid falling for a charismatic founder?
8. 013What is 301 times 447?Market sizing and estimationCorephone / first roundGeneral AtlanticGeneralist · New York · 2026Vista Equity PartnersPrivate Equity · Austin · 2021

   Say this

   134,547. Break the awkward number into a round one plus a remainder: 300 times 447 is 134,100, and one more 447 gives 134,547. Say the method out loud as you go, because they are listening to the decomposition more than the answer.

   Then walk it

   1. Split 301 into 300 plus 1. Three times 447 is 1,341, so 300 times 447 is 134,100.
   2. Add the last 447: 134,547. Two steps, about five seconds.
   3. The alternative decomposition works too: 447 is 450 minus 3, so 301 times 450 is 135,450, minus 903 gives 134,547. Same answer, and it is worth knowing both because sometimes one side is the rounder number.
   4. Then sanity-check the magnitude before you speak: 300 times 450 is about 135,000, so anything not starting with 13 is wrong. That check costs nothing and saves you from a transposition error.
   5. Say the working as you do it. In a growth or VC seat mental arithmetic shows up constantly — a revenue multiple in a meeting, an ownership percentage, a dilution check — and the interviewer wants to hear whether you decompose or freeze.
   6. If you genuinely lose the thread, restate the approach and start again rather than guessing. A wrong number said confidently is much worse than ten extra seconds.

   Where candidates lose it

   Trying to do long multiplication in your head, digit by digit, in silence. You will drop a carry and you will look uncomfortable. Round, multiply, adjust, and narrate. Also practise the standard set beforehand: percentages of round numbers, revenue multiples, and 'what IRR is 5x in 5 years'.

   Expect next

   • What is 17 percent of 1,400?
   • A company grows from $4m to $32m of revenue in four years. What is the CAGR?
   • If I invest at a $20m post-money and exit at $340m, what is my multiple on a 10 percent stake?

   Reported by candidates at General Atlantic (Generalist, New York, 2026); Vista Equity Partners (Private Equity, Austin, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.