Debt Capital Markets interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

45

Firms

26

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsTSTruist Securities5PIMCO4TD Securities4Apollo Global Management3Nomura3Scotiabank3Bain Capital2Houlihan Lokey2Mizuho2Neuberger Berman2Oaktree Capital Management2RCRBC Capital Markets2Carlyle Group1Deutsche Bank1Golub Capital1HPS Investment Partners1Invesco1KKR1Lazard1Moelis & Company1Moody's1Northern Trust1NUNuveen1Rothschild & Co1S&P Global1Wells Fargo Securities1

Topic

All topicsBond mechanics11Duration and convexity6Yield curve and rates5Credit spreads5Credit analysis and ratings13Credit modelling9Primary issuance9Syndication and loans10Structured credit7Covenants and documentation5Liability management5Indian debt markets7Fit8

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalBrainteaserMarket viewCaseFit

1. 028Walk me through the ratings process for a debut issuer.Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalRating agenciesCorporate banking

   Say this

   Six to ten weeks, and it is a managed process rather than a submission. You prepare a rating presentation and a model, hold a management meeting with the analytical team, they take it to a committee, you get an indicative or final rating with an outlook, and the issuer has one appeal before it is published.

   Then walk it

   1. Step one is choosing agencies. Most benchmark issuers take two, because index eligibility and many investor mandates require two ratings. A third is bought when you expect it to be better or when you need a specific investor base.
   2. Then the rating presentation, which the DCM team drafts with the company: business description, market position, financial policy, a five-year model, and crucially a stated leverage target. The financial policy commitment is often what decides the notch.
   3. The management meeting is the substance. The agency's lead analyst and team question the CFO and treasurer for several hours. Rehearsing the CFO for this is real ratings advisory work, not window dressing.
   4. Committee follows, and the analyst is one vote. Then the agency issues an indicative rating confidentially, which lets the issuer decide whether to proceed or fix something first — refine the structure, add security, change the maturity profile.
   5. Appeal is one shot and needs new information, not a better argument. Then the rating publishes with an outlook and the issuer enters ongoing surveillance, with an annual review and rating triggers.
   6. The practical number: a notch on the boundary is worth real money. Crossing from BBB minus to BB plus can widen the coupon by 100 to 200 basis points and shrink your investor base sharply, which is why ratings advisory happens before the deal, not during it.

   Where candidates lose it

   Describing it as a passive assessment the company receives. It is a negotiation with an evidence standard, and the commercially important insight is the indicative rating step, which lets the issuer restructure before anything is published.

   Expect next

   • Why would an issuer take two ratings rather than one?
   • What is ratings advisory?
   • What happens if the indicative rating comes back a notch below target?
2. 029What do rating agencies actually assess?Credit analysis and ratingsCoretechnicalRating agenciesCredit research

   Say this

   Two halves: a business risk profile and a financial risk profile, combined into an anchor rating, then adjusted by modifiers. And the thing candidates miss — a rating is an opinion on relative probability of default over a cycle, not a forecast of next year, and for most corporate scales it says nothing about recovery.

   Then walk it

   1. Business risk: industry cyclicality and competitive dynamics, the company's position within it, scale, diversification by product, customer and geography, and the operating margin's stability through a downturn.
   2. Financial risk: leverage and coverage, cash flow to debt, liquidity, the maturity profile, and above all financial policy — stated leverage targets, dividend and buyback behaviour, and appetite for debt-funded M&A.
   3. The two combine into an anchor on a published matrix, then modifiers adjust it: diversification, capital structure, liquidity, management and governance, and comparable ratings analysis, which is the agency's explicit override.
   4. Parent and government support is the other big modifier. A subsidiary can be rated above its standalone profile on expected parent support, and many bank ratings carry uplift for expected sovereign support.
   5. What it is not: not a buy or sell recommendation, not a price, not a forecast of default in a specific year, and on the issuer scale not a view on how much you recover. Recovery ratings and issue-level notching are separate.
   6. Worth stating the known weakness: agencies are paid by issuers, they were badly wrong on structured finance in 2007, and they are slow through turning points — downgrades lag the market by months. A good credit analyst uses the report for disclosure and does their own work on the conclusion.

   Where candidates lose it

   Listing only the financial ratios. Business risk is usually the bigger driver of the rating, and financial policy is what decides borderline cases. Leaving out the agencies' conflict of interest and their lag also reads as naive — say it before they do.

   Expect next

   • Which matters more, business risk or financial risk?
   • What is comparable ratings analysis?
   • Why do agencies lag the market?
3. 030Where is the line between investment grade and high yield, and why does it matter so much?Credit analysis and ratingsCorephone / first roundLeveraged financeCredit research

   Say this

   BBB minus from S&P and Fitch, Baa3 from Moody's, is the lowest investment grade rung. One notch lower, BB plus or Ba1, is high yield. The line matters because it changes who is allowed to own the bond, not just what it costs.

   Then walk it

   1. The pricing step is real but not the main event. Crossing the line typically widens spread by 100 to 200 basis points, more in a stressed market.
   2. The ownership step is the main event. Many insurance, pension and mandate rules restrict or penalise sub-investment-grade holdings, and index membership changes: the bond leaves the IG index and enters the HY index, forcing mechanical selling by one set of funds and buying by a smaller set.
   3. Structure changes too. IG bonds are typically bullets with light covenants and no call protection beyond a make-whole. High yield comes with a non-call period, a declining call premium, and a full incurrence covenant package.
   4. Bank behaviour changes. Revolvers get smaller and secured, commercial paper access disappears, and derivative counterparties want collateral. The funding model shifts from unsecured and flexible to secured and negotiated.
   5. A fallen angel is an issuer downgraded from IG to HY, and a rising star is the reverse. Fallen angels move markets because the forced seller base is far larger than the natural buyer base — the 2020 downgrades of Ford and Kraft Heinz are the canonical examples, and they widened the whole HY index.
   6. Which is why so many issuers cluster at BBB. Keeping the last IG notch is often an explicit board-level financial policy, and it constrains buybacks and M&A in a way that is genuinely visible in behaviour.

   Where candidates lose it

   Naming the rating boundary and nothing else. The question is really about consequences: investor base, index membership, covenant package and bank access. The forced-seller mechanics of a fallen angel is the detail that shows you follow the market.

   Expect next

   • What is a fallen angel and why does it move the index?
   • Why do so many issuers sit at BBB?
   • How does the covenant package change below the line?
4. 031How do you determine whether a company is good for credit investing, quantitatively and qualitatively?Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatesuperdayTD SecuritiesCredit · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Quantitatively, I want to know whether the cash flow covers the debt through a downturn, not just today — leverage, coverage, free cash flow conversion and the maturity wall. Qualitatively, I want to know whether the business is durable and whether management and the owner will behave. The qualitative side is what actually distinguishes credits at similar leverage.

   Then walk it

   1. The quantitative core: net debt to EBITDA, EBITDA to interest, free cash flow to debt, and the maturity schedule against available liquidity. Then the same four in a stress case — revenue down 20 percent, margin down 300 basis points — because credit is downside analysis.
   2. Cash conversion matters more than the EBITDA multiple. Two businesses at 4 times leverage, one converting 70 percent of EBITDA to free cash flow and one converting 20 percent because of working capital and capex, are not the same credit.
   3. Then asset coverage and recovery: what is the collateral, what would it fetch in a liquidation or a going-concern sale, and where does my claim sit relative to secured debt and structurally senior subsidiary obligations.
   4. The qualitative half starts with business durability: contracted or recurring revenue, switching costs, pricing power, customer concentration, and whether demand is cyclical or secularly declining. A structurally declining business at 3 times leverage can be a worse credit than a growing one at 5.
   5. Then the people and the owner. Financial policy, track record through the last downturn, willingness to support the business with equity, and for a sponsor-owned company its history on aggressive liability management. Whether your lender group has been primed before is genuinely predictive.
   6. And the honest limitation: none of this tells you about idiosyncratic fraud or a regulatory shock. That is what position sizing and diversification are for.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving a ratio list and calling the qualitative half 'good management'. Say what you would look at to judge management — leverage track record, behaviour in the last downturn, prior liability management exercises — because that is checkable and 'good management' is not.

   Expect next

   • What stress case would you run?
   • How do you judge financial policy in practice?
   • Two companies at the same leverage — what makes one a better credit?

   Reported by candidates at TD Securities (Credit, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

5. 032How would you assess whether someone is a good borrower?Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalWells Fargo SecuritiesGeneralist · North Carolina · 2025

   Say this

   I would use the old framework because it still works: character, capacity, capital, collateral and conditions. Capacity and collateral do most of the work, but character — the borrower's track record and willingness to pay — is what banks actually lose money on.

   Then walk it

   1. Capacity: can the cash flow service the debt through a cycle. Interest coverage, fixed charge coverage including leases and amortisation, and the same under stress. This is the quantitative heart of it.
   2. Capital: how much of their own money is in it. A sponsor with 40 percent equity behind your loan has a strong incentive to defend the business; one with 10 percent has an option.
   3. Collateral: what secures you and what it is worth in a downside, not at book. Receivables and inventory are worth a discount to book; specialised machinery is worth very little to anyone else.
   4. Conditions: the industry cycle, the regulatory environment, and what the money is for. Funding a contracted expansion is a different risk from funding a dividend recap.
   5. Character is the one people skip and it is where losses come from. Payment history, transparency with lenders, whether they have amended and extended quietly or surprised their banks, and whether they have moved collateral in a previous restructuring.
   6. Then the banker's addition: structure can fix a marginal borrower. Tighter covenants, amortisation, cash sweeps, security, a guarantee from the parent. The question is rarely a flat yes or no; it is 'yes at what price and on what terms'.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reciting the five Cs like a flashcard with no content under each. Interviewers in corporate banking use this framework daily and can tell instantly. Put one concrete test under each letter, and end on the banker's point that structure prices marginal credits.

   Expect next

   • How would you structure around a weak borrower?
   • What would you do if capacity is fine but character is questionable?
   • How much equity would you want behind you?

   Reported by candidates at Wells Fargo Securities (Generalist, North Carolina, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 033What specific line items on the financial statements would you look at when evaluating creditworthiness?Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalRCRBC Capital MarketsCorporate Banking · New York · 2026

   Say this

   I would go line by line with cash in mind. On the income statement: revenue trend, gross margin, EBIT and interest expense. On the cash flow statement: cash from operations, capex and the working capital swings. On the balance sheet: total debt by maturity, cash, and the off-balance-sheet items sitting in the notes.

   Then walk it

   1. Income statement: revenue growth and its stability, gross margin as the read on pricing power, EBIT, and interest expense. Interest expense divided by average debt gives you the effective rate, which is a fast check on whether the stated cost of debt is real.
   2. Cash flow statement is where I spend most time, because it is the hardest to dress up. Cash from operations versus EBITDA tells you the conversion rate. Working capital swings tell you whether growth consumes cash. Capex split between maintenance and growth tells you what is discretionary in a downturn.
   3. Balance sheet: debt by instrument and maturity, not just the total. Cash and undrawn revolver capacity, because liquidity kills companies before leverage does. Then receivables and inventory days against history, since a deterioration there is an early warning.
   4. The notes are where the real work is: operating and finance lease obligations, pension deficits, contingent liabilities, guarantees, receivables factoring and supply chain finance programmes, and the debt maturity table. Any of these can add a turn of effective leverage.
   5. Then the structural question the statements only half answer: which entity in the group actually owes the debt, and where do the assets and cash sit. Consolidated leverage of 3 times can hide a holdco that is structurally subordinated to everything.
   6. One quick number to illustrate: a retailer with 500 million of lease obligations and 300 million of drawn debt has effective leverage that is roughly double what the debt line suggests, and pre-IFRS 16 that was entirely invisible on the face of the balance sheet.

   Where candidates lose it

   Naming only the debt line and EBITDA. The answer that impresses a corporate banking interviewer goes to the notes — leases, pensions, factoring, guarantees — and then asks which legal entity owes the money. That is the difference between a ratio and a credit view.

   Expect next

   • How would you adjust EBITDA and debt for leases?
   • What would you check in the notes first?
   • How do you spot receivables factoring?

   Reported by candidates at RBC Capital Markets (Corporate Banking, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 034What credit metrics would you look at when analysing a company like Nike?Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalTSTruist SecuritiesLeveraged Finance · Atlanta · 2024

   Say this

   For a high-grade consumer brand like Nike the leverage question is almost trivial — it runs around one turn of net leverage and coverage in the teens — so the interesting metrics are the working capital and brand ones. Inventory days, gross margin, and the direct-to-consumer mix tell you far more about the credit than net debt to EBITDA does.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with the standard set anyway: net debt to EBITDA, EBITDA to interest, free cash flow to debt, and the maturity profile. For a single-A rated consumer company you expect leverage around 1 to 2 times and coverage well above 10, so none of these bind.
   2. Then adjust for what the statements hide: operating leases on retail stores are the big one, and for an apparel company they can add a full turn. Post-IFRS 16 they are on balance sheet, but the agencies still adjust further.
   3. Working capital is the real credit story. Inventory days is the single most informative number for a footwear and apparel business, because excess inventory forces discounting, which hits gross margin, which hits EBITDA and cash simultaneously. Nike's 2022 to 2023 inventory build is exactly that story.
   4. Gross margin is the read on brand strength and pricing power. A branded consumer credit is only investment grade because the brand lets it hold price. If gross margin is compressing while inventory rises, the brand thesis is weakening whatever leverage says.
   5. Then the structural items: channel mix between wholesale and direct, customer concentration among big wholesale accounts, FX exposure for a global business, and the buyback and dividend policy, because a company like this returns more cash than it needs to and that is a financial policy risk rather than an operating one.
   6. And what would actually break it: not leverage, but a multi-year brand decline. So I would monitor market share, inventory, and gross margin far ahead of the credit ratios.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reeling off leverage and coverage for a company where those metrics are irrelevant. The skill being tested is choosing metrics that fit the business. For a branded consumer company, inventory days and gross margin are the credit metrics, and saying so is the whole answer.

   Expect next

   • What would worry you first about that credit?
   • How do you adjust for store leases?
   • Would your metrics change for a supplier to Nike instead?

   Reported by candidates at Truist Securities (Leveraged Finance, Atlanta, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

8. 035What is the difference between credit and equity investments?Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalKKRDistressed Debt · New York · 2025

   Say this

   Payoff shape. Equity has unlimited upside and you lose everything at zero; credit has capped upside — you get par and your coupon — and real downside. So equity analysis is about how good it can get and credit analysis is about how bad it can get without you being impaired.

   Then walk it

   1. The asymmetry drives everything else. Your best case as a lender is that you get paid back on time, which you already priced. So the entire analytical effort goes into the downside scenario and the recovery if it happens.
   2. That changes what you study. Equity focuses on growth, margin expansion and terminal value. Credit focuses on cash flow adequacy, liquidity, the maturity wall, asset coverage and the documentation.
   3. It changes the seat at the table. Debt is a contract, so a lender has rights: covenants, information, consent, and in a default, control. Equity has votes and hope. In distress the creditor is the one who decides.
   4. It changes how you size. A credit portfolio needs diversification because one zero cannot be offset by a winner — there are no winners, only par. An equity book can carry concentrated positions because one 10-bagger pays for many failures.
   5. For a distressed seat specifically, the two converge. You buy debt at 40 with a view on the reorganised enterprise value, so you are underwriting equity economics through a debt instrument, and the fulcrum security is where the ownership lands.
   6. The honest framing to add: both are claims on the same enterprise value. A credit analyst who cannot value the business cannot value the recovery, so good credit work includes the equity work — it just stops caring above the point where you are made whole.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering only 'debt is senior and safer'. The concept the interviewer wants is the asymmetric payoff and the shift from upside to downside analysis. For a distressed seat, add that the two converge and name the fulcrum security.

   Expect next

   • So what is the fulcrum security?
   • How does that change position sizing?
   • Would you rather own the debt or the equity of a company you think doubles?

   Reported by candidates at KKR (Distressed Debt, New York, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

9. 036How does operating leverage affect debt versus equity holders?Credit analysis and ratingsHardsuperdayOaktree Capital ManagementCredit · Los Angeles · 2024

   Say this

   Operating leverage amplifies the volatility of EBIT, and because equity is the residual claim, equity holders get the amplified upside and downside while debt holders get amplified downside with no upside. So high operating leverage is straightforwardly bad for a lender and a mixed blessing for a shareholder.

   Then walk it

   1. Mechanism: a high fixed-cost base means a small revenue change produces a large EBIT change. A business with 70 percent fixed costs loses about 2.3 times as much EBIT percentage-wise as its revenue decline.
   2. Take an airline, a steel mill or a semiconductor fab. Revenue down 20 percent can take EBIT down 60 or 70 percent and straight through interest coverage. Same 20 percent decline at a staffing agency, where costs are variable, barely moves EBIT.
   3. For the lender, that translates into a much fatter left tail on coverage and leverage. So you lend less, at a higher spread, with tighter covenants, and you underwrite to a trough EBITDA rather than a mid-cycle one.
   4. For the equity holder it cuts both ways, and in a recovery it is spectacular: the same amplification means EBIT triples off a trough. That is why cyclical equities rally hardest early in a cycle.
   5. The critical interaction is with financial leverage. Operating leverage and financial leverage multiply. A high fixed-cost business at 5 turns of debt is a fundamentally different credit from a subscription business at 5 turns, which is exactly why software gets levered higher than shipbuilding at the same rating.
   6. So the practical rule for a credit investor: set your maximum leverage inversely to operating leverage. And the number to watch is not leverage at all but EBITDA volatility through the last two downturns.

   Where candidates lose it

   Explaining operating leverage correctly and never connecting it to the lending decision. The point the interviewer is testing is that operating and financial leverage compound, so the maximum debt a business can carry depends on its cost structure. Say that out loud.

   Expect next

   • So how much debt would you lend to an airline versus a software company?
   • How do you estimate trough EBITDA?
   • Does high operating leverage ever help a lender?

   Reported by candidates at Oaktree Capital Management (Credit, Los Angeles, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

10. 037Pick an industry you would lend into and describe its key risks.Credit analysis and ratingsIntermediatetechnicalNUNuveenLeveraged Finance · Chicago · 2019

    Say this

    Take business services — say a facilities management or testing and inspection business. The credit attractions are contracted recurring revenue, low capex and high cash conversion. The key risks are customer concentration, wage inflation against fixed-price contracts, contract renewal cliffs, and the fact that these are serial acquirers, so the leverage never comes down.

    Then walk it

    1. Frame it in four buckets and it works for any sector: demand risk, cost and margin risk, structural or regulatory risk, and financial policy risk. Interviewers care about the structure more than the sector.
    2. Demand: how much revenue is contracted, how long the contracts run, what the renewal rate is, and how concentrated the customer base is. Losing one 15 percent customer in a 6 percent margin business is an existential event.
    3. Cost: this is a labour business, so wage inflation is the margin risk, and it only matters if contracts are fixed-price. Contracts with CPI indexation change the credit completely, so I would want the indexed proportion of the book.
    4. Structural: low barriers to entry mean repricing at renewal, and the sector is exposed to insourcing when clients cut cost. That is a slow, hard-to-see erosion rather than a shock.
    5. Financial policy is usually the biggest single risk in sponsor-owned services credits. These are roll-up platforms, so every deleveraging quarter is followed by a debt-funded acquisition, and the pro forma EBITDA carries synergy add-backs that may not arrive.
    6. So what I would monitor: organic revenue growth stripped of acquisitions, margin against wage inflation, the renewal book, and reported versus add-back-adjusted EBITDA. That last gap is the single best early warning in this sector.

    Where candidates lose it

    Listing generic risks like 'competition and regulation' with no sector specificity. Pick a sector you can actually talk about, use the four-bucket structure, and land at least two risks that only apply to that sector. And say what you would monitor, not just what worries you.

    Expect next

    • How much would you lend into that sector?
    • How do you test whether EBITDA add-backs are real?
    • What would you cover instead if you had the choice?

    Reported by candidates at Nuveen (Leveraged Finance, Chicago, 2019). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.