Equity Research interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

72

Firms

45

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsMorningstar12Man Group6Balyasny Asset Management5BLBlackRock5FTFranklin Templeton5MSCI5Jefferies4CSCredit Suisse3Fidelity Investments3Moody's3Perella Weinberg Partners3Point723S&P Global3The Vanguard Group3WMWellington Management3Advent International2Apollo Global Management2Bank of America2Carlyle Group2DED.E. Shaw2Houlihan Lokey2HSBC2Piper Sandler2Sequoia Capital2SSState Street2Viking Global Investors2WBWilliam Blair2ACAQR Capital Management1BGBaupost Group1BMBNY Mellon1Centerview Partners1Coatue Management1Goldman Sachs1GSGuggenheim Securities1HWHarris Williams1Insight Partners1Invesco1Mizuho1Moelis & Company1MSMorgan Stanley1PIMCO1SCSchroders1Scotiabank1T. Rowe Price1TSTruist Securities1

Topic

All topicsResearch process9Stock pitch6Company analysis8Investment philosophy5Valuation14Modelling2Portfolio and risk8Macro8Sector knowledge2Accounting8Career and fit12Industry knowledge6Quantitative research1Sector: technology3Sector: consumer1Sector: healthcare1Sector: energy1Sector: financials2Sector: industrials1Case and estimation2

Level

AnyCoreIntermediateHard

Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitBrainteaserMarket view

1. 003Analyse whether Boeing is a good stock to invest in. Give me a two-line thesis on the spot.Stock pitchHardsuperdaySCSchrodersEquity Research · New York · 2025

   Say this

   Two lines means one claim and one reason. Something like: Boeing is a duopoly with a decade-long order backlog, so the question is not demand but whether it can execute delivery and repair its balance sheet; I would own it only if you believe free cash flow inflects within two years.

   Then walk it

   1. Line one is the structural fact that makes it investable: a global duopoly with Airbus, enormous switching costs for airlines, and a multi-year backlog that effectively pre-sells the output.
   2. Line two is the controversy, which is where the money is made or lost: production quality, regulatory constraint on output rates, and a balance sheet carrying heavy debt from the crisis years.
   3. So the thesis reduces to a single variable: deliveries per month. Revenue, cash flow and deleveraging all follow from that one number, which is unusual and worth saying because it makes the stock tractable.
   4. Then take a side. If you believe the rate ramps, free cash flow inflects sharply and the equity re-rates off depressed earnings. If you do not, the debt is a problem and you stay away.
   5. Then name the falsifier: monthly delivery data and the regulator's production cap are published, so the thesis is testable in near real time. That is what makes it a good pitch rather than an opinion.

   Where candidates lose it

   Reciting everything you know about Boeing. Two lines means two lines. The skill being tested is compression: finding the one variable the investment turns on and committing to a view on it.

   Expect next

   • What would change your mind?
   • How would you track the thesis?
   • Would you rather own Boeing or Airbus?

   Reported by candidates at Schroders (Equity Research, New York, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 005Are you sure your thesis can be backed up? What if their costs do not fall?Stock pitchHardsuperdayApollo Global ManagementInvestments · Remote · 2021FTFranklin TempletonOil and Gas · San Mateo · 2024

   Say this

   Answer the substance, do not defend the position. Say what evidence supports the cost assumption, quantify what happens if you are wrong, and state at what point you would exit.

   Then walk it

   1. First, give the evidence behind the assumption, specifically. 'Management guided to it' is weak. 'The input contract repriced in Q2 and the run-rate is already visible in the last two quarters of gross margin' is strong.
   2. Then quantify the downside. 'If costs stay flat, EPS is 15 percent below my number and the stock is worth 38 rather than 55, so I lose about 5 percent from here.' That shows you have modelled the bear case, not just the bull.
   3. Then the asymmetry: if the downside is 5 percent and the upside is 35, the position still makes sense even at a 50 percent probability. That is the real defence.
   4. Then the monitoring point: which disclosure tells you early that you are wrong, and by when you would expect to see it.
   5. And be willing to concede. 'You are right that this is the weakest part of the thesis, which is why I would size it at half a normal position' is a far better answer than digging in. Interviewers push to see whether you update on evidence.

   Where candidates lose it

   Defending the pitch emotionally. This is a pressure test of intellectual honesty, not of conviction. The winning response quantifies the downside and names the exit; stubbornness reads as someone who will lose the fund money.

   Expect next

   • At what price would you stop out?
   • How would you size the position?
   • What is the single data point you would watch?

   Reported by candidates at Apollo Global Management (Investments, Remote, 2021); Franklin Templeton (Oil and Gas, San Mateo, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 009Why did you take a variant view on the multiple you applied to that company, relative to street expectations?ValuationHardsuperdayFTFranklin TempletonOil and Gas · San Mateo · 2024

   Say this

   Because the multiple should reflect the durability and the capital intensity of the earnings, and I think the market is applying a mid-cycle multiple to earnings that are not mid-cycle. Say what the street assumes, then why that assumption is wrong.

   Then walk it

   1. First, state the street's implied assumption in numbers. 'Consensus applies 6 times to a refiner on peak crack spreads, which implies they believe those spreads persist.'
   2. Then your disagreement and its basis. 'I apply 4.5 times because I think those spreads normalise within 18 months as capacity comes back, so I am valuing normalised rather than trailing earnings.'
   3. For a cyclical this is the whole game: the multiple and the earnings must be consistent. A low multiple on peak earnings is a value trap; a high multiple on trough earnings is often the correct entry.
   4. Support it with something observable: capacity additions, inventory levels, forward curve, historical spread ranges. The evidence has to be external to your own model.
   5. Then the discipline point: I would show the valuation across the cycle rather than a point estimate, and say what spread assumption is embedded in today's price. Reverse-engineering the market's assumption is the most persuasive thing in a research note.

   Where candidates lose it

   Justifying a multiple by peer comparison alone. That is circular. The multiple has to be defended by the economics, and for cyclicals specifically by where in the cycle the earnings sit.

   Expect next

   • What earnings are you applying that multiple to?
   • How do you normalise a cyclical?
   • What is priced in today?

   Reported by candidates at Franklin Templeton (Oil and Gas, San Mateo, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 027How would you evaluate an LP stake in a fund, and how much would you pay for it?ValuationHardsuperdayBGBaupost GroupEquity Hedge · Boston · 2018

   Say this

   Start from reported NAV, then adjust it. You are buying the underlying assets plus the unfunded commitment and minus the fees, so the price is NAV adjusted for your own view of the marks, liquidity and remaining fee drag.

   Then walk it

   1. Reported NAV is the starting point, not the answer. Look through to the underlying positions and form your own view on the marks, especially anything illiquid or level three.
   2. Adjust for the fee drag on the remaining life: management fees on committed capital plus carry on future gains. That can be several percent of value in a fund with years left.
   3. For a closed-end structure, factor the unfunded commitment. You are buying an obligation to put in more money, and that has a cost and a risk.
   4. Then discount for illiquidity and for information asymmetry. The seller knows more than you, and there is a reason they are selling. Secondaries typically transact at a discount to NAV for exactly this reason, though quality assets can clear at or above.
   5. Then the vintage and the J-curve position. A fund three years in with assets marked at cost is a very different proposition from one seven years in with a clear path to exit.
   6. So my answer would be a percentage of NAV with the adjustments itemised, and I would say which adjustment I am least confident about.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering 'NAV'. If it were NAV there would be no question. The expected content is the fee drag, the unfunded commitment, the illiquidity discount and adverse selection. Name the seller's information advantage explicitly.

   Expect next

   • Why is the seller selling?
   • How would you diligence the marks?
   • What discount to NAV would you want?

   Reported by candidates at Baupost Group (Equity Hedge, Boston, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

5. 028How would you perform a whitespace analysis?Company analysisHardtechnicalViking Global InvestorsQuantitative Research · New York · 2024

   Say this

   Map what the company currently sells to whom, map the total set of customers and products it could serve, and the gap between them is the whitespace. Then test whether the company can actually reach it.

   Then walk it

   1. Build the current position first: revenue split by product, by customer segment, by geography. You need the base to measure the gap from.
   2. Then size the addressable set honestly, bottom-up. Number of potential customers times realistic spend per customer, not a top-down market report number that includes everyone.
   3. The whitespace is the difference: customers in the addressable set who do not buy, and products the existing customers buy from someone else. The second is usually the higher-probability opportunity, because the relationship already exists.
   4. Then the feasibility test, which is where most whitespace analyses fail. Does the company have the product, the sales capacity and the right to win? Whitespace that requires capability it does not have is not an opportunity, it is a wish.
   5. Then quantify what the market is paying for. If the current price implies the company captures a third of the whitespace, and your work says it captures a tenth, you have a short. That conversion from market map to expectation is the actual investment output.

   Where candidates lose it

   Producing a large total addressable market number and calling it whitespace. The analytical value is entirely in the feasibility filter and in converting the result into what is priced in.

   Expect next

   • How do you size a market bottom-up?
   • How much of that is in the price?
   • How would you verify penetration rates?

   Reported by candidates at Viking Global Investors (Quantitative Research, New York, 2024). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 040How would you analyse a pharmaceutical company?Sector: healthcareHardtechnicalMoelis & CompanyMergers and Acquisitions · Los Angeles · 2022GSGuggenheim SecuritiesHealthcare · London · 2026

   Say this

   Value it asset by asset. The marketed drugs are annuities running to patent expiry, the pipeline is a set of probability-weighted options, and the two are valued completely differently.

   Then walk it

   1. Marketed products: forecast each drug's sales to its loss of exclusivity date, then model the cliff. Generic entry typically removes 70 to 90 percent of small-molecule revenue within a year or two; biologics erode more slowly because biosimilars are harder.
   2. Pipeline: for each candidate, size the patient population, price, penetration and duration, then apply probability of success by phase. Roughly 60 to 70 percent from Phase III, around 30 percent from Phase II, low single digits preclinical.
   3. Sum the parts and add net cash. The output is a range, because a single readout can move the value by a factor.
   4. Then the structural questions: the patent cliff schedule over the next five years, R&D productivity measured as approvals per dollar spent, and whether the company can acquire its way out of a gap.
   5. Pricing and reimbursement risk is the sector's macro. Policy on drug pricing can reset the whole group's multiple independently of any company's execution.
   6. The practical framing for a note: what percentage of current revenue loses exclusivity within five years, and does the pipeline plus reasonable business development replace it? That one question drives most pharma investment cases.

   Where candidates lose it

   Applying a single P/E to the whole company. A pharma is a portfolio of expiring annuities plus options, and blending them into one multiple hides the cliff, which is the entire risk.

   Expect next

   • How do you handle the patent cliff?
   • What probability would you use for a Phase II asset?
   • Which is riskier, biologics or small molecules?

   Reported by candidates at Moelis & Company (Mergers and Acquisitions, Los Angeles, 2022); Guggenheim Securities (Healthcare, London, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

7. 041How would you analyse an energy or commodity producer?Sector: energyHardtechnicalFTFranklin TempletonOil and Gas · San Mateo · 2024Perella Weinberg PartnersInvestment Banking · Houston · 2025

   Say this

   Position on the cost curve first, then reserves and production, then the balance sheet. The commodity price is the same for everyone, so the only company-specific variables are cost, volume and leverage.

   Then walk it

   1. Cost position is everything. A producer in the bottom quartile of the cost curve survives the trough and buys assets cheaply; a high-cost producer is a leveraged bet on the price.
   2. Reserves and reserve life: how long can they produce at current rates, what is the finding and development cost per barrel, and what is the decline rate on existing wells. Shale declines fast, so maintenance capital expenditure is enormous relative to conventional.
   3. Never value it on a spot price. Use a normalised or strip-based deck and show sensitivity across a price range. A low P/E on peak prices is the classic cyclical value trap.
   4. Balance sheet and hedging: leverage against trough cash flow, not current cash flow, and what percentage of next year's production is already hedged and at what price.
   5. Then capital discipline, which has become the sector's main equity story: are they returning cash or reinvesting into growth at the top of the cycle? The market now pays a premium for discipline.
   6. And the long-run structural question on terminal value: what do you assume about demand in twenty years? That assumption, not this year's earnings, is what most energy disagreements are actually about.

   Where candidates lose it

   Valuing on trailing earnings at current prices. Cyclicals invert the normal multiple logic: high multiples at the trough and low multiples at the peak are the correct pattern, not an anomaly.

   Expect next

   • What price deck would you use?
   • How do you normalise a cyclical?
   • How does hedging change your view?

   Reported by candidates at Franklin Templeton (Oil and Gas, San Mateo, 2024); Perella Weinberg Partners (Investment Banking, Houston, 2025). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

8. 052What would you ask a CEO or CFO in a one-on-one meeting?Research processHardsuperdayMoody'sCorporate Finance · New York · 2018

   Say this

   Ask what you cannot get from the filings: intent, trade-offs and things they have decided not to do. Never ask for a number that is already disclosed.

   Then walk it

   1. Capital allocation intent: what returns do you require from an acquisition, and how does that compare to buying back your own stock at today's price? The answer reveals whether they think in returns or in empire.
   2. Trade-offs: if you had to choose between defending margin and defending share next year, which do you choose? This forces a real answer rather than a rehearsed one.
   3. Competitive reality: which competitor worries you most and why? CEOs answer this more candidly than they should, and it is genuinely informative.
   4. Leading indicators: what internal metric do you watch weekly that we do not see? Sometimes they name it, and now you know what to ask about every quarter.
   5. Then the question that surfaces the risk: what would have to go wrong for you to miss the plan? The hesitation matters as much as the answer.
   6. Then listen for what they avoid. In a thirty-minute meeting the topics they steer away from are usually the ones worth modelling.

   Where candidates lose it

   Asking questions answered in the last filing. Access is scarce and wasting it marks you as unprepared. Every question should be about judgement, intent or something not disclosed.

   Expect next

   • What if their answers contradicted the filings?
   • How much weight do you put on management meetings?
   • How would you verify what they told you?

   Reported by candidates at Moody's (Corporate Finance, New York, 2018). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

9. 053How would you check a company's claims independently?Research processHardtechnicalPoint72Investment Research · New York · 2026

   Say this

   Triangulate from sources the company does not control: customers, suppliers, competitors, ex-employees, regulatory filings, import and export data, job postings and pricing you can observe yourself.

   Then walk it

   1. Channel checks: talk to distributors, customers and competitors. If a company claims it is taking share, the people losing it will know.
   2. Alternative data: web traffic, app downloads, credit card panels, satellite imagery of car parks or storage tanks, shipping and customs data. Each is noisy alone but they corroborate.
   3. Public records nobody reads: regulatory filings in other jurisdictions, patent filings, litigation dockets, local permits, and the subsidiary accounts filed in countries with granular disclosure.
   4. Hiring data: job postings reveal expansion plans, technology stacks and which functions are growing, usually before anything is announced.
   5. Cross-check within the filings themselves: segment disclosures, the tax footnote and geographic breakdowns often disagree with the narrative in the press release.
   6. And the boundary that matters professionally: everything must be from public or properly sourced channels, with no material non-public information from an insider. In a hedge fund interview, saying that unprompted is the right instinct, because it is a compliance question as much as a research one.

   Where candidates lose it

   Not mentioning the compliance boundary. In a multi-manager or hedge fund interview, an enthusiastic answer about getting information from insiders is disqualifying. Name public sourcing and expert-network rules explicitly.

   Expect next

   • What are the compliance limits on expert calls?
   • How do you weigh noisy alternative data?
   • Give me an example where a check changed your view.

   Reported by candidates at Point72 (Investment Research, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

10. 061How would you analyse an insurance company?Sector: financialsHardtechnicalPerella Weinberg PartnersFinancial Institutions Group · New York · 2026

    Say this

    Two businesses in one: underwriting and investing. Judge underwriting on the combined ratio and investing on the return on the float. Value it on price to book against return on equity.

    Then walk it

    1. The combined ratio is the core underwriting metric: claims plus expenses divided by premiums. Below 100 means underwriting profit; above 100 means they lose money on insurance and rely on investment income.
    2. The float is the money collected as premiums before claims are paid. A company with a combined ratio under 100 is effectively being paid to hold other people's money, which is the whole Berkshire insight.
    3. Reserving is where the judgement and the risk sit. Reserves are estimates of future claims, so an under-reserved insurer looks profitable until it does not. Watch reserve development, which shows whether prior years' estimates proved too low.
    4. The investment portfolio matters for duration and credit risk. A long-tail insurer holds long assets, so it is highly rate-sensitive on both sides.
    5. Valuation is price to book against ROE, like a bank. Life insurers add embedded value and the new business margin, because the economics span decades.
    6. And know the cycle: insurance pricing is cyclical, hardening after large loss events and softening when capital floods in. Where you are in that cycle drives the sector's earnings more than any single company's skill.

    Where candidates lose it

    Treating it as a normal company with revenue and margin. The distinctive content is the combined ratio, the float and reserve adequacy. Missing reserving means missing the main way insurers surprise negatively.

    Expect next

    • What is reserve development and why does it matter?
    • How do rising rates affect an insurer?
    • How would you value a life insurer differently?

    Reported by candidates at Perella Weinberg Partners (Financial Institutions Group, New York, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.