Private Equity interview preparation

Questions

100

Traced to a firm

83

Firms

40

Updated

September 2026

Asked at

All firmsAdvent International6Apollo Global Management6Audax Group6Carlyle Group6EQT6Silver Lake6Vista Equity Partners6WPWarburg Pincus6HIH.I.G. Capital5Oaktree Capital Management5Platinum Equity5TPTPG5General Atlantic4AMAres Management3Blackstone3Clayton Dubilier and Rice3GSGuggenheim Securities3Insight Partners3Invesco3Lazard3Neuberger Berman3NUNuveen3TSTruist Securities3Bain Capital2HWHarris Williams2Kohlberg Kravis Roberts2Millennium Management2Moody's2Rothschild & Co2WBWilliam Blair2Bessemer Venture Partners1Citi1Evercore1FTFranklin Templeton1Houlihan Lokey1HPS Investment Partners1KKR1Mizuho1MSMorgan Stanley1Sycamore Partners1

Topic

All topicsLBO mechanics7Value creation5Returns2Fund economics9Investment judgement18Valuation6Firm knowledge2Credit and financing9Operations4Due diligence8Career and fit11Sector knowledge4Accounting2Deal structuring7Industry knowledge3Brainteasers3

Level

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Type

AnyTechnicalCaseFitMarket viewBrainteaser

1. 011Give me a purchase price for this company, given that the acquisition will generate an extra million of EBITDA.ValuationHardtechnicalAudax GroupPrivate Equity · Boston · 2021

   Say this

   Price the standalone business on its own multiple, then decide how much of the synergy you are willing to hand to the seller. In a buy-and-build you want to pay for the asset as it is and keep the synergy for yourself.

   Then walk it

   1. Start with standalone value: the target's own EBITDA at a multiple appropriate to its size and quality. Small bolt-ons trade well below platform multiples, often six to eight times against twelve for the platform.
   2. Then the synergy. That extra million of EBITDA, capitalised at your platform's exit multiple, is worth ten or twelve million of enterprise value to you.
   3. The negotiation is about how much of that you concede. A disciplined buyer pays little or nothing for synergies it creates; a competitive auction forces you to share some of it.
   4. So I would express it as a range: I would open at the standalone multiple, and my walk-away is the price at which the deal stops clearing my return hurdle after synergies.
   5. Then check the maths on the multiple arbitrage: buying at seven times and having it valued at twelve inside the platform creates value immediately, and that arbitrage is the core of any buy-and-build.
   6. And I would probability-weight the synergy. Cost synergies in a bolt-on are largely deliverable; revenue synergies rarely are, so I would underwrite only the former.

   Where candidates lose it

   Adding the synergy to the target's EBITDA and paying a full multiple on the combined figure. That hands the entire value creation to the seller before you have done any work, and it is the error the question is designed to find.

   Expect next

   • How much of the synergy would you pay away in a competitive auction?
   • What is multiple arbitrage?
   • How do you underwrite synergies in diligence?

   Reported by candidates at Audax Group (Private Equity, Boston, 2021). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

2. 036Why would a distressed company have a high equity value?ValuationHardtechnicalSilver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022

   Say this

   Because equity in a levered company is a call option on the enterprise. Even when the option is deep out of the money, it has time value, so the market prices the chance that the business recovers before the debt comes due.

   Then walk it

   1. Equity holders have limited liability and a residual claim, which is exactly the payoff of a call option struck at the face value of the debt.
   2. So when enterprise value is below debt, the intrinsic value is zero but the option still has time value. Volatility and time to maturity both increase it.
   3. That has a counterintuitive consequence: higher volatility increases equity value in a distressed company, which is why shareholders of a failing business rationally prefer risky strategies. The lenders bear the downside.
   4. There are also more mundane explanations: the market may disagree with the accounting distress, there may be a valuable non-operating asset, or a rescue refinancing may be expected.
   5. And sometimes it is just a small float with retail buyers and constrained short interest, which is a market microstructure story rather than a valuation one.
   6. The practical read for an investor: a distressed equity with meaningful market value is a levered bet on recovery, and it should be sized like an option, not like equity.

   Where candidates lose it

   Answering that the market is simply wrong. The option framing is what the question is testing, and the follow-on insight, that volatility helps distressed equity and hurts the lenders, is the part that shows genuine understanding.

   Expect next

   • So what does that imply about management's incentives in distress?
   • How does that affect the lenders?
   • How would you value the fulcrum security instead?

   Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

3. 037If a company raises $100 of debt to buy back $100 of shares, what happens to enterprise value and equity value?ValuationIntermediatetechnicalSilver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022

   Say this

   Enterprise value is unchanged, because the operating business did not change. Equity value falls by $100 and net debt rises by $100, so the two offset exactly.

   Then walk it

   1. Enterprise value is the value of the operating assets. Issuing debt and retiring stock rearranges the claims on those assets without touching them.
   2. Equity value falls by the $100 spent on the buyback. Net debt rises by the $100 raised. EV equals equity plus net debt, so it is unchanged.
   3. Share count falls, so value per share need not fall. If the buyback was executed at fair value, per-share value is unchanged; above fair value it destroys per-share value, below it creates it.
   4. The second-order effects are where it gets interesting: the tax shield on the new debt adds some value, while higher leverage increases distress risk and the cost of equity. In the Modigliani-Miller frame with taxes, the tax shield dominates at moderate leverage.
   5. EPS usually rises because the share count fell more than net income did, but as always that is arithmetic rather than value creation.
   6. So the clean answer: EV flat, equity down $100, net debt up $100, per-share value depends entirely on the price paid.

   Where candidates lose it

   Saying enterprise value falls because debt went up. Debt is part of the bridge, not part of enterprise value. This is the single most common enterprise value misunderstanding and it gets tested constantly.

   Expect next

   • What happens to value per share?
   • When is the buyback value-destructive?
   • What happens to WACC?

   Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

4. 038An oil company loses $40 million of market cap because of litigation and sells an asset to pay for it. Is the stock price drop justified?ValuationHardsuperdaySilver LakeTechnology, Media and Telecom · San Francisco · 2022

   Say this

   It depends on two things: whether the expected liability is genuinely $40 million on a present-value basis, and whether the asset was sold at fair value. If both hold, the drop is justified. If the asset went at a discount, the drop should be larger.

   Then walk it

   1. First, size the liability properly. A $40 million settlement paid today is worth $40 million, but a $40 million liability payable over ten years is worth considerably less. The market should discount it.
   2. Then, is the litigation over? If the settlement establishes precedent for further claims, the true liability exceeds the headline number and the drop should be bigger.
   3. Second, the asset sale. If the asset was sold at fair value, the transaction is value-neutral: cash in, asset out, liability settled. The whole $40 million is the litigation cost.
   4. But a forced seller rarely gets fair value. If the asset was worth $50 million and went for $40 million, the company destroyed another $10 million and the drop should be $50 million.
   5. Then the operating consequence: does losing that asset reduce future cash flows? If it was producing, you have lost the associated EBITDA and the drop should reflect the capitalised value of that, not just the cash.
   6. So my answer would be: $40 million is the floor. The justified drop is $40 million plus any discount on the forced sale, plus the capitalised value of the lost earnings, less any tax benefit on the settlement.

   Where candidates lose it

   Treating it as a simple one-for-one. The examinable content is the forced-sale discount and the lost earnings from the disposed asset. Both make the justified drop larger than the headline number.

   Expect next

   • What if the asset was non-producing?
   • How would you value the litigation tail risk?
   • Is the settlement tax deductible, and does that change your answer?

   Reported by candidates at Silver Lake (Technology, Media and Telecom, San Francisco, 2022). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

5. 081How would you value a business with negative EBITDA that a sponsor is still interested in?ValuationHardtechnicalPlatinum EquityGeneralist · Los Angeles · 2014

   Say this

   Value it on normalised or post-turnaround earnings, and cross-check against asset value. The question is not what it earns today but what it earns once the fixable problems are fixed, and what it is worth if they are not.

   Then walk it

   1. First diagnose why EBITDA is negative. Cyclical trough, a fixable cost problem, a loss-making division dragging a profitable core, or genuine structural decline. Only the first three are investable.
   2. Build normalised EBITDA: strip out the loss-making division, add back the cost the business should not be carrying, and assume mid-cycle volumes. That gives you an earnings base to apply a multiple to.
   3. Then value the downside on assets: what are the receivables, inventory, property and equipment worth in an orderly liquidation? For a turnaround, asset value is the floor and it is often what makes the deal safe.
   4. Then the cash requirement, which is the thing that kills turnarounds. How much cash does the business burn before it breaks even, and is that funded? A turnaround that runs out of money at month fourteen fails regardless of the thesis.
   5. Structure follows: often a low or nominal purchase price, sometimes the seller paying you to take it, with the real investment being the capital injected afterwards. Platinum Equity built a business on exactly this.
   6. So the honest framing: you are not buying earnings, you are buying an asset base and an option on a turnaround, and the price should reflect the probability that the turnaround works.

   Where candidates lose it

   Trying to apply a multiple to a negative number. The answer is normalised earnings plus an asset floor, and crucially the cash burn to breakeven, which is what determines whether the deal is survivable.

   Expect next

   • How much cash would you need to fund it?
   • When would you walk away from a turnaround?
   • How do you tell a cyclical trough from structural decline?

   Reported by candidates at Platinum Equity (Generalist, Los Angeles, 2014). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

6. 095What is the difference between enterprise value and equity value, and which do you negotiate?ValuationCorefirst roundTSTruist SecuritiesCorporate Banking · Atlanta · 2025WBWilliam BlairMergers and Acquisitions · London · 2026

   Say this

   Enterprise value is the price of the operating business; equity value is what the shareholders receive after settling everyone with a prior claim. In a deal you negotiate enterprise value, then bridge to the cash the seller actually gets.

   Then walk it

   1. Enterprise value is what the business itself is worth, independent of how it is financed. That is why it is quoted as a multiple of EBITDA and why it is the number in the headline.
   2. The bridge: less debt, plus cash, less preferred, less minority interest, less debt-like items such as pension deficits and unpaid capex creditors, gives equity value.
   3. The reason deals are negotiated on enterprise value is comparability. The seller's capital structure is irrelevant to what the business is worth, and it will be refinanced anyway.
   4. Where the money actually moves is the debt-like items list. Whether deferred revenue, accrued bonuses, customer deposits or lease liabilities count as debt is negotiated line by line, and each line changes the cash the seller receives.
   5. Then the working capital adjustment on top, comparing delivered working capital to the agreed peg.
   6. So the practical answer: you agree enterprise value first because it is the clean comparable number, and then the real negotiation happens in the bridge and the completion mechanics, which is where a few percent of deal value is routinely won or lost.

   Where candidates lose it

   Giving the textbook formula without saying that the fight is over the debt-like items in the bridge. That detail is what separates someone who has been on a live deal from someone who has read a guide.

   Expect next

   • Which items get argued over as debt-like?
   • How does the working capital peg interact with this?
   • How do you treat an underfunded pension?

   Reported by candidates at Truist Securities (Corporate Banking, Atlanta, 2025); William Blair (Mergers and Acquisitions, London, 2026). Source: Wall Street Oasis.

Firm tags come from public, anonymous candidate reports on Wall Street Oasis: strong signal, not sworn testimony. Firms are named as the places a question was reported, not as partners of Fin Maverick. Answers are written for this page to show how to think out loud; they are not scripts to recite.